Canada-United States Law Journal
Volume 43

Issue 1

Article 6

2019

A Guide to Emissions Trading under the Western Climate Initiative
Chios Carmody

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj
Part of the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Chios Carmody, A Guide to Emissions Trading under the Western Climate Initiative, 43 Can.-U.S. L.J. 148
(2019)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol43/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canada-United States Law Journal by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

A GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER THE
WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE
Chios Carmody †
ABSTRACT: This Guide presents an overview of the cap-and-trade system of carbon emission
trading created and adhered to under the Western Climate Initiative (WCI). The Guide is divided
into five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of a cap-and-trade system of emission
permits. Chapter 2 explains the constitutional background to cap-and-trade schemes in the
United States and Canada. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the linked system and a summary
of its principal features in each WCI cap-and-trade partner jurisdiction (California, Québec,
Ontario). Chapter 4 explains how emission allowances are traded under the WCI and includes
the results of a survey undertaken of emissions trading market participants. Chapter 5 provides
some concluding observations with respect to WCI cap-and-trade.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents .............................................................................................. 148
Chapter 1: Introduction ..................................................................................... 151
1.1 Purpose .................................................................................................. 151
1.2 Executive Summary ............................................................................... 151
1.3 How this Guide Works .......................................................................... 153
1.4 Addressing Climate Change .................................................................. 153
1.4.1 Background ................................................................................... 153
1.4.2 Cap-and-Trade Basics ................................................................... 156
1.4.3 Cap-and-Trade versus Carbon Tax................................................ 157
1.4.4 Criticisms of Cap-and-Trade ......................................................... 158
1.5 A Brief History of Cap-and-Trade ......................................................... 160
1.5.1 The EPA Acid Rain Program ........................................................ 160
1.5.2 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative....................................... 160
1.6 Comparative Experience ........................................................................ 161
1.6.1 The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)......... 162
1.6.2 China ............................................................................................. 162
†

Associate Professor & Canadian National Director, Canada-United States Law Institute,
Faculty of Law, Western University, London, Ontario N6A 3K7. Financial Support for the
research conducted in preparing this Guide was gratefully received from the Centre for
International Governance Innovation (CIGI). Professor Carmody gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of the following law students in the preparation of this Guide during Spring-Summer
2018 – at Western University Faculty of Law: Andrea Stuhec-Leonard (3L), Hannah Allen (3L),
David Fanjoy (2L), Anju Bansal (1L), So Eun (Kate) No (1L); at the Case Western Reserve
University School of Law: Morgan Helgreen (2L), Jennifer Wei (2L); at the University of
California Law School, Berkeley: Erik Kundu (2L). Professor Carmody would also like to thank
the following individuals at CIGI who made funding possible: Oonagh Fitzgerald (Director,
International Law Research Program), Hugo Perezcano Diaz (Deputy Director, International
Law Research Program), Maria Panezi (Research Fellow, International Law Research Program)
and Clodagh Manning (Program Assistant, International Law Research Program). The Guide is
current to December 2018.

A Guide to Emissions Trading under the WCI

149

Chapter 2: North America and the Western Climate Initiative ......................... 164
2.1 The Background to Cap-and-Trade in North America .......................... 164
2.1.1 The United States .......................................................................... 165
2.1.2 Canada ........................................................................................... 170
2.2 State and Provinces ................................................................................ 174
2.2.1 California....................................................................................... 174
2.2.2 Québec........................................................................................... 178
2.2.3 Ontario........................................................................................... 180
2.3 The WCI Cap-and-Trade System .......................................................... 185
2.3.1 The Western Climate Initiative ..................................................... 185
2.3.2 The Western Climate Initiative, Inc. (WCI, Inc.) .......................... 186
2.4 Harmonization ....................................................................................... 187
2.4.1 Program Design ............................................................................. 189
2.4.2 Linkage.......................................................................................... 196
2.4.2.1 California-Québec Linkage (2014) ....................................... 197
2.4.2.2 California-Québec-Ontario Linkage (2018).......................... 204
Chapter 3: WCI Cap-and-Trade: Overview and Cap ........................................ 207
3.1 System Overview ................................................................................... 207
3.2 Legislation ............................................................................................. 209
California .......................................................................................... 209
Québec .............................................................................................. 211
Ontario .............................................................................................. 212
3.3 The Cap.................................................................................................. 213
California .......................................................................................... 213
Québec .............................................................................................. 214
Ontario .............................................................................................. 215
3.4 Compliance Periods ............................................................................... 216
California .......................................................................................... 216
Québec .............................................................................................. 216
Ontario .............................................................................................. 217
3.5 Coverage ................................................................................................ 217
California .......................................................................................... 217
Québec .............................................................................................. 217
Ontario .............................................................................................. 218
3.5.1 Determining Emissions Attribution............................................... 218
California .......................................................................................... 218
Québec .............................................................................................. 219
Ontario .............................................................................................. 220
3.6 Emissions Allocation ............................................................................. 220
California .......................................................................................... 220
Québec .............................................................................................. 221
Ontario .............................................................................................. 222
3.6.1 Initiation of Activity ...................................................................... 222
California .......................................................................................... 222
Québec .............................................................................................. 223
Ontario .............................................................................................. 224

150

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43, 2019]

3.6.2 Permanent Cessation of Activity ................................................... 224
3.7 Flexibility............................................................................................... 225
3.7.1 Banking and Borrowing of Allowances ........................................ 225
3.7.2 Offsets and Credits ........................................................................ 225
California .......................................................................................... 226
Québec .............................................................................................. 226
Ontario .............................................................................................. 227
3.7.3 Price Management ......................................................................... 228
3.7.3.1 Price Containment Reserves ................................................. 228
3.7.3.2 Price Floors and Price Ceilings ............................................. 228
California .......................................................................................... 229
Québec .............................................................................................. 229
Ontario .............................................................................................. 230
3.8 Registration ............................................................................................ 230
California .......................................................................................... 231
Québec .............................................................................................. 231
Ontario .............................................................................................. 232
3.9 Reporting ............................................................................................... 233
California .......................................................................................... 233
Québec .............................................................................................. 234
Ontario .............................................................................................. 235
3.10 Verification .......................................................................................... 239
California .......................................................................................... 239
Québec .............................................................................................. 240
Ontario .............................................................................................. 240
3.11 Monitoring ........................................................................................... 241
3.12 Enforcement......................................................................................... 241
California .......................................................................................... 241
Québec .............................................................................................. 243
Ontario .............................................................................................. 244
Cap-and-Trade Litigation ............................................................................ 245
Chapter 4: WCI Cap-and-Trade: Trading ......................................................... 246
4.1 Nature of the WCI Markets ................................................................... 246
4.2 Account Types ....................................................................................... 247
California .......................................................................................... 247
Québec .............................................................................................. 249
Ontario .............................................................................................. 249
4.3 The Transfer Process ............................................................................. 249
4.4 Auctions ................................................................................................. 251
4.4.1 Format ........................................................................................... 251
4.4.2 Administration and Participant Application .................................. 251
4.4.3 Auction Results ............................................................................. 253
4.5 Reserve Sales ......................................................................................... 254
California .......................................................................................... 254
Québec .............................................................................................. 256
Ontario .............................................................................................. 257

A Guide to Emissions Trading under the WCI

151

4.6 Secondary Markets ................................................................................ 258
California .......................................................................................... 259
Québec .............................................................................................. 260
Ontario .............................................................................................. 260
4.7 Taxation ................................................................................................. 260
4.7.1 United States ................................................................................. 260
4.7.2 Canada ........................................................................................... 261
Legislative Scheme ........................................................................... 261
Value of Emissions Allowances ....................................................... 262
GST/HST Collection ........................................................................ 263
Tax Deductions ................................................................................. 264
Disposal of Emissions Allowances ................................................... 264
4.8 Survey .................................................................................................... 265
4.8.1 Survey Questions .......................................................................... 265
4.8.2 Summary of Survey Responses ..................................................... 269
Chapter 5: Conclusion ....................................................................................... 276

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose

This is a Guide to the legal framework for carbon emissions trading under the
cap-and-trade system created and adhered to under the Western Climate Initiative
(WCI). This Guide has three aims. First, provide an overview of the WCI cap-andtrade system for emissions trading by users of the system, potential industry
participants, state, provincial, and municipal governments, academic institutions
and members of civil society. Second, to foster learning among domestic and
international actors interested in North America’s collective response to climate
change and highlight one attempt to combat climate change through a subnational
cap-and-trade system on the continent. During the course of research for this
Guide, in 2018, the province of Ontario linked its WCI-inspired cap-and-trade
system with that of California and Québec and six months later delinked its system,
eventually terminating its participation altogether and announcing its intention to
withdraw from the WCI. Accordingly, a third purpose of this Guide is to serve as
an account of Ontario’s short-lived cap-and-trade system and its brief experience
with linkage.
1.2 Executive Summary

Cap-and-trade systems have been written about extensively, often from the
perspective of public participants in the system, that is, the governments involved.
By contrast the focus in this Guide is on private behavior, that is, the private actors
– cap-and-trade market experts, cap-and-trade participant entities, and cap-andtrade offset project developers and advisors – that are directly engaged in
emissions trading, that advise such actors, or that develop cap-and-trade offset
projects. The research focuses on this topic because it is less studied and because
it appears to be pivotal in debate about the pros and cons of emissions trading.
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At the outset we were interested in determining whether private actors believe
that emissions trading under the WCI is an efficient, market-based response to
climate change. Our general conclusions based on a very limited survey of private
actors is that they do concur in this belief. The two-step approach to regulatory
harmonization of emissions allowance markets pursued under the WCI – involving
separate phases of 1) program design and 2) linkage – is useful in allowing
jurisdictions to accommodate certain necessary political realities in establishing
emission trading markets. At the same time, the research reveals that linkage under
the WCI does not involve “plug-and-play” (i.e. unthinking transposition of capand-trade regulation from one jurisdiction to another). Instead, the introduction of
a cap-and-trade scheme in a jurisdiction requires indigenous commitment and an
authentic investment of administrative resources as well as difficult political
choices. Later, in the linkage phase, a common platform and continuing dialogue
between jurisdiction partners is necessary. Dialogue evidences how harmonization
and linkage are not static but rather dynamic and adaptive processes. The market(s)
created out of this process are also dynamic and require continuing intervention to
regulate and discipline.
Our specific findings with respect to private behavior are that:
1. Participants agree that WCI cap-and-trade is cost-effective and efficient.
WCI cap-and-trade allows entities to achieve environmental goals more
efficiently.
2.Currently, the market for carbon allowances under the WCI is small and
highly technical. It is dominated by a few major players, with the market for carbon
allowances being little understood beyond them. The technicality of the market
demands specialization, yet specialization limits participation to those who can
afford to do so.
3. The acquisition by Ontario market participants of some CAD $2.8 billion
worth of allowances in 2017-2018 at a time of free allowance distribution in the
province suggests that eligible participants were using the emissions trading
market under the WCI to hedge (i.e. to limit their exposure to future emission price
increases).
4. The possibility of excessive banking of emission credits and the threat of
market domination and manipulation in future cannot be discounted. Both of these
potential developments raise serious issues about the equity of the emissions
trading system and could make the public in WCI jurisdictions skeptical about the
use of market-based mechanisms to combat climate change in years to come. In
response to these concerns, regulators may consider developing a Code of Conduct
for WCI market participants and others going forward.
5. the survey conducted as part of this research involved only a very small set
of market participants. We contacted 61 participants. Only four agreed to respond.
The survey questions and results are contained in Chapter 4.8. We surmise that
events during the course of the research may have depressed sample size.
Consequently, the conclusions put forward here merit confirmation in a wider
sampling of market participants and others.
These findings lead us to conclude that the vital thread running through the
successful emission trading system is trust and fairness. There must be trust and
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fairness if emission trading schemes are to continue to function as intended.
However, those values can only be instilled if allowances are equitably allotted, if
ethical standards are adhered to in all phases of market operation, if continuing
efforts are made a transparency, and if public can be made to see tangible evidence
of fair and efficient markets contributing to climate change goals.
1.3 How this Guide Works

This Guide is divided into five chapters. This Introduction (Chapter 1)
provides readers with an overview of a cap-and-trade system of emission permits,
including how cap-and-trade systems work, a comparison of cap-and-trade
systems versus a carbon tax, and comparative experience with cap-and-trade
systems in the European Union (EU) and China.
Chapter 2 explains the constitutional background to cap-and-trade schemes
in the United States and Canada. It also provides a factual background to cap-andtrade legislation in three North American subnational jurisdictions (California,
Québec, Ontario), a description of the effort to harmonize cap-and-trade
legislation in each jurisdiction, and an overview of the framework for doing so
under the Western Climate Initiative and its corporate form, the Western Climate
Initiative, Inc. The chapter then examines the linkage of cap-and-trade systems in
California and Québec in 2014 and the addition (and subsequent withdrawal) of
Ontario to/from the link in 2018.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the linked system and a summary of its
principal features in each WCI cap-and-trade partner jurisdiction. The summary
includes the legislative basis for the cap-and-trade system in each partner
jurisdiction, the cap, compliance periods, emissions attribution, allowance
distribution, flexibility, the registration of participants, reporting, verification and
monitoring, and enforcement.
Chapter 4 explains how emission allowances are traded under the WCI. It
explains how emissions trading occurs in the WCI by means of auctions, reserve
sales and the secondary market, as well as issues of pricing and taxation. The
chapter also contains a summary of comments culled from a survey of market
participants, regulators and members of civil society as to the effectiveness of the
WCI cap-and-trade system.
Chapter 5 provides some concluding observations with respect to WCI capand-trade.
1.4 Addressing Climate Change
1.4.1 Background

Climate change is defined as “a change in the statistical distribution of weather
patterns when that change lasts for an extended period of time”. 1 Climate change
is thought to be caused by a number of factors including biodegradation, variations
in solar radiation and seismic and volcanic activity. In recent decades, consensus
opinion has centered on human activity through carbon emissions of greenhouse
1

Joshua Busby, Comment: Warming World, 97, FOREIGN
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/warming-world.

AFF.

(2018),
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gases (GHG) as a primary cause of continuing climate change, often termed
“global warming”. 2 One leading school of thought maintains that without
immediate action to address climate change and global warming, the earth could
experience massive loss of vegetation, species habitat and biodiversity. In turn,
these changes could trigger massive flows of human migration, competition for
remaining resources and geopolitical instability. 3
Both the United States and Canada have historically played leading roles in
efforts at a global level to address climate change and have cooperated actively
together in the field of international environmental protection. 4 Both countries are
signatories to numerous international environmental agreements and subscribe to
globally endorsed environmental principles. 5 Both countries have also signed the
2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change 6 negotiated within the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change 7 in which they commit to setting
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for GHG emission reductions. The
U.S. initially set an NDC to reduce its emissions by 26-28% below 2005 levels by

2

“ . . . there is a strong, credible body of evidence, based on multiple lines of research,
documenting that climate is changing and that these changes are in large part caused by human
activities NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADVANCING THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE
AMERICAS CLIMATE CHOICES: PANEL ON ADVANCING THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2010) at
1.
3 “Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting
changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive
and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems” (italics added); “A large fraction of species
faces increased extinction risk due to climate change during and beyond the 21st century,
especially as climate change interacts with other stressors”: United Nations Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS(2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_
SPM.pdf. at 8, 13.
4 Close U.S.-Canada environmental cooperation stems from the fact of a shared border.
The U.S.-Canada border includes four of the five Great Lakes, many rivers and lakes, major
airsheds, and migratory routes for wildlife species. In addition, there are many U.S. Native
American Tribes and Canadian First Nations residents whose culture spans the border. The U.S.
EPA notes that the two federal governments have implemented over 40 international agreements
for the management and protection of environmental quality and ecosystems in the border area
and there are over 100 additional such agreements between U.S. states and Canadian provinces.
The two countries also share policies, programs, and goals to prevent and control pollution and
to ensure sound policies and practices to protect and restore the many shared ecosystems.
Historic bilateral environmental initiatives include the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the
Trail Smelter Arbitration of 1940, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905.
5 Among these principles are those identified in Agenda 21: Programme of Action for
Sustainable Development; the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN, 1992,
UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874 (1992); and the Statement of Principles for the
Sustainable Management of Forests, UN, 1992, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III). These were
adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992.
6 Paris Agreement, Dec. 13, 2015, U.N Registration No. 54113.
7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Sept. 8, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S
107.
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2025. 8 Canada set an NDC to reduce emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by
2030. 9
In 2017, the U.S. announced that it would cease participation in the Paris
Agreement and withdraw from the agreement at the earliest possible withdrawal
date, likely in late 2020/early 2021. The announcement was prompted by concern
over the Paris Agreement’s impact on U.S. businesses and workers as well as the
perception that the treaty would not solve climate change and did not impose
uniform obligations on all countries.
Action on climate change at the federal level in both countries has been
paralleled by actions at the subnational level by states, provinces, municipalities,
and indigenous groups. In California a history of intensive resource extraction,
rapid urbanization and the loss of wildlife habitat prompted the state government
to act promptly in the 1960s to stem environmental degradation. In 1965 California
became the first U.S. jurisdiction to regulate vehicle exhaust. 10 Two years later,
the newly formed California Air Resources Board (CARB) set the U.S.’s first air
quality standards. 11 In subsequent decades these initiatives were accompanied a
number of other efforts to protect the environment, making California an
acknowledged worldwide leader in environmental standard-setting. 12
In pursuit of its environmental goals, in 2007, California – along with Arizona,
New Mexico, Oregon and Washington State – created the Western Climate
Initiative (WCI) to evaluate and implement ways to reduce their states’ GHG
emissions and achieve related co-benefits. The WCI was expanded in 2008 to
include two more U.S. states (Montana, Utah) and four Canadian provinces
(British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Québec). Together the 11 jurisdictions
developed a Design document, released in 2010, that furnishes a template for a
comprehensive strategy to reduce regional GHG emissions. The 2010 Design
document foresaw the creation of cap-and-trade mechanisms on a jurisdiction-byjurisdiction basis, followed by the possibility of jurisdictional linkage.
The jurisdictions involved in the WCI are all subnational jurisdictions,
meaning that, as a formal matter, they have no international personality, and
conversely, no ability to conclude binding agreements under international law. As
a result, three WCI jurisdictions (British Columbia, California, Québec) created
the Western Climate Initiative Inc., a non-profit corporation established under
Delaware law, in 2011 to provide technical and scientific advisory services to U.S.
states and Canadian provinces in the development and implementation of GHG
8 Han Chen, THE ROAD FROM PARIS: THE UNITED STATES PROGRESS TOWARD ITS CLIMATE
PLEDGE (2017), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/paris-climate-conference-US-IB.pdf.
9 Canada, CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY INDICATORS: PROGRESS TOWARDS
CANADA’S
GREENHOUSE
GAS
EMISSIONS
REDUCTION
TARGET,
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/documents/pdf/cesindicators/progress-towardscanada-greenhouse-gas-reduction-target/2019/progress-towards-ghg-emissions-target-en.pdf
(last visited 2018).
10 Charles W Schmidt, “Environment: California Out in Front” (2007) 115:3 Environmental
Health Perspectives at A146 [Schmidt 2007].
11 For total suspended particulates, photochemical oxidants, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
dioxide, and other pollutants, see: Ellyn Adrienne Hershman, “California Legislation on Air
Containment Emissions from Stationary Sources” (1970) 58:6 Cal L Rev 1474 at 1486-1488.
12 Schmidt 2007, supra note 10, at A146.

156

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43, 2019]

emissions trading programs. Subsequently, with WCI input, two WCI jurisdictions
– California and Québec – developed their own cap-and-trade programs in close
alignment, a development which allowed them to fully link their programs with
each other in 2014. 13 Ontario joined the link in early 2018. It subsequently
withdrew six months later.
1.4.2 Cap-and-Trade Basics

For some time it has been known that GHG emissions are a large contributor
to climate change, and conversely, that reducing GHG emissions can be a
significant factor in mitigating the effects of climate change. For this reason, a
number of advocates have promoted the idea of a cap-and-trade system for GHG
emission credits. 14
Cap-and-trade is a market-based approach to regulating and reducing GHG
emissions and mitigating climate change. 15 Each covered emitter is assigned a
specific emission limit, which it can meet by the receipt of emission allowances,
offset activities, market purchases, or any combination of these. The total
emissions of all emitters is subject to a ‘cap’, which under a cap-and-trade program
sets a numeric ceiling on GHG emissions in a given jurisdiction while providing
emissions allowances to participating entities in a quantity consistent with the
cap. 16 Over time the cap is gradually lowered, giving GHG emitters an incentive
to reduce emissions through the establishment of a market-based price on GHG
emissions measured per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (tonne/CO2e). 17 By
means of an established emissions trading market, emitters are able to buy or sell
additional allowances with other cap-and-trade participants. 18 The market provides
an incentive to participants to reduce GHG emissions while affording businesses
flexibility in terms of how they meet the cap in a given compliance period. 19
13 Both California and Québec’s cap-and-trade programs began operating within their
respective jurisdictions in 2013 after requiring reporting in 2012. For California background
information, see,: OVERVIEW OF ARB Emissions Trading Program, (2015),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/cap_trade_overview.pdf..
For
Québec
background information, see,: Ministry of Sustainable Development, the Environment and the
Fight Against Climate Change, HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: QUÉBEC CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM FOR
GREENHOUSE
GAS
EMISSION
ALLOWANCES
(C&T),
http://www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/documents-spede/historicaloverview.pdf.
14 For early experience with cap-and-trade programs in the U.S., see,: ADP Ellerman, L
Joskow & D Harrison, Jr, Emissions Trading in the U.S. (2003). Emissions Trading in the U.S.
– Experience, Lessons, and Considerations for Greenhouse Gasses, Pew Center on Global
Climate Change (2013) (prepared by A. D. Ellerman et al.)
15 Selina Lee-Andersen, CLIMATE CHANGE ESSENTIALS: NAVIGATING CARBON PRICING
MECHANISMS AND GUIDE TO CANADIAN FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
(2018),
https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/articles/climate-change-essentials-navigatingcarbon-pricing-mechanisms-and-guide-canadian-federal-and-provincial-regulatory-framework
(last visited 2018).
16 Shaun Fluker & Salimah Janmohamed, “Who Regulates Trading in the Carbon Market?”
(2014) 26:83 Journal of Environmental Law and Practice at 6.
17 Lee-Andersen 2018, supra note 15, at 15.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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The principal innovation of a cap-and-trade program is its use of the power of
the market to achieve environmental goals. Traditionally, environmental
regulation has taken place by “command-and-control” methods in which
governments establish environmental standards, permit certain behavior, assign
liability and penalties for noncompliance, and give regulators wide powers to
authorize or prohibit activities or pollution. While these methods have made
progress in reducing pollution, “command-and-control” approaches have been
criticized for not achieving various legislative mandates and deadlines in a timely
manner and for being economically inefficient and difficult to enforce. 20 By
comparison, in the case of cap-and-trade programs, governments create the
programs but allow market forces a degree of involvement in promoting
“efficient” pollution and the attainment of environmental targets. In this way,
freedom and flexibility are introduced in the regulatory scheme.
An additional benefit of a cap-and-trade system is that the sale of allowances
by governments generates funds that are typically reinvested in pollution
abatement and clean technology. In many instances funds are also devoted to
related innovation and job creation. Consequently, cap-and-trade helps to promote
community goals of economic growth at the same time as it generates a cleaner,
more sustainable environment.
1.4.3 Cap-and-Trade versus Carbon Tax

Governments often weigh two policy instruments to price carbon in their
efforts to combat climate change:
1) a carbon tax
2) a cap-and-trade scheme.
Both a carbon tax and cap-and-trade are market-based instruments designed
to internalize the cost of negative environmental effects. However, they display
some important differences.
In the case of a carbon tax the policy tool is a tax – a fiscal increment – that
increases the price of inputs requiring the use of fossil fuels. The aim of a carbon
tax is to discourage fossil fuel emissions. By raising prices and effectively
decreasing demand for those commodities, the tax creates an incentive to reduce
fossil fuel use and stimulates demand for energy-efficient products. The tax rate
must be set at an optimal level. If the tax is too low, fossil fuel users may continue
to pollute despite the cost of the tax. If the tax is too high, fossil fuel users may
suffer significant economic losses which could have wider economic
repercussions.
A carbon tax is often described as a ‘simpler’ method for GHG reduction than
cap-and-trade because the legal relationship put in place by the tax exists only
between the government and the taxpayer. A carbon tax is therefore faster and
simpler to implement since government can take advantage of existing
administrative frameworks of tax collection. Businesses will know beforehand the
costs of the tax that they are expected to pay.
20

F. P. SULLIVAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 2-3, 22ND ED. (2014).
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With a cap-and-trade program, by comparison, the policy tool at work is a
limit on emissions. The limit is combined with the possibility of participants
trading emission allowances among themselves to achieve some ‘optimal’ level of
pollution. In the process, both a regulator and a market for trading emissions must
be created.
A cap-and-trade program provides certainty to achieve GHG reduction goals
because it enforces a cap of emissions. Nevertheless, there can be uncertainty as
to the amount of cost of the scheme depending on the spot price for emission
credits in the market. In some jurisdictions like California cost uncertainty is
mitigated with a hybrid cap-and-trade system featuring both a price floor and a
‘soft’ price ceiling. These indicators serve as benchmarks that allow entities
subject to the cap-and-trade regulation to buy allowances so they can cover their
emissions within certain specified costs. Contemporary cap-and-trade systems also
possess features like the borrowing and banking of credits as well as extended
compliance periods that can allow greater fine-tuning by participants and
regulators of their activities over time.
1.4.4 Criticisms of Cap-and-Trade

Both carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programs are questioned by those who
believe that there is little demonstrable link between human activity and climate
change. However, cap-and-trade programs come under particular scrutiny for the
following reasons:
Complexity
Cap-and-trade programs are criticized due to their relative complexity. A capand-trade program will require the establishment of baselines for emission
reduction targets and the distribution of allowances. 21 Developing the legislative
and administrative framework for the system can be time-consuming. 22 Effort is
also required to create the necessary regulations and to initiate an emissions trading
market. 23
Cost Uncertainty
Because cap-and-trade programs establish a ‘cap’ – or limit – on emissions,
there is a theoretic guarantee that the desired reductions in emissions will follow.
This guarantee is referred to as “benefit certainty”. 24 However, critics of cap-andtrade emphasize that benefit certainty comes at a cost, specifically that of cost
uncertainty. 25 When compared to programs that set penalties for emissions,
systems that create a free market and emissions caps have relatively less control
21 Reuven Avi-Yonah & David Uhlmann, “Combating Global Climate Change: Why a
Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap-and-trade” (2009) 28:1 Stan
Envtl LJ 3 at 6 [Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann 2009].
22 Id.
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www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=bf03807a-ad55-cf29-d45f4568be4a735b.
25 Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann 2009, supra note 21, at 42-44.
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over the overall cost of the system to the economy, individual polluters, and trade.
If caps are lowered without a corresponding lowering of the price of allowances,
the cost of compliance with a cap-and-trade program could be a burden to
participants in the program. Standard emissions reductions pursued over time
could either inflate the overall cost of the scheme or generate political pressure to
raise the emissions cap, or both.
Limited Experience
Cap-and-trade programs regulating GHG emissions are relatively new
compared to other regulatory schemes. Critics of cap-and-trade therefore claim
that there is insufficient evidence for the effectiveness of such programs. Even
those who recognize that some cap-and-trade programs have been successful in
the past are skeptical about extrapolating from this experience to draw conclusions
regarding the effectiveness of cap-and-trade programs generally. 26 However, some
commentators have suggested that there is no room for further delay in
implementing cap-and-trade systems given the targeted effectiveness they offer in
reducing GHG and the pressing need to protect local and global environments. 27
Reduced Incentives to Adopt Sustainable Practices
One criticism of cap-and-trade programs is that they do not encourage
research or the deployment of new sustainable technologies. 28 Since the cost of
emitting GHG under a cap-and-trade program is unpredictable, participants may
be less inclined to invest in developing more sustainable means of conducting their
activities in parallel with the program. It has also been suggested that cap-andtrade programs do not send a clear message to polluters that GHG emissions are
costly, both for polluters and for society in general. 29 Instead, it is sometimes
suggested that cap-and-trade programs send the message that pollution is
permissible so long as one pays for it. The conceptual difference between a penalty
for pollution and a price for a right to pollute discourages polluters that can
otherwise afford to pay for allowances (and arguably emit the most) so that they
can continue acting in unsustainable ways. 30
Potential Abuse
The inherent complexity of cap-and-trade programs and the lack of incentives
to otherwise reduce emissions can render a cap-and-trade program prone to
potential abuse. 31 Depending on how emissions are accounted for, emission
allowances can be distributed in an inequitable manner. For example, major
polluters which can afford to purchase emission allocations may receive and hold
a disproportionate amount of allowances and may use political influence to acquire
allowances at low or no cost. 32 Further, if the regulatory mechanism is prone to
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(2008) 32 Harv Envtl L Rev 293 at 299 [Stavins 2008].
29 Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann 2009, supra note 21, at 43.
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favoritism, then polluters may be able to improperly influence the allocation of
allowances. 33
Market manipulation is another concern. The reliance of cap-and-trade
programs on market trading means that market actors may attempt to ‘stack’ the
market by intervening in certain ways or at certain times for undue benefit. This
concern points to the need for elaborate frameworks of reporting, verification and
monitoring, together with enforcement procedures, as part of cap-and-trade
programs to ensure that markets remain fair for all participants.
1.5 A Brief History of Cap-and-Trade
1.5.1 The EPA Acid Rain Program

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Acid Rain Program was
the first national cap-and-trade program established in the United States and
remains in existence today. 34 The Program’s goal is to reduce emissions of sulfur
dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOX) – the primary sources of acid rain –
generated by the energy sector.
Under the Program the EPA places a cap on sulfur dioxide emissions by power
plants and allocates emission allowances based on historic fuel consumption and
emission rates specific to each power plant. 35 Allowances can be bought, banked,
or sold on the emissions market in the U.S. energy sector sources (which must
participate) and other private organizations (whose participation is voluntary)
active in the market. 36
Under the Program each power plant monitors its emissions using an approved
monitoring method and reports its emissions on a quarterly basis to the EPA, which
tracks the data. 37 The EPA regulates compliance and assigns penalties for
noncompliance. 38
The Acid Rain Program has been highly successful. Between 1990 and 2015,
sulfur dioxide and nitric oxide emissions were reduced by 89% and 76%
respectively. 39 A study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology notes that the
Program’s positive environmental outcomes are attributable to “the more
fundamental characteristics of the program, namely, a flexible, decentralized,
property rights system.” 40
1.5.2 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was established among
several U.S. states in 2005 and held its first emissions auction in 2008. The
33
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initiative’s current participants are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 41 The
Program has enjoyed considerable success to date and by 2020 aims to reduce
carbon emissions of covered industries by 45% from 2005 base levels. 42 Each
participating state has a further jurisdiction-specific goal of reducing emissions by
an additional 30% by 2030. 43
The RGGI currently regulates fossil fuel power plants with a capacity of 25
MW or more. 44 Any power plant operating at or above this capacity must obtain
allowances for its CO2 emissions in participating jurisdictions. RGGIadministered auctions of emissions allowances take place four times yearly. 45 To
ensure that the auctions run smoothly, a ‘price floor’ is maintained and a ‘cost
containment reserve’ is triggered if the trading price exceeds specified levels. 46
The RGGI establishes three-year compliance periods. 47 At the end of each
period, covered entities must submit one allowance for each ton of carbon
generated during the three-year period. Participants are allowed to bank
allowances for future use and may meet up to 3.3% of their compliance obligations
by purchasing offsets. 48
Proceeds from auctions held under the RGGI are returned to states and
invested in consumer and environmental programs related to energy efficiency,
renewable energy, direct energy bill assistance, and other GHG reduction
initiatives. 49
1.6 Comparative Experience

Cap-and-trade systems are not unique to North America. Currently, 45
national and 25 subnational jurisdictions have policies that use carbon pricing in
the form of either carbon taxes or emissions trading schemes. 50 The following is a
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survey of comparative experience with cap-and-trade systems in the European
Union (EU) and China.
1.6.1 The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)

The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) began in 2005 and currently
regulates the world’s largest carbon market. 51 It operates in the 28 EU member
states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 52 In total, approximately 45%
of the EU’s GHG emissions are covered by the EU ETS. 53
The EU ETS applies to some 11,000 installations in the power generation,
manufacturing industry and airline sectors. 54 The scheme aims to reduce carbon
dioxide, nitrous oxide (N20) and perfluorocarbon (PFCs) emissions, with
emissions of these types in 2030 projected to be 43% lower than in 2005. 55
The EU ETS has operated in three phases. In Phase One (2005-2007) of the
program the scheme did not generate the expected reduction in emissions because
the number of allowances, which was based on the estimated needs of emitters,
was excessive. 56 As a result, the price of allowances fell to zero in 2007. 57 In Phase
Two (2008-2012) an economic downturn in Europe depressed emissions as well
as the demand for allowances. 58 Currently, in Phase Three (2013-2020) major
reforms have been carried out. An EU-wide cap on emissions amounting to a
reduction of 1.74% per year has been introduced and there has been a progressive
shift towards the auctioning of allowances in place of cost-free allocation. 59 These
reforms have meant that businesses have had to buy an increasing proportion of
their allowances through auctions.
The legislative framework of the EU ETS for Phase Four (2020-2030) has
been revised to harmonize the system with the EU’s 2030 climate and energy
policy framework and to support the EU’s contribution to the 2015 Paris
Agreement. The revision focuses on strengthening the EU ETS by increasing the
pace of annual reductions in allowances to 2.2% as of 2021 and associated
reduction mechanisms; continuing the free allocation of allowances in a manner
that is focused and reflects technological progress; and providing interim help to
industry to transition to a low carbon future through a number of funding
mechanisms. 60
1.6.2 China

China’s explosive economic growth in the last few decades has taken a
substantial toll on its environment, particularly in major Chinese cities where air
51 European Union, EU EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM (EU ETS) CLIMATE ACTION EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2017), https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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60 Id.
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and water pollution are a significant problem. China is now the world’s largest
GHG emitter. 61
China’s Nationally Determined Contribution to the 2015 Paris Agreement
contains a commitment to peak CO2 emissions by 2030 at the latest, lowering the
carbon intensity of GDP by 60%–65% below 2005 levels by 2030, increasing the
share of non-fossil energy carriers of the total primary energy supply to around
20% by that time, and increasing its forest stock volume by 4.5 billion cubic meters
compared to 2005 levels. 62 In connection with these reductions China announced
in 2017 the launching of a national cap-and-trade system involving six of its largest
carbon-emitting industrial sectors, beginning with coal-fired power generation. 63
This announcement follows the success of earlier pilot municipal cap-andtrade programs in Beijing, Chongqing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hubei, Shanghai,
Shenzhen and Tianjin, which have now been folded into the national system. 64 The
eight municipal pilot programs, which ran from 2013-2017, allowed for the trading
of 40.24 million metric tonnes of carbon and saw a reduction of 38.6% in carbon
intensity. 65 These municipal programs only permitted allowances and offsets to be
traded on local emissions exchanges. 66 Localization meant that there were eight
different carbon prices depending on the specific pilot. Although there were policy
differences between the pilots due to the diversity of China’s industrial
development, all of the schemes have been successful in subjecting companies
within their territorial limits to annual MRV (Monitoring, Reporting, Verification)
processes. Compliance with the pilot programs is regarded as fairly successful,
although this view is tempered by reports of possible over-allocation of allowances
by municipal officials designed to ward off industrial opposition to the pilots. 67
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China formally launched its own national emissions trading market in
December 2017. 68 In the first phase of the national program only coal-fired power
generation was covered. Nevertheless, it is believed that this limited coverage will
still have major climate benefits since China’s power sector generates 65% of its
electricity from coal and accounts for more than 3.5 gigatonnes of carbon
emissions annually. 69 The cap introduced is almost twice as intense as that under
the EU ETS. 70 Due to the novelty of the program, little further information is
available at present.

CHAPTER 2: NORTH AMERICA AND THE WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE
This Chapter explains the background to the WCI cap-and-trade program in
the United States and Canada. It also provides the background to cap-and-trade
legislation in three North American subnational jurisdictions – California, Québec
and Ontario – and an overview of the framework for harmonizing such legislation
under the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and the Western Climate Initiative,
Inc. (WCI, Inc.). The chapter then examines the linkage of cap-and-trade programs
in California and Québec in 2014 and the addition and withdrawal of Ontario from
the link in 2018.
During the course of preparing this Guide, many conditions pertaining to capand-trade programming under the WCI were in a state of flux. The conditions were
brought about by a confluence of domestic and international events. It is therefore
necessary to examine several issues as background to fully understand the
operation of cap-and-trade under the WCI.
The withdrawal of Ontario from its link with California and Québec’s capand-trade programs in July 2018 occurred late in the preparation of this Guide. The
Guide is therefore drafted, generally speaking, with references to Ontario’s
participation phrased in the past tense. Any mentions of its participation in the
present tense should be understood as referencing conditions prevailing only until
the date of Ontario’s cancellation of its cap-and- trade program on July 3, 2018
although some limited information has been included to update this Guide to the
end of 2018.
2.1 The Background to Cap-and-Trade in North America

Until July 2018 the cap-and-trade program implemented under the WCI was
maintained by three jurisdictions that are subnational units of two countries, the
68 Environmental Defense Fund, THE PROGRESS OF CHINA’S CARBON MARKET(2018),
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/documents/The_Progress_of_Chinas_Carbon_Market_
Development_English_Version.pdf..
69 Qian Guoqiang & Huang Xiaochen, China’s National Carbon Market and the Roadmap
Ahead(2018), https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/?option=com_attach&task=download&id=547.
Found in the International Carbon Action Partnership Status Report 2018.
70 China undertakes its commitments on climate change in terms of emissions intensity
instead of the absolute amount of emissions. This is because of persistent uncertainty over the
growth of its economy and GHG emissions and the fact that official emissions data are far from
complete: Shaozhou Qi & Si Cheng, China’s national emissions trading scheme: integrating
cap, coverage and allocation, 18 CLIMATE POLICY45–59 (2018).
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United States and Canada. As a result, cap-and-trade implementation and
operation under the WCI needs to take account of certain legal and policy
considerations prevailing in each country.
The constitutions of the United States and Canada have little to say expressly
on the subject of the environment. The ‘environment’ as a distinct subject of
regulation was unknown in early constitutional thinking in both countries,
although indigenous environmental knowledge has a long history and specific
topics that can be assimilated into modern environmental awareness were dealt
with and referenced in the foundational instruments, statutes and judicial opinions
of each country. 71 The constitutional framework is supplemented by the shared
legal heritage of both countries rooted largely in the common law. 72
2.1.1 The United States

In the United States the Constitution is the primary document governing the
distribution of powers between the federal government and the states. Under the
Tenth Amendment any power not delegated to the Congress is reserved to the
states. 73 At the same time, because environmental awareness evolved
incrementally in U.S. history, different aspects of environmental protection have
been the subject of regulation by both levels of government. Dual regulation has
given rise to the possibility of jurisdictional overlap, competition and the need for
coordination.
U.S. federal environmental law applies to broad subjects of coverage such as
natural resource development and protection and environmental aspects of air,
water, land, chemical regulation as well as general environmental policy. “Major
federal environmental statutes define most of the substantial compliance
obligations in U.S. law.” 74 In addition, “other components of U.S. environmental
law supplement or complement standards established by federal environmental
statutes” 75, such as administrative regulations specifying the regulatory obligations
of certain industries.
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Many federal statutes such as the Clean Air Act 76 or the Clean Water Act 77
create “federal/state regulatory programs through which the states are given an
opportunity to enact and enforce laws which meet federal criteria to achieve certain
regulatory objectives.” 78 In most instances, states have taken the opportunity to do
so and have enacted corresponding laws and regulations at the state level. 79 For
this reason, “states are generally the primary permitting and enforcing authority in
U.S. environmental law and are subject to federal intervention only if they do not
enforce effectively or rigorously enough.” 80
Moreover, “[s]tates are given considerable leeway to follow state-level
enforcement interpretations that may not be fully consistent with those applied at
the federal level.” 81 In most instances “states are not precluded from enforcing
criteria more stringent than federal laws.” 82 For this reason, “the laws and
interpretations used to apply and enforce federal environmental laws may vary
considerably from state to state.” 83
In addition, “many U.S. states provide their citizens and their environment
with protection beyond that generally available under federal statutes.” 84 Such
legislation includes toxic waste minimization laws, environmental disclosure law,
property transfer law, product stewardship laws, and laws regulating GHG
emissions. 85 For instance, “[i]n 2006 California became the first U.S. state to enact
a comprehensive law requiring mandatory industrywide GHG reductions”. 86 Other
state-led environmental initiatives include measures to encourage recycling and
groundwater protection laws. 87
Nevertheless, the federal government retains substantial powers within the
U.S. federal structure that effectively limit state behavior. The Preemption Clause,
found in Art. VI of the U.S. Constitution, provides that in a situation where the
federal and state governments pass opposing regulations, federal regulation will
preempt state regulation. 88 Any state legislation that “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”
has the potential to be struck down, although in recent decades the doctrine of
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“cooperative federalism” in U.S. environmental law has tended to temper such
outcomes. 89
Another federal power with the ability to constrain state action is the federal
government’s power in foreign relations. Article I, Section 10 of the U.S.
Constitution forbids states from entering into treaties with foreign governments. 90
This prohibition is a significant limit on states’ abilities to conclude binding
agreements with foreign jurisdictions concerning environmental protection.
Finally, the federal commerce power in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the
Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce. 91 Broad interpretation of this power by the courts means that state
regulation must be coordinated with the federal commerce power. “It is well
settled that a state regulation validly based on police powers does not
impermissibly burden interstate commerce if the regulation does not discriminate
against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt the uniformity of commerce.” 92
Still, “there have been numerous environmental cases involving the application of
the Commerce Clause as a limit on state power.” 93
Limitations aside, in the last few decades there has also been an emphasis in
both U.S. federal and state regulatory jurisdiction on “reinventing” environmental
regulations and develop more effective legislative schemes. Traditional
“command and control” systems have been widely criticized for not achieving
various legislative mandates and deadlines quickly enough or in an efficient
manner. 94 Consequently, in recent years “the U.S. federal government has adopted
various economic instruments, such as market-based trading programs for
emission of air pollutants and wastewater constituents, in order to introduce more
flexibility, efficiency and cost-effectiveness in pollution control.” 95 These
instruments operate as incentives to polluters to determine the most efficient and
cost-effective means for achieving environmental targets, often incorporating
“polluter pay” or “user pay” principles. 96
Many U.S. states have also tried to implement new programs “to gain more
control over their environmental affairs and increasingly are being viewed as
“laboratories” for the development of innovative approaches to environmental
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regulation.” 97 The sum of these changes has meant a more flexible and diverse
regulatory landscape in U.S. environmental law.
Notwithstanding this pluralism, the overarching enforcement responsibility
for most of the U.S.’s federal environmental laws remains with the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 98 The EPA was established in 1970 to
consolidate a variety of federal research, monitoring, standard-setting and
enforcement activities for the purposes of environmental protection. The EPA has
had a substantial role in the effort to abate aerial pollution over several decades.
For instance, in 1970 the U.S. Clean Air Act was passed, regulating air emissions
and giving the EPA the power to set air quality standards. 99 Amendments to the
Clean Air Act in 1977 and 1990 raised the standards in order to counter air-borne
problems like acid rain and ozone depletion. 100 In 1999 the EPA set new emissions
standards for automobiles. 101 In 2004 the EPA informed the governors of 31 states
that the air pollution in their states did not meet federal health standards and
ordered them to develop new pollution controls to clean up their air. 102 Later, in
2012 the EPA helped finalize still more stringent automobile fuel efficiency
standards. 103
While the U.S. State Department generally retains the lead in developing and
projecting U.S. international climate policy, the EPA has also played a major role
in international efforts to protect the global environment. Much of this effort has
been in relation to the aerial environment, particularly at a time of growing concern
about ozone depletion. For example, in 1987 the U.S. was one of 24 countries to
ratify the Montreal Protocol, an agreement to phase out production of
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). 104 In 1992 EPA officials participated in the U.S.
delegation to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro that brought together 150 nations to set global
standards for protecting the earth against global warming and other environmental
threats. Out of this effort in 1997 38 industrialized nations signed the Kyoto
Protocol wherein they agreed to reduce their GHG emissions by about 5% over 15
years. 105 As part of this commitment the U.S., which was at that time the world’s
97
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largest GHG emitter country, agreed to reduce its emissions by 7%. However, in
2001 the U.S. refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol due to the agreement’s limited
coverage and the projected expense to U.S. businesses.
Nevertheless, concern about global warming continued to grow. In 2014 the
UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a report
predicting dire consequences if the world’s leading economies did not start to
reduce GHG emissions immediately. 106 This forecast helped to secure the
conclusion of the Paris Agreement in 2015.
As mentioned, the Paris Agreement is an international treaty that has been
ratified by the United States, Canada and many other countries. The Agreement
recognizes the imperative of “an effective and progressive response” to the “urgent
threat of climate change.” It urges countries to engage in a global effort to restrict
the increase in the global average temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.
An important premise underlying the Paris Agreement is that global warming is
largely driven by GHG emissions. Therefore, each country is called upon to make
a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to reduce emissions as mentioned in
the last chapter. The U.S. NDC indicated a target of 26-28% below 2005 levels by
2030.
However, since the 2016 U.S. federal election the EPA has moved to change
or end a number of U.S. climate-related policies. It has proposed repeal of the
Clean Power Plan, which sought to regulate power-plant emissions, and has also
announced that the agency would revisit 2022-2025 car fuel economy standards. 107
In addition, the EPA administrator has wanted to revise downward the ‘social cost
of carbon,’ a key statistic when weighing the costs and benefits of fighting climate
change. 108
In 2017 the U.S. also announced its withdrawal from the 2015 Paris
Agreement at the earliest possible opportunity. 109 At the same time the U.S.
administration ordered the cessation of all implementation of the Agreement by
the U.S., stating that compliance with the terms of the agreement could undermine
U.S. competitiveness and jobs. Following the announcement, governors of several
U.S. states formed the U.S. Climate Alliance to continue to promote the Paris
Agreement’s objectives at the state level. 110 As of early 2019 19 states and Puerto
Rico were members of the Alliance.
At the international level, concern has continued to be voiced about failure to
achieve climate targets underpinning the Paris Agreement’s goals and NDCs. In
106

United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 3.
Coral Davenport, Trump Administration Unveils Its Plan to Relax Car Pollution Rules
Video, August 2, 2018.
108 For instance, in March 2018 it was reported that the U.S. Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) has removed “climate change” and associated terminology from
the FEMA strategic plan.
109 Under Paris Agreement Art. 28(1) a country may withdraw from the Agreement at any
time after three years from the date on which the Agreement entered into force for that country.
Under Paris Agreement Art. 28(2) the withdrawal is to take effect one year from the date of
receipt of notice of withdrawal. The U.S. ratified the Paris Agreement in December 2016 and,
with the appropriate notice of withdrawal, would be in a position to withdraw either in late 2020
or early 2021.
110 U.S. Climate Alliance, U.S. CLIMATE ALLIANCE, http://www.usclimatealliance.org/. >.
107
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October 2018 the IPCC published a Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5C
(SR15) 111 which found that meeting a 1.5C reduction target is possible but would
require “deep emissions reductions” and “rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented
changes in all aspects of society.” 112 Similarly, in November 2018 the World
Meteorological Organization released a report stating that 2017 atmospheric
carbon dioxide levels reached 405 parts per million (ppm), a level not seen in the
last three to five million years.
2.1.2 Canada

In Canada the Constitution Act, 1867 sets out the division of powers and
allocates certain subjects exclusively to federal or provincial jurisdiction.
However, within that division certain subjects of environmental significance such
as “navigation and shipping” and “the sea coast and inland fisheries” are allocated
to the federal government while others, like “management and sale of public
lands” and “property and civil rights”, are allocated to the provinces.
Judicial decisions in Canada have reaffirmed the existing constitutional
allocation of specific subjects of environmental importance to the federal or
provincial governments. However, the Supreme Court of Canada considers
environmental protection to be an aggregate matter composed of separate elements
rather than a single unitary one. 113 Thus, in an environmental dispute a variety of
matters involving federal powers, such as the licensing of toxic substances and
criminal offenses, can arise and be intertwined with matters involving provincial
powers, such as the regulation of local businesses and private property. This being
the case, environmental protection cannot be allocated to one level of government
alone but in many instances must be a shared responsibility. 114
Like in the U.S., if a conflict exists in the operation of federal and provincial
environmental laws dealing with the same matter, then by the doctrine of
paramountcy the federal statute will prevail if the matter can be characterized as
falling within federal jurisdiction. 115 Nevertheless, the scope of any potential
conflict is often defined narrowly and, in the normal course, governments of both
levels are likely to work out their differences or design laws that are capable of
operating without apparent conflict. 116 As a result, true ‘compliance dilemmas’ are
rare. 117 It may possible to comply with both federal and provincial laws by simply
meeting the higher standard.
111

GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 ºC, https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/.
Id.
113 In Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport, [1992], 1 S.C.R
3, the Supreme Court of Canada made clear that “the environment is not, as such, a subject
matter of legislation under the Constitution Act, 1867”: R v Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R 213
(Can.) at 112, per La Forest J. Jamie Benedickson, in Environmental Law in Canada, 2nd ed
(2016) at 27.
114 R v Crown-Zellerbach Canada Ltd, [1988] 1 S.C.R 401 (Can.).
115 PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA: LOOSE-LEAF EDITION (2007).
116 Id at 16-4.
117 Id Peter Hogg notes that “[g]iven the overriding force of federal law, a wide definition of
inconsistency will result in the defeat of provincial laws in “fields” which are “covered” by
federal law; a narrow definition, on the other hand, will allow provincial laws to survive so long
as they do not “expressly contradict” federal law. The wide definition is the course of judicial
112
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Canadian federal and provincial authorities have also concluded agreements
and engaged in other harmonization techniques to coordinate action and clarify
their respective roles in relation to the environment. Some examples include
“intergovernmental agreements under the Canadian Environmental Protection
Act, 1999 to accept provincial regulations as equivalent and withdraw federal
regulations, agreements for joint federal–provincial environmental assessment
processes, and the Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization.” 118
In Canada the federal Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change is the
primary department with responsibility for the environment. Its duties generally
encompass environmental matters within the scope of federal authority. These
include preservation and enhancement of the natural environment (water, air and
soil quality), renewable resources, water and boundary waters between Canada
and the U.S., meteorology, and coordination of policies and programs on these
subjects. The federal Ministry is also tasked with providing leadership and
coordination to support government consultation and planning in connection with
federal sustainable development initiatives. 119
Provincial and territorial governments have also created ministries or
administrative departments to oversee environmental responsibilities arising
within their jurisdictions. The wide range of environmental matters potentially
falling within the scope of provincial jurisdiction is such that many other ministries
that have responsibility for natural resources, energy, forests, wildlife and so forth
may be involved in a specific issue.
The principal piece of federal legislation over environmental matters is the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA). 120 CEPA entails the formulation
of environmental quality objectives, guidelines, and codes of practice concerning
the environment. CEPA is concerned mainly with systemic threats to the
environment. Provincial environmental legislation varies between jurisdictions,
but all provinces have at least one general law concerning the subject. These are
supplemented by laws related to specific activities such as the protection of water
resources, environmental assessment, and pesticide use.
Both federal and provincial legislation on the environment contains broad
powers that allow the respective level of government to prosecute polluters or
others who break environmental laws. Nevertheless, most actions for
environmental damage in Canada can be brought only by government authorities,
a legacy of the perception among Canadians that the environment is a public

activism in favor of central power; the narrow definition is the course of judicial restraint,
leaving all but the irreconcilable conflicts to be resolved in the political arena. We shall see that
Canadian courts have followed the course of restraint.”
118 Paul Muldoon et al, An Introduction to Environmental Law and Policy in Canada, 2nd
ed (2015) at 41.
119 Canada was the first country to legislate the oversight of the performance of government
departments against sustainable development goals. The creation of the Office of the
Commissioner for Environment and Sustainable Development was an important step in the
integration of sustainable development considerations into government decision-making: Jamie
Benedickson, Environmental Law in Canada, 2nd ed (2016) at 52 [Benedickson 2016].
120 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. c33.

172

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43, 2019]

resource. 121 Generally speaking, civil suits are limited to actions for nuisance
and/or possibly negligence when legislative standards are not met. 122
The control that governments have over environmental prosecutions in
Canada means that there is an emphasis on uniformity and regularity in
environmental enforcement. For instance, in a statement on CEPA compliance and
enforcement policy in 2001, the federal government indicated that enforcement
officials are to apply the Act “in a manner that is fair, predictable and
consistent”. 123 The same policy statement indicated that officials will aim to
“administer the Act with an emphasis on prevention of damage to the
environment”. For this reason the regulatory orientation is towards “environmental
protection in the public interest” 124, meaning that while penalties and remedial
powers are applied, the general accent in enforcement is placed on the use of other
remedial powers such as orders of restoration work. 125
Canada has also played an active role in international environmental
protection efforts in recent decades although the degree to which it may do so is
often constrained by provincial disagreement. 126 A 2017 compendium of Canada’s
engagement in international environmental agreements indicates Canada’s current
engagement in 94 international environmental agreements, including 24 CanadaU.S. agreements and 39 multilateral agreements. 127 Although Canada is the only
country to have withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol, it continues to be actively
engaged in implementing the Paris Agreement.
In recent years the federal government has also taken action to implement its
international commitments under the Paris Agreement in the form of the PanCanadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change. 128 Such a legislative
121

In discussing penalties and remedial powers under Canadian environmental law, Jamie
Benedickson has observed that “considerable emphasis is placed on the goal of environmental
protection in the public interest that underpins the overall regulatory regime”: Benedickson
2016, supra note 119, at 268.
122 Id. at 277-78.
123 See: Environment Canada, Compliance and Enforcement Policy for the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (March 2001) at 5. For instance, in order to support “fair,
predictable and consistent application of legislation administered by Environment Canada,
enforcement functions were reorganized in 2005 to establish and enforcement branch under the
direction of the Chief Enforcement Officer”: Benedickson 2016, supra note 119, at 267.
124 Id. at 270.
125 Jamie Benedickson notes that “In addition to prosecutorial action . . . measures envisaged
to promote compliance include education and exchange of technical information, the elaboration
of codes of practice and guidelines, inspections, oral and written warnings, increased
monitoring, and the use of administrative orders, recalls, ticketing, and directions, as well as
support base proceedings to secure injunctions and civil claims for cost recovery”: Id. at 273.
126 Annie Chaloux et al, “Canada’s Multiple Voices Diplomacy in Climate Change
Negotiations: A Focus on Québec” 20 International Negotiation (2015) 291 at 309.
127 Government of Canada, Participation in international environmental agreements (9
November
2011),
online:
<www.canada.ca/en/environment-climatechange/corporate/international-affairs/partnerships-organizations/participation-internationalenvironmental-agreements.html>.
128 Government of Canada, Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate
Change: Canada’s Plan to Address Climate Change and Grow the Economy (2016), online:
<https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/themes/environment/documents/weather1/20170125en.pdf>.
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framework is likely within federal jurisdiction if grounded in the federal taxation
power or possibly the peace, order and good government (POGG) power. 129
However, there could well be a provincial dimension to such regulation,
effectively requiring provincial agreement or participation.
The regulation of GHG emissions therefore has the potential to introduce a
double-layer of regulation in Canada, with both provincial governments and the
federal government being empowered to enact relevant legislation. While the
overlap could complicate the regulatory framework in each province, The
Framework operates as a ‘backstop’ or minimum requirement for provincial GHG
plans. The Framework establishes a minimum price that must be put on CO2
emissions, establishing a starting price of $10 per tonne in 2018 and rising to $50
per tonne by 2022. 130
Applied to jurisdictions with a cap-and-trade system, The Framework requires
provinces to have:
(i) a 2030 emissions-reduction target equal to or greater than Canada’s
30% Paris Agreement reduction target; and
(ii) a declining annual cap that corresponds, at a minimum, to the
projected emissions reductions resulting from the average carbon price
that year in price-based systems. 131
Prior to July 3, 2018, the cap-and-trade systems in Québec and Ontario met
the first of these criteria, with both provinces setting targets of at least 37% below
1990 levels by 2030. 132 The second criterion requires the annual cap to decline
such that it matches or exceeds the reduction effects of a carbon tax. Both Québec
and Ontario projected 4-5% annual decreases in their respective caps, with exact
numbers to be set annually based on forecasts for electricity use, transportation,
129

Bryan Schwartz has observed that a federal tax/levy is likely to be upheld on the basis
that s. 91(3) of the Constitution accords the federal government broad powers to raise “money
by any mode or system of taxation” and furthermore that the federal government has a history
of legislation in the area. Schwartz also notes that factors likely to influence a reviewing court’s
opinion in deciding a challenge of the matter is: i) the particularity of the claim (allowing the
court to decide on one particular ground linked to the actual legislation in question and leave
other challenging questions to be worked up by politicians or courts in other cases); ii) the fact
that in controversial cases the Supreme Court of Canada “often prefers to avoid “winner take all
outcomes” so that by upholding the legislation a court would avoid being seen to be obstructing
an important political initiative by the national government; and iii) the fact that courts often
consider the existence of an international treaty and the desirability of implementing it as a factor
that supports a decision in favor of federal jurisdiction. Schwartz also adverts to the possibility
of a court overturning the legislation because it in substance amounts to regulatory scheme in
an area of provincial jurisdiction: BRYAN SCHWARTZ, LEGAL OPINION ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL CARBON PRICING BENCHMARK AND BACKSTOP PROPOSALS
PREPARED
FOR
THE
GOVERNMENT
OF
MANITOBA
(Oct.
6,
2017),
http://manitoba.ca/asset_library/en/climatechange/federal_carbon_pricing_benchmark_backsto
p_proposals.pdf.
130 ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE CANADA, PAN-CANADIAN FRAMEWORK ON CLEAN
GROWTH AND CLIMATE CHANGE Annex 1 (2016).
131 Id. at 50.
132 Id. at 67.
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and heating fuels. 133 Québec and Ontario’s schemes meet the second criteria. As
of mid-June 2018, it was therefore not anticipated that either province would be
affected by the backstop created by The Framework. Action by the Ontario
government in early July 2018 altered this conclusion significantly, as outlined
below.
At the same time, it is important to note that The Framework does not require
the cap-and-trade system to set a minimum trading or auction price for emissions
so long as provincial emissions targets continue to exceed the federal target and
provincial caps decline sufficiently each year. Furthermore, The Framework is a
short term plan that extends only to 2022, at which time Canada’s federal
government could enact more stringent federal rules or establish a comprehensive,
nationwide emissions reduction scheme.
During the fall of 2018, Canada’s federal climate policy continued to evolve.
In October 2018, the federal government indicated that Alberta, British Columbia,
Newfoundland and Labrador, Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Nunavut, Prince
Edward Island, Québec, and Yukon had met federal standards for pollution pricing
either by developing their own systems or choosing to adopt the federal system. 134
At the same time, the federal government indicated that the ‘backstop’ would be
introduced in Ontario, New Brunswick, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan in 2019,
with one aspect of it being focused on large CO2 emitters beginning in January
2019 and the second aspect of it being a general fossil-fuel charge to be introduced
in April 2019. 135 The federal government emphasized that any direct proceeds
collected from such taxes under the federal scheme would be returned to people in
the affected provinces. Notwithstanding these efforts, a 2018 end-of-year report
by Environment and Climate Change Canada projected that federal and provincial
policies then in place would only deliver three-quarters of the emissions reduction
target required under Canada’s Paris Agreement NDC. 136
2.2 State and Provinces

The preceding section provided an overview of the background to cap-andtrade in the U.S. and Canada. What follows is an examination of the background
to cap-and-trade legislation in California, Québec, and Ontario as a prelude to a
more focused examination of the WCI, the WCI Inc., and the decisions taken by
the three jurisdictions to link their cap-and-trade programs.
2.2.1 California

The State of California has been an acknowledged leader in environmental
regulation for several decades. California’s leadership in environmental legislation

133

Id. at 59.
Prime Minister of Canada, Government of Canada fighting climate change with price on
pollution (Oct. 23, 2018). pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2018/10/23/government-canada-fighting-climatechange-price-pollution.
135 Id.
136 ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE CANADA, CLEAN CANADA: PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT AND GROWING OUR ECONOMY 13 (2018); see also Shawn McCarthy, Transit
Funding Key to Hitting Climate Goals: McKenna, GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 21, 2018, at B2.
134
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has been generated and sustained by a host of factors, notably the state’s unique
geography and severe air pollution problems.
California was the first U.S. state to enact air pollution legislation in 1947 and
likewise the first U.S. state to enact auto emission standards in 1965. The
California Air Resources Board (CARB) was created in 1967 to monitor and
address air quality issues, with the greater aim of attaining healthy air quality,
protecting the public from exposure to toxic air contaminants, and providing
innovative approaches to compliance with air pollution rules and regulations.
In recent decades, CARB has worked with the public, the business sector, and
local governments to find solutions to the state’s continuing air quality
problems. 137 In the 1980s and 1990s, CARB mandated rigorous auto emission
standards. In addition, it adopted standards for cleaner-burning gasoline as well as
initial standards for cleaner diesel fuel. The agency also began work to reduce
smog-forming emissions in common household products.
CARB standards attracted widespread interest and were eventually adopted in
a number of other U.S. states and foreign jurisdictions. The fact that the California
market is so large made it the de facto standard in setting environmental
regulations for many products. All of this adherence helped to solidify the state’s
reputation as a first-mover in the domain of environmental regulation.
CARB’s record of success means that its relationship with the California
Legislature is generally a respectful one. The California Legislature has given
CARB wide berth in most of the Board’s detailed rule-making. The Legislature
legislates, the Board regulates. At the same time, the California Legislature
reserves to itself the power to step in to provide guidance where it believes this is
necessary. CARB rule-making must be “consistent with legislative intent”. 138
CARB’s assertive role is, however, underpinned by an abiding consensus in favor
of air pollution control within the state. Official documentation makes clear that
CARB’s role and rule-making have historically attracted bipartisan support. 139
In the 2000s, CARB was given responsibility by the California Legislature for
monitoring and reducing GHG. California Assembly Bill 32, also known as “AB
32” and the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, established a first-in-theworld comprehensive program of regulatory and market mechanisms to achieve

137 Some innovative vehicle emission control strategies that have led to cleaner air in
California include: 1) the U.S.’s first tailpipe emissions standards for hydrocarbons and carbon
monoxide (1966), oxides of nitrogen (1971), and particulate matter from diesel-fueled vehicles
(1982); 2) catalytic converters, beginning in the 1970s, 3) on-board diagnostic, or “check
engine” light, systems, beginning with 1988 model-year cars, 4) a Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV)
regulation (1990) that requires manufacturers to produce an increasing number of such vehicles;
5) the U.S.’s first greenhouse gas emissions standards for cars mandated by the California
Legislature in 2002 and approved by CARB in 2004; and 6) California’s Advanced Clean Cars
Program (2012), which reduces both conventional “criteria” and GHG pollutant emissions from
AIR
RESOURCES
BOARD,
automobiles:
History,
CALIFORNIA
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/about/history.
138 MAC TAYLOR, CAP-AND-TRADE EXTENSION: ISSUES FOR LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT (2017),
lao.ca.gov/reports/2017/3719/cap-trade-extension-121217.pdf [hereinafter MAC TAYLOR].
139 History, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/about/history.;
Miriam Pawel, What Makes California Politics So Special, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2018, at SR4.
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reductions in GHG. 140 The Act set in place regulations and market mechanisms to
lower the state’s GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. 141 Pursuant to this
mandate, CARB undertook to design implementing regulations and engaged in a
multiyear scoping exercise that identified a cap-and-trade program as one of the
strategies the state could adopt to reduce GHG emissions. The state’s cap-andtrade program began in 2012 and compliance obligations under it began with 2013
GHG emissions.
In the current decade, California has continued to innovate. Its current range
of programs to reduce GHG emissions address every major sector of its economy,
including Zero Emission Vehicles, an important point of regulation given that
transportation-related emissions continue to constitute the largest component of
the state’s emissions. California also linked its cap-and-trade program with
Québec’s cap-and-trade program in 2014 and Ontario’s program in 2018,
discussed further below. In addition, California concluded a number of offset
agreements with foreign jurisdictions.
In 2016, the California Legislature approved Assembly Bill 398, also known
as “AB 398”, which required an additional 40% cut in GHG emissions below 1990
levels by 2030. The Legislature again entrusted CARB with devising the necessary
implementing regulations to extend AB 32 but also directed that the new
regulations meet specific design features for the period post-2020. These include:
1) evaluating and addressing concerns relating to a large number of
banked (i.e. pre-existing) emission allowances that might impair
California’s ability to meet its GHG targets in future.
2) adopting banking-of-allowance rules that discourage speculation, avoid
financial windfalls and consider the impact on complying entities and
market volatility
3) establishing a “hard” price ceiling for allowances and consider various
factors when setting that ceiling
4) establishing two price containment points (known as “speed bumps”)
between the allowance price floor and ceiling
5) establishing new, lower offset limits to a maximum of 4% in 20212025 and 6% in 2026-2030, with no more than half of offsets retired in
either interval coming from projects that do not provide direct
environmental benefits in California
6) establishing whether an industry assistance factor of 100% for certain
critically affected industries in the period 2021-2030 is appropriate in
light of the trade-off between leakage risk and incentives for GHGemissions reductions. 142

140
141
142

HEALTH & SAFETY, H.S.C. § 38500-38599 (2006).
Id. § 38550.
Assemb. B. 398 ch. 135 (Cal. 2017); MAC TAYLOR, supra note 138.
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Despite these goals, California’s progressive policies on the environment
present the prospect of divergence and/or conflict with U.S. federal ones. One
recent disagreement concerns the U.S. federal air pollution waiver given to the
state. The waiver, first granted under s. 209 of the U.S. Clean Air Act in 1969 and
renewed over 100 times since, acknowledges the state’s severe smog problem and
the car emissions regulations California has devised to reduce air pollution by
allowing the state to establish more stringent standards than federal ones. Since
that time, 13 other U.S. states have agreed to follow California’s emissions
policies, meaning that about 40% of American cars are now covered by California
rules. 143 That number is large enough that car manufacturers generally design all
their vehicles to meet California standards. The result is that California’s policies
drive technological change in the transportation sector nationally and
internationally.
Automatic extension of the federal air pollution waiver has been questioned
by the current U.S. administration. 144 If the EPA decides to revoke California’s
existing waiver, which covers all vehicles manufactured through 2025, the agency
would have to argue that California has no need to regulate GHG emissions, a
position which could likely trigger a lengthy legal battle. In May 2018, California
and 16 other states attempted to forestall such a revocation by suing the EPA and
seeking to block the agency from revising vehicle emissions standards. 145
Nevertheless, the consensus opinion appears to be that California’s cap-andtrade program faces little immediate threat from the U.S. federal government since
the cap-and-trade scheme does not regulate auto emissions and does not otherwise
depend on federal approval. 146 This view must be balanced against the fact that
transportation – particularly automobile – emissions continue to be a major source
of GHG in the state, inferring that any meaningful effort to significantly reduce
GHG emissions in future will have to deal with them going forward.
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Jacques Leslie, In the Face of a Trump Environmental Rollback, California Stands in
Defiance, YALEENVIRONMENT360 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/features/in-the-faceof-trump-environmental-rollback-california-stands-in-defiance [hereinafter Jacques Leslie].
144 Statements by then-EPA Administrator, Scott Pruitt, at his confirmation hearing in
January 2017 suggested that California’s waiver was in jeopardy. Invited by California Sen.
Kamala Harris to commit to upholding the waiver, Pruitt said instead that he “would not want
to presume the outcome” of a review of the policy: JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, CALIFORNIA
WAIVER
ON
TABLE,
PRUITT
SAYS
AT
SENATE
HEARING
(2018),
www.law360.com/articles/1006798/calif-waiver-on-table-pruitt-says-at-senate-hearing.
Despite later backtracking by Pruitt and his subsequent resignation, the U.S. administration has
indicated it will continue to seek revocation: Natasha Geiling, EPA plans to end California’s
fuel economy waiver despite Pruitt’s claims to the contrary, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 27, 2018),
thinkprogress.org/epa-end-california-waiver-freeze-fuel-economy-standards-2020ea5ac66b8fed/.
145 Greg Gardner, California Sues EPA To Preserve Current Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards, FORBES (May 1, 2018), www.forbes.com/sites/greggardner/2018/05/01/californiasues-epa-to-preserve-current-greenhouse-gas-emission-standards/.
146 Jacques Leslie, supra note 143.
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2.2.2 Québec

The Province of Québec is Canada’s largest province by area, comprising a
land territory three times the size of California. The province’s majority
Francophone heritage, its religious history, its system of civil law, and its
relationship with indigenous people, distinguish it from other Canadian
jurisdictions. To a notable extent, debate, discussion, and outlook in Québec differ
from those in other regions of Canada. 147 A majority of French-speaking
Québeckers also consistently voice opinions distinct from their Canadian
counterparts on major political, economic, and social issues.
Profound changes in Québec society since the 1960s have given rise to a
contemporary form of Québec nationalism. This shift has had both internal and
external implications. Internally, it has involved a wholesale remaking of the
province’s political, administrative, and economic infrastructure along more
explicitly Francophone, and at times corporatist, lines. 148 Externally, the province
has attempted to assert itself with the rest of Canada and internationally as an
independent actor.
Part of Québec’s self-assertion has involved the province claiming jurisdiction
abroad in its areas of its exclusive jurisdiction (the “Gérin-Lajoie Doctrine”)
within Canadian federalism. Another part has been its pursuit of vigorous
‘paradiplomacy’ in sectors like culture, immigration, and the environment where
jurisdiction is justified by Québec’s unique identity or is otherwise unclear under
Canada’s existing constitutional arrangements. The subject of climate change has
given Québec an issue with which to shape the Canadian federal government’s
climate policies and international positioning at the same time as it meets the
province’s own aspirations for international personality.
Factually, a consensus developed quickly in Québec about the threat posed by
climate change to the province. In 1992, the Québec National Assembly
unanimously adopted a motion declaring itself bound to the objectives and
principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 149
Successive climate events, including a massive flooding the Saguenay–Lac-SaintJean region in 1995 and the 1998 ice storm in the Montréal area, promoted the idea
that sustained action to address climate change was necessary. Later in 2001,
Québec’s National Assembly unanimously adopted a motion of support for the
Kyoto Protocol and expressed its willingness “to do its fair share” in meeting the

147

Québeckers’ sense of distinction is often described as being part of a “distinct society”, a
term invented by Jean Lesage, Premier of Québec (1960-66), to refer to the province’s special
collective identity. Québec remains the only province where most Canadians speak French
rather than English and the only jurisdiction in Canada that practices civil law rather than
common law. On November 27, 2006, Canada’s federal House of Commons voted to recognize
the Québécois as a ‘nation’ within Canada. As only a motion of the House, the vote’s outcome
is not considered legally binding. Advertisers have also long noted that attitudes and tastes in
Québec are different from the “Rest of Canada”: Carole Fortin, Headspace says It knows what
Québec Consumers want (May 16, 2013), http://marketingmag.ca/brands/what-do-Québecconsumers-want-78693/.
148 JOHN DICKINSON & BRIAN YOUNG, A SHORT HISTORY OF QUÉBEC 305 (2003).
149 Québec: A Historical Overview, supra note 13, at 3.
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Protocol’s targets. 150 The provincial government eventually went so far as to
publicly denounce Canada’s decision to withdraw from Kyoto in 2011. 151
Since that time, climate change has formed a central part of Québec’s efforts
at ‘green paradiplomacy’. These efforts are undertaken in a number of ways. 152
First, Québec representatives have been integrated into Canadian delegations to
intergovernmental conferences, the so-called “intra-channels”. Inclusion allows
Québec representatives “access to the negotiating forums, press conference rooms
and side events”. 153 Second, Québec representatives have been proponents of and
participated actively in “extra-channels”, that is, “forums and side-events held in
parallel to [international] negotiations, and organized bilateral or multilateral
meetings at all levels.” 154 This activity has been undertaken “to develop or deepen
partnerships, and to promote its major goal – the recognition of the role of nonsovereign states in the regulation of global climate change.” 155 A third venue for
Québec’s climate activism has been subnational multilateral organizations such as
the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers and
the WCI. 156 A fourth channel by which Québec’s climate goals have been
promoted is through direct implementation of international commitments. For
example, the province declared itself bound by the Kyoto Protocol and committed
“to incorporate the provisions of the Protocol in its domestic law.” 157
Nevertheless, Québec has certain advantages in addressing climate change.
Due to early development of its hydroelectric resources, the province has one of
the lowest carbon footprints of any jurisdiction in North America. Currently, more
than 99% of the electricity generated in Québec and nearly 50% of the total energy
used in the province come from renewable sources, mainly hydraulic and wind
energy. 158 Such an energy profile poses challenges of its own however, since it
means that the province has had to focus attention in recent emission reductions
on sectors where GHG reductions are difficult to achieve.
To fulfill goals under the Kyoto Protocol, the Québec government put forward
its first Climate Change Action Plan covering the period 2006-2012. The Plan
called for reversing the upward trend in emissions from transportation and
buildings – the two major sources of emissions - in a way that would allow the
Québec economy to improve its competitiveness overall and wean itself off fossil
fuel dependency. The revised 2006-2012 Action Plan aimed to avoid and reduce
Québec GHG emissions by 6% below 1990 levels by 2012, which it financed via
150

L’Assemblée nationale du Québec appuie à l’unanimité le protocole de Kyoto:
Communiqué de presse, QUÉBEC: ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE DU QUÉBEC (2001), at c010410a.
151 Chaloux notes that “in 2006, Québec sent its Minister of the Environment to Nairobi
(COP-12) to present the province’s dissenting voice regarding the federal government’s position
[on the Kyoto Protocol], which it considered unsatisfactory and not audacious enough”: Annie
Chaloux et al., Canada’s Multiple Voices Diplomacy in Climate Change Negotiations: A Focus
on Québec, 20 INT’L NEGOT. 291, 306 (2015).
152 Id. at 308-312.
153 Id. at 308.
154 Id. at 309.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 310.
157 Id. at 310-311.
158 Québec: A Historical Overview, supra note 13, at 3.
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a levy on fossil fuels. 159 By 2012 the province had reduced its emissions by 8%
below 1990 levels as a result of its adherence to the Plan. 160
The Québec provincial government took additional steps to address climate
change by joining the WCI in 2008 and began to work in close collaboration with
WCI partner jurisdictions to develop guidelines and operating rules for a cap-andtrade system. Cap-and-trade would later become the centerpiece of Québec’s
2013-2020 Climate Change Action Plan which was developed with the support
and participation of businesses, municipalities, and citizens. The 2013-2020 Plan
also promotes investment in research and innovation, aims to raise public
awareness about the consequences of climate change, and seeks to further lower
the public sector’s carbon footprint. Transportation is a prime concern since that
sector continues to be responsible for over 44% of all GHG emissions in the
province. 161
The Québec cap-and-trade program was inaugurated in 2013. The linkage of
Québec’s cap-and-trade program with that of California came into effect in
January 2014, a development which allowed individual participants in the
California or Québec cap-and-trade systems to buy and sell allowances with each
other. In addition, allowances from either system may now be used by an emitter
that is covered by either system to comply with regulatory obligations in the other.
The California-Québec carbon market thus became the largest cap-and-trade
system in North America and so far the only carbon market in the world to have
been designed and operated by subnational governments from two different
countries. The first joint auction involving participants from both jurisdictions
took place in November 2014, thereby completing the integration process.
2.2.3 Ontario

Ontario is a province of 13.6 million people (2014) with a varied industrial
base that in recent decades has evolved towards a service economy underpinned
by traditional strengths in natural resources and agriculture. Rich in human capital,
it continues to attract the majority of immigrants to Canada and is home to the
country’s largest city, Toronto.
In recent decades the province has struggled with the challenges of erosion of
its historic industries and uneven economic growth. The Greater Toronto Area
(GTA) and Ottawa have enjoyed strong growth while most of the remainder of the
province has stagnated. 162 This dual development has led to charges of a “twotrack” province. 163
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Id.
Id. at 4.
161 Id.
162 BEN EISEN & JOEL EMES, THE FIVE SOLITUDES OF ONTARIO (The Fraser Institute 2016).
163 “Across much of Southern Ontario, cities and towns are grappling with dimmer economic
prospects, slammed by decades of jobs lost to factory closings and their ripple effects. The
decline has taken on renewed ferocity over the past 10 years as skyrocketing electricity prices,
a volatile exchange rate and foreign competition have hit hard at local employers and
surrounding communities. Some sectors, however, are thriving. Since 2000, hundreds of
thousands of jobs have been created in such sectors as construction, real estate, finance and
professional and technical services – a reflection of both the building boom in desirable urban
160
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Ontario’s geographic location in central North America and its tie-in with the
North American auto and steel industries mean that it is often constrained to
achieve policy alignment with adjacent U.S. jurisdictions in order to remain
competitive. That reality impels it to pursue interchangeability and regulatory
harmonization with U.S. standards.
Nevertheless, at the turn of the 21st century, there was substantial evidence of
climate change as a growing threat to Ontario’s economy. 164 At the same time,
policy makers grappled with ways to transition the province away from a single,
inefficient power generator-transmitter-regulator in the form of a crown
corporation, Ontario Hydro, to a more nimble mix of energy sources while at the
same time promoting job creation, regional development, and environmental
goals.
In 1998, the province passed the Energy Competition Act, 1998, 165 which
authorized the establishment of a market in electricity and reorganized the existing
Crown monopoly, Ontario Hydro, into five separate companies. 166 However, to
prevent newly privatized companies from passing along the full cost of expensive
infrastructure upgrades to consumers, the provincial government capped
electricity rates until 2004 and thereafter allowed rates to rise only gradually.
In the interim, the province focused preliminary efforts to contain climate
change on phasing out the use of coal, a unique policy approach among North
American jurisdictions. 167 In 2001, Ontario had five coal-fired generating stations
representing 25% of total power generation in the province. In 2003, the provincial
government committed to the phasing out of coal generated electricity and over
the next 11 years coal generating capacity was gradually reduced, after which it
was eliminated completely. 168 Ontario’s coal-fired plant closures remain the
areas and the tech-heavy tasks that underpin the modern economy. The result is an Ontario that
can be roughly divided into its boom and bust towns, where wealth and opportunity either pile
up or dissipate. The fault line deepened over the past decade as 90 per cent of new jobs went to
Toronto and Ottawa, while incomes in former industrial centres grew at anemic rates or
declined”: Matt Lundy et al., Ontario divided: Anger, economics and the fault lines that could
&
MAIL
(May
18,
2018),
decide
the
election,
GLOBE
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/economy/article-ontario-divided-angereconomics-and-the-fault-lines-that-could/.
164 Ontario’s Ministry of the Environment noted in its 2015 Climate Change Discussion
Paper that “payouts from extreme weather events have more than doubled every five to 10 years
since the 1980s, and in 2013, losses were a historic $3.2 billion as a result of floods in Alberta
and Toronto”: MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE, ONTARIO CLIMATE
CHANGE
DISCUSSION
PAPER
2015
(2015),
http://www.downloads.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/env_reg/er/documents/2015/012-3452.pdf at 4
[hereinafter ONTARIO CLIMATE CHANGE PAPER 2015].
165 Energy Competition Act, 1998 S.O. c 15, Schedule A (Can.).
166 The five companies were Ontario Power Generation (OPG), the Ontario Hydro Services
Company (renamed Hydro One), the Independent Electricity Market Operator, the Electrical
Safety Authority, and Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation. OPG and Hydro one were
intended to eventually operate as private businesses rather than as crown corporations.
167 Leah Stokes, The Politics of Renewable Energy Policies: The case of feed-in-tariffs in
Ontario, Canada, 56 ENERGY POL’Y 490, 493 (2013) [hereinafter Leah Stokes].
168 Percentage share of total power generation by source in Ontario in 2003 was Nuclear
(42%), Gas (11%), Hydro (23%), Coal (25%). In 2014 the percentage share of total power
generation by source was Nuclear (60%), Gas (9%), Hydro (24%), Renewables (7%). The End
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largest GHG reduction action in Canada to date. By 2012, total GHG emissions in
the province had decreased by 11% due to the phase-out of coal-fired electricity,
improved energy efficiency, and the shifting composition Ontario’s economic
base. 169
The decision to phase-out coal as a source of power generation in Ontario
spurred a search for alternative sources of renewable energy in the province. While
in the short-term only nuclear power would fulfill demand, policy-makers
projected that long-term renewable sources could make up much of the gap. After
several years of policy experimentation Ontario enacted a feed-in tariff (FIT)
program in 2009 as part of its Green Energy and Green Economy Act (GEGEA),
the first, large-scale FIT program in North America. The program offered
enhanced government support for wind, solar/photovoltaic, bioenergy, and
hydropower. 170 The province also encouraged a move to a community power
generation model that “would deploy more renewable energy more quickly” as it
had in Europe. 171
In the first phase of GEGEA the government offered wind energy and
hydropower contracts in response to requests for proposals. However, in a second
phase, while the government concluded supply contracts with manufacturers who
promised “green jobs”, opposition to GEGEA began to grow. Some opposition
came from citizens protesting against the siting of wind turbines. 172 Another source
of opposition were groups concerned about the FIT price schedule, which appeared
too generous. In addition, in 2010 the provincial government had to contend with
a complaint about the FIT program’s domestic content requirements in the World
Trade Organization (WTO). The challenge was successful, an outcome which
made Ontario’s FIT program appear protectionist. 173
To allay these concerns, the provincial government was forced to make
changes. In 2009, the government lowered the tariff paid for photovoltaic
production of electricity, but only for small producers. It also announced a
moratorium on offshore wind projects in early 2011. 174 These changes, in addition
to the fact that the promised “green jobs” did not fully materialize, left the

of Coal, ONTARIO (July 16, 2018), www.ontario.ca/page/end-coal. The CA-QC-ON Linkage
Discussion Paper noted that “Since 2003, Ontario has significantly reduced GHG emissions
through its coal reduction plan and legislation. From 2005 to 2015, GHG emissions in Ontario’s
electricity sector decreased by approximately 87%. Ontario’s early action on coal power
generation demonstrates strong leadership in reducing GHGs.” Partly based on this the CA-QCON Linkage Discussion Paper concluded that “Ontario’s program is at least as stringent as the
California Cap-and-Trade Program.” See: CA-QC-ON Linkage Agreement, CALIFORNIA AIR
RESOURCES BOARD (2017), www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/linkage.htm.
169 The End of Coal, ONTARIO (July 16, 2018), www.ontario.ca/page/end-coal.
170 Leah Stokes, supra note 167, at 492.
171 Id. at 493.
172 The provincial government was caught unawares when it streamlined the approval
process for wind generation, transmission lines, and other infrastructure and later faced criticism
that this change was “undemocratic”. Id. at 495.
173 Id.
174 Id.
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ensemble of measures contained in Ontario’s “Green Shift” under GEGEA
looking disappointing. 175
Despite these setbacks, Ontario’s provincial government pursued discussions
with members of civil society on how to deal with climate change in a more broadbased fashion. 176 With the Ontario government’s release of its first Climate
Change Action Plan in June 2016, the province introduced a number of new
policies and programs to reduce GHG emissions from buildings, waste,
transportation, and land use, much as California had done several years before. 177
An important component of its approach was to put a cap and a price on the
province’s GHG emissions through a WCI-compatible cap-and-trade program that
entered into force in the province in January 2017. Under that program some 147
major emitters were granted free emission allowances.
Because long-term predictability of carbon policy is so important, Ontario
took the opportunity in late 2016 to announce its cap on future GHG emissions for
every year until 2030. 178 The Ontario cap was projected to decline about 4% each
year to 2020 and then approximately 2.9% each year afterwards to 2030. The
provincial goal was for GHG emissions to decrease 15% below what they were in
1990 by 2020, 37% below the 1990 level by 2030, and 80% below the 1990 level
by 2050. 179 These decreases were roughly consistent with those projected in
California and Québec.
In January 2018, Ontario’s carbon market was fully linked with California and
Québec through the WCI. Ontario emitters were able to buy and sell allowances
and Ontario-issued allowances that were fully fungible with those issued in those
jurisdictions. During 2017-2018 emitters purchased some $2.8 billion worth of
Ontario-issued allowances, in addition to those allocated by means of free
distribution. 180
Nevertheless, concerns continued to be expressed about the cap-and-trade
program from several sources, including the provincial auditor general 181, the
175

Shawn McCarthy, Green Shift to Green Slump, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 4, 2018, at B1.
ONTARIO CLIMATE CHANGE PAPER 2015, supra note 164.
177 Chapter 2: Policies and Programs Since the Climate Change Action Plan in Ontario
Environmental Commissioner, in ANNUAL GREENHOUSE GAS PROGRESS REPORT 2017: FROM
PLAN TO PROGRESS, 46-79 (2017).
178 These caps were set out in section 54 of O Reg 144/16 under the Climate Change
Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016, S.O. c 7 (Can.).
179 Ontario had legislatively enshrined its major GHG targets in s. 6(1) of the Climate Change
Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016, S.O. c 7 (Can.).
180 Shawn McCarthy, California, Québec Close Carbon Market to Ontario, GLOBE & MAIL,
June 18, 2018, at B1.
181 The provincial Auditor General, Bonnie Lysyk, indicated in November 2016 that
Ontario’s cap-and-trade program would not result in the target of 18.7MT of GHG reductions
being met. At that time, she also noted several concerns related top cap-and-trade and linkage
with California and Québec. Among them were 1) that the Ontario Ministry of the Environment
and Climate Change has not inspected approximately 80% of approved Ontario GHG emitters,
2) that there could be double reporting of GHG emissions between the WCI jurisdictions, and
3) that Ontario participants would be contributing financially to the cap-and-trade program but
not necessarily be contributing to any actual GHG emission reductions. The Auditor General
also expressed concern that, in the decision to adopt a cap-and-trade, consideration was not given
to alternatives that would produce the same GHG emission reductions at significantly lower
176
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province’s environmental commissioner 182 and the political opposition, suggesting
that there was no strong consensus concerning the need to prioritize GHG emission
reduction by means of cap-and-trade, as had happened in California and Québec.
In June 2018, a provincial election in Ontario led to an abrupt change in
government and provincial policy. The new government announced the province’s
withdrawal from WCI cap-and-trade. In connection with the cancellation, 758
solar and wind projects in the province were terminated. 183 Provincial legislation
provided limited compensation. 184 However, the new provincial government
indicated that it was committed to developing a new plan to address climate change
in fall 2018. 185
In July 2018 the Ontario government announced its decision to join
Saskatchewan in a reference question challenging the constitutionality of the
federal government’s Pan-Canadian Framework posed to the Saskatchewan Court

cost. MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 165-190 (2016),
www.auditor.on.ca/en/content/annualreports/arreports/en16/v1_302en16.pdf.
182 Since 2008 Ontario’s Environmental Commissioner has issued an annual review on the
province’s efforts to reduce GHG emissions to the Ontario Legislature. In several such reviews
the Commissioner has been highly critical of government action, leaving the impression of
government action as inadequate. ENVIRONMENTAL COMMISSIONER OF ONTARIO, CLIMATE
CHANGE (2018), eco.on.ca/our-reports/climate-change/.
183 The cancellation also reportedly had an unsettling effect on investment in the province.
Shawn MacCarthy, Cancellation of German-owned Ontario wind project prompts warning from
Berlin, GLOBE & MAIL (July 23, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/articlecancellation-of-german-owned-ontario-wind-project-prompts-warning-from/.
184 Section 8 of the Cap-and-trade Cancellation Act, 2018 (Bill 4) provides for compensation,
but Art. 8(4) specifies no compensation to a list of key participants, and Arts. 9-10 otherwise
prohibit compensation than by means of the act and deprive most potential claimants of any
cause of action against the provincial government for the cancellation. Dennis Mahony et al.,
Ontario Government Introduces Bill Repealing Cap-and-trade (Torys Insights Publication
2018), https://www.torys.com/insights/publications/2018/07/ontario-government-introducesbill-repealing-cap-and-trade. It is also curious that the Ontario government decided to halt
emissions trading and withdraw from the WCI but left intact the little-known Ontario Emissions
Trading Code. The Code, together with Ontario Regulation 397/01, facilitates the reduction of
emissions that create smog and acid rain through industry caps and incentives that reward
innovation and voluntary action. See https://www.oetr.on.ca/oetr/faq/faq.jsp#8.
185 For an overview of policy options for the Ontario provincial government see Globe
Editorial: Ontario’s Carbon Tax Conundrum, GLOBE & MAIL, July 26, 2018, at A10. See also
Shawn McCarthy, Ontario government to introduce GHG-emission-reduction plan, GLOBE &
MAIL (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-ontario-government-tointroduce-ghg-emission-reduction-plan/.
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of Appeal. 186 Later, the new government also announced a decision to pose its own
reference question challenging the framework to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 187
In November 2018, the Ontario government announced it would create
emission regulations for industrial emitters, support business investment in
environmental innovation and clean technology, and mandate an increase in
ethanol content for gasoline sold in the province to 15% from 10 per cent by
2025. 188 At the same time, it confirmed that it aimed to reduce provincial GHG
emissions by 30 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030, the same target adopted by
the federal government for the country under Canada’s Paris Agreement NDC.
Federal authorities responded that the more relaxed approach of the new Ontario
government, which would depend on adoption of new technology and investment
in rapid transit, would increase the margin of uncertainty in Canada’s attempt to
meet its Paris Agreement NDC goal. 189
2.3 The WCI Cap-and-Trade System
2.3.1 The Western Climate Initiative

The WCI is self-described as “a collaboration of independent jurisdictions
working together to identify, evaluate, and implement emissions trading policies
to tackle climate change at a regional level.” 190 As mentioned, the WCI was
founded in 2007 by five U.S. states seeking to develop a regional target for
reducing GHG emissions, participate in a multi-state registry to track and manage
regional GHG emissions, and develop a market-based program to fulfill emissions
targets. It was not entirely new, building instead on involvement with two other
similar initiatives as well as the accrued experience of several early emissions
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Canada’s provincial governments, under their respective Constitutional Questions Acts,
are able to submit questions for advisory opinions to their provincial Superior Courts or Court
of Appeal. In the reference originally posed in April 2018 the Saskatchewan government asks
the Court following question: “The Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act was introduced into
Parliament on March 28, 2018 as Part 5 of Bill C-74. If enacted, will this Act be unconstitutional
in whole or in part?” Once the provincial Court of Appeal has given its decision on the reference
question, the government or other parties to the reference have the right under the Supreme
Court Act to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. This same right is not
available to federal or state governments in U.S. law. Under the ‘Case or Controversy’ Clause
of Art. III of the U.S. Constitution, federal courts are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions
in which no actual issue exists but an opinion is sought.
187 Justin Giovanetti, Ontario Targets Federal Carbon Tax with Second Legal Challenge,
GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 4, 2018, at A1.
188 Shawn McCarthy & Laura Stone, Ontario to Scale Back Climate Targets, GLOBE & MAIL,
Nov. 29, 2018.
189 Shawn McCarthy, Transit Funding Key to Hitting Climate Goals: McKenna, GLOBE &
MAIL, Dec. 21, 2018, at B2.
190 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, www.westernclimateinitiative.org.
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trading programs in the U.S.. 191 Since its founding, two other states and four
Canadian provinces have become involved. 192
From an organizational perspective, the WCI can be classified as an
intergovernmental entity. 193 Its founding document is a simple agreement among
five governors. 194 It accords the WCI no legal identity since its members have not
constituted the initiative as an independent legal entity under any system of law.
WCI decision-making powers are exercised by the government representatives of
partner jurisdictions. The WCI can take decisions, but decision-making is only
possible where the decision in question enjoys the unanimous approval of all
members. Otherwise, the WCI seeks to promote collaboration among jurisdictions
and is in no way superior to them.
Because the WCI’s membership is composed of subnational jurisdictions that
lack personality under international law, they are therefore themselves powerless
to create the WCI as an independent entity under international law. This reality
presents the issue of the legal form by which the WCI’s work is to be
accomplished.
2.3.2 The Western Climate Initiative, Inc. (WCI, Inc.)

To provide a legal form for WCI’s work, several WCI jurisdictions created
the Western Climate Initiative, Inc. (WCI, Inc.) in 2011 as a non-profit corporation
under Delaware law and headquartered in Sacramento. California. WCI, Inc.’s
purpose is to provide administrative and technical services to support
implementation of state and provincial GHG emissions trading programs. Its main
activities are to develop a compliance tracking system that monitors allowances
and offsets certificates, administers allowance auctions, and conducts market
monitoring of allowance trading.
WCI, Inc. is structured as a corporation. WCI Inc. by-laws provide for the
appointment of voting and non-voting directors to the WCI, Inc. Board of
191 The early EPA programs included four cap-and-trade programs related by the common
objective of providing sources with flexibility to comply with traditional source specific
command and control standards while maintaining environmental objectives focused primarily
on local air quality. These included netting of emissions, and offsets, bubbles and banking. ADP
Ellerman, L Joskow & D Harrison, Jr, Emissions Trading in the U.S. (2003). The WCI built on
existing GHG reduction efforts in the individual states as well as two existing regional efforts.
In 2003, California, Oregon and Washington created the West Coast Global Warming Initiative,
and in 2006, Arizona and New Mexico launched the Southwest Climate Change Initiative.
History, WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE (2013), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/history.
192 Id. The WCI began in February 2007 when the Governors of Arizona, California, New
Mexico, Oregon, and Washington signed an agreement directing their respective states to
develop a regional target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. During 2007 and 2008, the
Premiers of British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Québec, and the Governors of Montana
and Utah joined the original five states in committing to tackle climate change at a regional
level.
193 HENRY SCHERMERS & NIELS BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 45 (4th ed.
2003).
194 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, WESTERN REGIONAL CLIMATE ACTION INITIATIVE, (Feb.
26, 2007), www.westernclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/general/WCI-GovernorsAgreement. For background to the Agreement see Press Release, Five Western Governors
Announce Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Agreement (Feb. 26, 2018).
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Directors, recognize participating jurisdictions (currently California, Nova Scotia,
Ontario, and Québec), the need for regular meetings, quorum, voting rules, and so
forth. Both voting and non-voting directors are appointed by participating
jurisdictions. In 2018, WCI, Inc.’s annual budget was about USD $4.6 million,
most of which was earned through the provision of services. Participating
jurisdictions contract with WCI, Inc. for those services.
WCI, Inc. currently performs a number of functions. Since 2011, it and its
participating jurisdictions have worked with SRA International, Inc. (SRA) to
develop and support the Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service
(CITSS). CITSS provides accounts for market participants to hold and retire
compliance instruments and to record transactions of compliance instruments with
other account holders. The WCI, Inc. Help Desk provides multi-jurisdictional
telephone and online customer assistance for CITSS users. WCI, Inc. also supports
participating jurisdictions in the execution of coordinated auctions of GHG
emission allowances as well as the execution of jurisdictions’ reserve sales. 195 In
connection with this, it also provides financial administrative services, which
includes evaluation of bid guarantees and conduct of settlement. 196 In addition,
WCI, Inc. supports participating jurisdictions by contracting for analyses that
support market monitoring and by performing certain cash flow functions.
The general conclusion to be drawn from a survey of these functions is that
WCI, Inc. mainly provides administrative and technical support. It does not
constitute a supra-jurisdictional authority. Indeed, as will be seen, partner
jurisdictions insist on the inviolability of their sovereignty vis-a-vis WCI
arrangements. Jurisdictions participate in cap-and-trade under the WCI on a purely
voluntary “best efforts” basis, with the tacit prospect of suspension/withdrawal of
linkage should non-compliance with basic requirements persist.
2.4 Harmonization

The functions of WCI and WCI, Inc. are clearly aimed at facilitating
harmonization. Harmonization has been defined as “the process of making
different regulations, principles, domestic laws and government policies
substantially or effectively the same or similar.” 197
Today, harmonization assumes a number of different forms. One approach
involves the introduction of a common standard where jurisdictions base their
standards on an exact reproduction of the standard or approximated by more
loosely ‘basing’ local requirements on international, foreign, or generic ones. A
195 In 2013, WCI, Inc. contracted with Markit Group Ltd. to build on Markit’s previous work
with CARB and develop and implement the auction and reserve sale platform to support auctions
and reserve sales among linked programs in California and Québec. The contract with Markit
was amended to provide auction and reserve sale services through December 31, 2016. In June
2016, the Board approved a new contract with Markit over the period of June 15, 2016-January
31, 2021.
196 WCI, Inc. released a request for expression of interest (REI) in February 2016 to procure
financial administrative services. The result of this procurement was a contract through the end
of January 2021 with Deutsche Bank.
197 Graham Mayeda, Developing Disharmony? The SPS and TBT Agreements and the Impact
of Harmonization on Developing Countries, 7 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 737, 740 (2004).
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second approach offers greater flexibility to participants by using a ‘mutual
recognition’ approach, that is, an approach to standard-setting which allows
jurisdictions to accept each other’s rules in pursuit of certain recognized regulatory
goals. 198 The focus in mutual recognition is on different rules achieving a
jurisdiction’s regulatory goal. A third approach to harmonization is an
‘equivalence’ approach, that is, a process by which a jurisdiction recognizes that
its regulatory goals may be fulfilled by the use of different kinds of measures. 199
The chief difference between mutual recognition and equivalence is that the
former is bilateral or multilateral (that is, jurisdictions recognize each other’s
processes for achieving regulatory goals) whereas the latter is unilateral (that is, a
jurisdiction agrees to recognize another entity’s processes for achieving its
regulatory goals even though it may not have any equivalent processes of its
own). 200
Among the WCI’s key achievements regarding harmonization to date are two
documents: the 2008 Design Recommendations for the WCI Regional Cap-andTrade Program201 and the 2010 Design for the WCI Regional Program. 202 The two
documents cover a wide range of topics pertaining to the design and
implementation of cap-and-trade programs. Nevertheless, an underlying goal in
both documents is linkage, that is, the interconnection and integration of cap-andtrade programs in different jurisdictions in order to benefit from scaling. The
process of harmonization under the WCI culminates in the mutual recognition of
compliance instruments (i.e. emission certificates) issued by different
jurisdictions. They become ‘fungible’ – or interchangeable – from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
At the same time, harmonization imposes certain requirements, among these
being uniformity, consistency, and trust. A jurisdiction will not engage in
harmonization efforts unless it can be reasonably sure that another jurisdiction’s
standards are either the same as its own or achieve similar (or the same) regulatory
goals. 203 A degree of uniformity is necessary because it is the essence of what
harmonization involves. Consistency is essential to ensure harmonization is
maintained from one moment to the next. The trust required for harmonization is
more usually generated among jurisdictions with similar backgrounds and levels

198 HUMBERTO ZÚÑIGA SCHRODER, HARMONIZATION, EQUIVALENCE AND MUTUAL
RECOGNITION OF STANDARDS IN WTO LAW 97 (2011) [hereinafter SCHRODER 2011].
199 FRODE VEGGELAND & CHRISTEL ELVESTAD, EQUIVALENCE AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN
TRADE ARRANGEMENTS: RELEVANCE FOR THE WTO AND THE CODEX ALIMENTARIUS
COMMISSION (2004).
200 SCHRODER 2011, supra note 198, at 97.
201 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WCI REGIONAL CAPAND-TRADE
PROGRAM
(Sept.
23,
2008),
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/general/designrecommendations/Design-Recommendations-for-the-WCI-Regional-Cap-and-Trade-Program/
[hereinafter 2008 WCI Recommendations].
202 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN FOR THE WCI REGIONAL PROGRAM (July 27,
2010),
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/the-wci-cap-and-trade-program/programdesign.
203 SCHRODER 2011, supra note 198, at 97.
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of economic development. Even here, however, commentators have observed how
progress on harmonization can be exceedingly slow. 204
Because the qualities necessary for the deep harmonization that WCI
arrangements are ultimately premised upon – including trust – must be built,
harmonization under WCI arrangements is achieved in two successive phases:
1) program design
2) linkage.
In the program design phase, the basic features of a cap-and-trade program are
identified and examined. Once approved, they are put in place and allowed to
operate. Subsequently, when a program has had an opportunity to prove itself,
linkage can be considered. As mentioned, the linkage phase involves the
interconnection and integration of different programs.
A ‘bottoms-up’ approach to developing cap-and-trade programs on a
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis might appear cumbersome and inefficient, except
that this two-step mode of harmonization was adopted in the 2008 Design
Recommendations and the 2010 Design for the WCI Regional Program in
recognition of the fact that creating a successful cap-and-trade program requires
difficult – often very detailed – political choices that can only be made at a
jurisdiction-specific level. Once these choices have been implemented and a
jurisdiction’s program is up-and-running, different cap-and-trade programs can be
linked through a process of harmonization. The point to appreciate, therefore, is
that cap-and-trade programs in different WCI jurisdictions have come together
relatively quickly and seamlessly because of this two-stage method of
harmonization.
2.4.1 Program Design

The 2008 Design Recommendations and the 2010 Design for the WCI
Regional Program serve slightly different purposes, although an incremental
progression can be observed from one document to the next. The 2008
Recommendations embody the results of a consultative exercise involving
“extensive stakeholder input”. They take a form – recommendations – that are
traditionally made to governments. 205 Specific design elements were identified and
the ultimate design recommendations summarized. Each recommendation was
discussed “in light of stakeholder input, the balancing required between disparate
stakeholder positions, and in light of the experience of other cap-and-trade
programs, economic analysis, and expert opinion.” 206
In the 2008 Recommendations, stakeholders referred to the requirement to
achieve the “broadest possible coverage of sources and omissions” under the capand-trade program. Breadth of coverage was dictated by 1) the need to provide
greater certainty that economy wide emission reductions would be achieved, 2) the
204
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need to reduce compliance costs by covering a broad set of emissions sources with
diverse emission opportunities, 3) creating a level playing field for all fuels, 4)
ensuring that carbon was priced throughout the economy and 5) creating a more
robust GHG trading market. 207
Many stakeholders also stressed the importance of having reliable
measurement, monitoring, and reporting protocols. There was also much
discussion of the need to cover different fuel sources, particularly transport fuels,
as well as the need for progressive coverage extension to ensure economy-wide
reduction goals could be achieved. Thus, the opinion was expressed that “if
transportation fuels were omitted from coverage, then they would enjoy a
competitive advantage over electricity as vehicle fuel, since electricity would be
covered by the program.” 208 It was repeatedly emphasized and recommended that
“it is important to internalize the cost of carbon throughout the economy and to
ensure a level playing field across all fuels.” 209
At the same time, for ease of administrative convenience, it was recommended
that cap-and-trade programming would apply to entities with an emission limit of
25,000MT CO2, then projected to cover 90% of emissions.
In terms of the cap – the central regulatory element in a cap-and-trade program
– the 2008 Recommendations described the cap to be “[a jurisdiction’s] best
estimate of expected actual emissions based on population growth, economic
growth, voluntary and mandatory emission reductions, and other factors such as
reporting data.” 210 In connection with this, the Recommendations went on to
specify an initial compliance period starting in 2012 and expanded coverage of
transport fuel, residential commercial, and industrial fuels in the second
compliance period starting in 2015.
In several respects the 2008 Recommendations presaged future concerns. For
instance, they indicated a fear of over-allocating allowances 211, double-counting
of emissions credits 212, and the need to take into account “the special or unique
circumstances of each state and province.” 213 In this vein, on the most sensitive
issue – the allocation of allowances – the 2008 Recommendations note that
“generally, allowance distribution will be done independently by each WCI
Partner jurisdiction.” 214
The 2008 Recommendations also covered a number of other key topics. These
included a regional auction platform, the introduction of a reserve price, early
reduction credits, banking, offsets, and allowances from other cap-and-trade
jurisdictions, monitoring and measurement, and enforcement. Thus, with respect
to offsets, WCI partners were urged to have a “rigorous” 215 offset program and, in
conjunction with other partners, to “establish standards and processes for issuing
207
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offset credits”, excepting such credits from other mechanisms and jurisdictions. It
was also recommended that a cap of no more than 49% be the maximum use of
total emissions reductions from offsets. 216 With respect to reporting (i.e.
measurement and monitoring), it was recommended that the monitoring of six
standard GHGs be undertaken and that this monitoring be done by means of thirdparty verification. It was foreseen that certain data would “be made available to all
WCI partner jurisdictions for review and consideration for possible expansion of
the cap-and-trade program.” 217 And with respect to enforcement, the design
Recommendation was that “if a covered entity . . . does not have sufficient
allowances at the end of a compliance period, the entity . . . shall be required to
surrender three allowances for every excess metric ton of CO2 to the jurisdiction
to which they have the compliance obligation within three months of the end of
each compliance period.” 218 Additionally, partner jurisdictions might establish
additional penalties, “including civil and criminal penalties for intentional
violations of program requirements.” The 2008 Recommendations observed that
“such penalties provide an additional level of deterrence to ensure that the financial
incentives associated with the cap-and-trade program are not abused and to
increase confidence in the integrity of the market in the value of an allowance.” 219
The 2008 Recommendations did not foresee the creation of any supra-national
authority to oversee the operation of the WCI program. Instead, an entity would
be “designed to help the WCI Part jurisdictions achieve the necessary
coordination.” The jurisdictions themselves would retain “regulatory authority and
enforcement responsibilities”. 220
Importantly, however, the 2008 Recommendations recognize that there would
be benefits to cap-and-trade systems that are not fully represented in economic
modelling. These included heterogeneity 221, diffuse behavioral change 222, the
inducement of innovation 223, and inherent errors in direct regulation cost
estimates. 224
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at 62.
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224 The WCI 2008 Recommendations note that “[w]hen direct regulations are promulgated,
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In addition to specific program recommendations, certain program design
principles for a cap-and-trade program were identified in the 2008
Recommendations. These principles included the following characteristics to
ensure that a program:
•

is equitable and administratively simple

•

maximizes total benefits in jurisdictions

•

requires all reductions to be real, verifiable, additional,
enforceable, and permanent

•

stimulates investment

•

covers as many sources as is practical

•

provides appropriate recognition and incentives for early
emissions reductions

•

assures transparent and robust accounting

•

minimizes the potential for leakage

•

facilitates linkage to similarly rigorous regional and
international GHG markets and programs and encourages other
jurisdictions to join.

The 2008 Recommendations were evidently put together with the grand goal
of a regional, linked program in mind. There are a number of references to
“regional” caps and targets, the coordination of action and across jurisdictions, and
other elements of an integrated system. 225 This ‘top-down’ approach was evidently
problematic and has yet to eventuate.
The 2008 Recommendations were followed two years later by the 2010
Design for the WCI Regional Program document, which represents a step forward
but also step back. It goes somewhat beyond the 2008 Recommendations in that it
lays out the outline of a jurisdiction-specific cap-and-trade program in general
terms. That generality is a function of the need to strike a balance between
outlining a framework and the avoidance of dictating particulars. In the process of
225

It is to be recalled that the 2008 Recommendations were formally denominated “Design
Recommendations for the WCI Regional Cap-and-Trade Program” and that there are repeated
references to a regional system throughout the document (e.g. the description of the program as
“this ambitious effort to design a regional, market-based approach for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.” Id. at 3). The effort to globalize the scheme in order to avoid double-counting of
emission credits is also evident in the CA-QC-ON Linkage Agreement, Art. 1(c) which
references the purpose of “develop[ing] and implement[ing] an accounting mechanism that
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the total greenhouse gas emission reduction achieved jointly by the Parties’ linked cap-and-trade
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the Parties.” CA-QC-ON Linkage Agreement, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD (2017),
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/linkage.htm.
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implementation there would also be a need to recognize a degree of pluralism. For
example, the 2010 Design document observes that:
. . . variations in jurisdictional authorities, regulatory procedures and
administrative requirements inevitably lead to differences in the manner
in which rules are written. Consequently, the Detailed Design was
prepared with the understanding and expectations in each jurisdiction’s
rule language may vary . . . The intent, however, is that even with
differences in language or approach, the ability to implement the core
program design in a compatible manner across jurisdictions is preserved,
so that the integrity of the regional effort is assured. 226
The 2010 Design document noted that cap-and-trade would harness the power
of the market to achieve environmental goals, encourage emission reductions
throughout the economy and advance certain core policies and programs such as
energy efficiency, the encouragement of renewable energy sources, tackling
transportation emissions, and establishing performance benchmarks, that would
help to speed the transition to a clean energy economy. 227
The 2010 Design document went on to outline the fundamentals of a cap-andtrade program but shied away from describing the program as a “regional” one.
Instead, it simply acknowledged that:
. . . a broad geographic scope will also reduce overall compliance costs
and can help mitigate leakage risks. A large carbon market across a
diverse set of emission sources provides a wider range of reduction
opportunities. There are multiple paths for achieving the broad
geographic and economy-wide coverage that is preferred for a cap-andtrade program. The WCI Partner jurisdictions also recognize alternative
schedules for implementation can be accommodated and will continue to
encourage additional jurisdictions to join the program . . . 228
The 2010 Design document identifies the core of a cap-and-trade program as
reliance on high-quality emissions data from rigorous reporting. It is upon this
basis that caps can be established. The 2010 Design document specified that in
order to minimize the reporting burden for emitters, WCI partner requirements
should be harmonized with U.S. EPA regulations and made equivalent to a
Canadian version of the reporting requirements. There was also a need identified
by the 2010 Design document to develop reporting protocols for certain emission
sources that did not then have them. 229
The need for uniformity is stressed in the need to ensure that “each jurisdiction
develop its allowance budget in the same manner to ensure consistency and
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transparency through the program.” 230 Additionally, the 2010 Design document
recommends “a common limit on the use of offset certificates be applied
uniformly.” 231 From these basic premises the 2010 Design document went on to
recommend that “each Partner’s 2012 allowance budget for emitters covered in
2012 be the best estimate of actual emissions anticipated in 2012” 232, essentially a
recognition of the need to establish a starting point of ‘business as usual’. The 2010
Design recommendations went on to note that after a first emissions period the
projected program would be “designed to expand to cover providers of
transportation fuels and residential and commercial fuels.” 233
At the same time, there would be a need in any cap-and-trade program
establishing a cap to make allowances for flexibilities. Here, once again, the need
to accommodate early reductions and offset certificates from other jurisdictions
was mentioned. The 49% limit on the use of offset certificates and other approved
instruments mentioned in the 2008 Recommendations was repeated. 234 This led
into a general discussion in the 2010 Design document of the need to enhance
compliance flexibility and program adaptability to manage compliance costs.
Adaptability would be required because “combinations of circumstances could
result in compliance cost increases that may impact consumers or industry
competitiveness and increase emissions leakage risk.” 235 For this reason, the 2010
Design document referred to the need to establish allowance reserves “from which
emission allowances could be released under high-price conditions” 236, borrowing
of allowances from one compliance period to the next might be permitted, and
“special purpose allowance pools or other mechanisms could be created that target
localized conditions that affect compliance costs locally.” 237 Taken together,
“[w]hen combined with an auction floor price . . . these mechanisms would help
create boundaries on the range of allowance prices . . . ”. 238
Two other areas of flexibility mentioned in the 2010 Design document were
first, the need to maintain competitiveness of covered industries by a process of
‘benchmarking’ 239 and the distribution of free allowances, and second, the need to
address ‘leakage risk’, or in other words, the incentive for covered emitters to leave
a jurisdiction to avoid or evade program compliance costs.
The 2010 Design document detailed that “The interconnected nature of the
North American electricity grid creates the potential for leakage, and existing
practices see considerable quantities of electricity transacted among jurisdictions.”
However, the need “[t]o maintain a level playing field and a consistent price for
230
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carbon, the emissions associated with imports of electricity are included in WCI
Partner jurisdiction emissions.” 240 In such situations possibilities for over- (or
under-) counting of emissions meant that a common point of regulation needed to
be adopted, which the 2010 Design document recommended as being “the First
Jurisdictional Deliverer (FJD), which is the first entity that delivers electricity over
which the consuming WCI Partner jurisdiction has regulatory authority.” 241
A further issue dealt with in the 2010 Design document was the design of
offsets. Given that there had been much experience with offset design by that
point, the 2010 Design document simply recommended that offset projects
approved by WCI partner jurisdictions would meet criteria described in certain
final recommendations on the subject issued by a WCI working group tasked with
devising standards on the matter. Although a number of protocols already existed
in other cap-and-trade systems at the time the 2010 Design document further noted
that WCI partners were “continuing to establish key protocol components for each
priority project type.” 242
The 2010 Design document noted as well that “[t]he WCI Partner jurisdictions
plan to auction emission allowances in a regionally coordinated manner to ensure
fairness and transparency, maximize efficiency, and ensure consistent application
of state and provincial laws.” 243 This would require coordinated auction format,
timing, and frequency, a standard reserve price, the creation of emission ‘vintages’
to further regulate sales, lot sizes, the regulation of guarantees, information sharing
and transparency, mitigation of market manipulation, and a number of associated
criteria that would have to be worked out. 244
A final concern in the 2010 Design document is the need to ensure “a wellfunctioning market”. 245 This subject included “specific policies to ensure fair and
equal access to the market, transparent operations and timely public disclosure of
critical information to maintain public confidence, and a market free of
manipulation so that prices reflect supply and demand conditions.” 246 The 2010
Design document therefore recommended that partner jurisdictions maintain
primary responsibility for the auction and cash markets and that the appropriate
jurisdiction-specific authorities (the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in
the U.S.; the provincial regulatory authorities in each Canadian province) be
primarily responsible for oversight of the derivatives market as it related to
emissions allowances.
As mentioned above, the 2008 Recommendations and 2010 Design documents
became a common platform on which the basis of cap-and-trade programs would
be built in each WCI partner jurisdiction. In California and Québec, such programs
began in 2013 and linkage occurred at the beginning of 2014. In Ontario, the capand-trade program began in 2017 and linkage with California and Québec was
240
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achieved at the beginning of 2018, followed by Ontario’s withdrawal six months
later.
2.4.2 Linkage

Linkage is a subject that is mentioned in both the 2008 Recommendations and the
2010 Design for the WCI Regional Program but not fully detailed. The
justification given for the phenomenon of linkage of cap-and-trade programs is
that linkage allows:
1) the incorporation of more opportunities to reduce GHG emissions,
thereby improving a program’s cost-effectiveness while achieving greater
reductions in emissions;
2) reducing the risk of emissions leakage and maintaining competitiveness
between actors subject to the same emissions rules
3) improving market liquidity, reducing volatility and the likelihood of
market manipulation
4) sharing of administrative functions, thereby reducing the costs of
program operation and enhancing consistency across jurisdictions. 247
The 2008 Recommendations are particularly noteworthy for the way that they
identify elements that must be harmonized in linking in contrast to those that may
be harmonized in such a scheme. Thus, the 2008 Recommendations note that:
. . . some elements of a multi-jurisdictional cap program . . . must be the
same between implementing jurisdictions.; these include certain elements
of measurement and reporting of emissions, the schedule for distributing
allowances to covered entities or facilities, compliance and reconciliation
periods, the use of banking and/or borrowing, the acceptance of offsets
and allowances from other trading programs, and compliance and
enforcement. 248
By contrast, the 2008 Recommendations identify the following features as not
requiring harmonization:
Other elements of a multi-jurisdictional cap-and-trade program did not
need to be the same across implementing jurisdictions: it is not critical
that the states and provinces allocate allowances within their jurisdictions
in the same manner in jurisdictions may include varying levels of auction
in their allowance distribution. 249
Harmonization under the WCI therefore depends upon a combination of
elements, both harmonized and non-harmonized. The exact combination will
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differ depending on the jurisdictions involved. A review of experience in each
linkage achieved under WCI is instructive.
2.4.2.1 California-Québec Linkage (2014)

By virtue of Assembly Bill 32, California’s Legislative Assembly directed
CARB to maintain California’s leadership in climate change mitigation by
developing integrated and cost-effective regional, national, and international GHG
reduction programs. The idea of linking California’s cap-and-trade system with
Québec’s was to be a keystone in that effort. No other formal connection
maintained by the state to date is nearly as ambitious.
Following the release of the WCI 2010 Design document both California and
Québec adopted and implemented cap-and-trade programs based on it. In
California’s case, the program was enshrined in CARB’s original cap-and-trade
regulation. Similarly, Québec amended its Environmental Quality Act to provide
for an in-province cap-and-trade program. The fact that both programs were
developed from the same template and prepared about the same time meant that
harmonization could proceed, even if the two jurisdictions sit at opposite ends of
North America and are in no sense “regional”.
At the same time, Québec government documents are clear that even at that
stage – and with the prior benefit of the 2008 Recommendations and the 2010
Design document – harmonization with California’s program required substantial
staff coordination and alignment due to legal and linguistic differences:
. . . the two systems operated in two very different linguistic and legal
environments. French being the official language of Québec, the Québec
regulation respecting its cap-and-trade system was drafted in that
language under the Province’s civil code; while California’s
corresponding regulation was written in English according to common
law principles. This meant that every word, expression, sentence, article
and legal terminology in the regulations, once translated, also had to be
scrutinized to achieve agreement on its conceptual and practical
meaning. 250
In addition, different approaches had been taken to implementation, meaning
that a sophisticated approach had to be adopted to the question of what needed to
be aligned versus that which did not. The same Québec government document
details that “in agreeing on a similar phrasing for the matching provisions in each
other’s regulations, both sides had to reconcile two different legal approaches to
achieve harmonization. And last, the two systems were operating under different
broader sets of environmental regulations and public consultation processes, and
those had to be respected.” 251
The specific approach to harmonization pursued by the two jurisdictions in
linking involved the identification of three specific categories of measures:
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1. Those provisions that, for the full linking to occur, had to be identical:
for example, the provisions regarding the joint auction of allowances and
the purchase and holding limits that protect against market manipulation.
In addition, since allowances are only created in electronic form, all
transfers of allowances between systems had to take place within a
common registry. The rules governing such transfers also had to be
identical.
2. Those provisions that, for the full linking to occur, had to produce
similar outcomes but did not need to be identical: for example, the
provisions regarding measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) that
are needed to make sure that a ton of GHG emitted and verified in a
partner jurisdiction equals a ton of GHG emitted and verified everywhere
within the partnership;
3. Those provisions that could still be different from one another without
impacting the linking process: for instance, California’s regulation
contains provisions recognizing GHG emission reductions from a
voluntary offset program that had started several years before its cap-andtrade system became operational, while Québec’s regulation includes
provisions recognizing GHG mitigation efforts made voluntarily by
industry prior to the implementation of its cap-and-trade system. 252
In California, certain statutory requirements require the state’s Governor to
certify any program to which California is proposed to link before that linkage
may take place. 253 The certification involves an assessment by CARB of whether
or not the linked program satisfies four requirements:
1) the jurisdiction has adopted program requirements for GHG reductions,
including, but not limited to, requirements for offsets, that are equivalent
to or stricter than those required by the California program;
2) under the proposed link, California must be able to enforce its program
against any entity subject to the regulation and against any entity located
within the linking jurisdiction;
3) the proposed linkage provides for enforcement of program
requirements that are equivalent to or stricter than California’s;
4) the proposed link cannot impose any significant liability on the state
for any failure associated with the link. 254
In the California assessment of readiness for linkage, three general questions
were articulated to guide the process. They were:
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1) whether the procedures and systems used to implement the program
were compatible and ensure integrity of the program,
2) whether the procedures and systems that need to be conducted jointly
for linkage were well-defined and in place to support linking, and
3) whether the two jurisdictions have in place procedures to work
collaboratively and constructively to maintain harmonization.
In practical terms, the assessment was organized to examine three main topics
corresponding to the three main groupings of the program activities examined.
These pertained to 1) readiness to coordinate programs, 2) readiness to enable
cross-jurisdictional transfer of compliance instruments, and 3) readiness to join the
auction of emission allowances.
In terms of coordinating the linked programs, the focus was on procedures that
both jurisdictions had in place to work collaboratively throughout the
implementation of their respective programs. In particular, the focus at this stage
was on whether the two jurisdictions had in place a process for review and public
input regarding any changes proposed to a linked jurisdictions program, including
changes or additions to offset protocols.
In terms of cross-jurisdictional transfer of compliance instruments, the focus
was on the program elements that affected the compliance instruments themselves,
which consequently fed into the environmental integrity of each jurisdiction’s
program. These activities broadly covered the cap-and-trade program including
management of the mandatory emissions reporting process and data; issuing and
tracking emission allowances; issuing and tracking offset credits; operating the
CITSS; registration of participants in the CITSS; monitoring and evaluating
instrument transfers in the CITSS; and examining transactions that underlie the
instrument transfers in the CITSS and that occur in related markets.
In terms of joint auctions, the focus was on the program elements required for
California and Québec to hold joint auctions of emissions allowances. This
involved examination of the auction platform, including financial services, auction
procedures performed in each jurisdiction such as approval of auction applicants,
and auction procedures performed jointly by the two jurisdictions — such as
review and acceptance of the report prepared by the independent market monitor.
To assess readiness for coordination of the two programs, California and
Québec staff focused on putting in place a linkage agreement that would define
the manner in which the two jurisdictions would manage their relationship going
forward. This became the California-Québec Linkage Agreement (hereinafter
‘CA-QC Linkage Agreement’). 255 For this purpose, program elements were
identified. In addition, several joint procedures were noted that were needed to

255 Agreement between the California Air Resources Board and the Government of Québec
concerning the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for Reducing
Greenhouse
Gas
Emissions
(2013),
www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/documentation-en.htm#regulations [hereinafter
CA-QC Linkage Agreement].
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support linked activities. 256 These were then assessed against criteria of
completeness, management control, accuracy, security and auditability. 257
The application of these criteria was facilitated by the fact that many of the
program procedures involved working through the CITSS, a single mechanism
with exactly the same procedures for all participants. California and Québec had
worked together for several years to specify the functionality and security built
into the CITSS. The Governor’s review “found that the two jurisdictions conduct
many processes in essentially identical ways”. 258
In addition, the Linkage Readiness Report noted that California and Québec
had each adopted regulations for their respective mandatory GHG emissions
reporting and cap-and-trade programs: “Through extensive consultations between
the jurisdictions, the regulations have been harmonized in all respects necessary to
ensure that they are compatible and ready for linking. Each jurisdiction included
in its regulations and the ability to link with the other, including specifying that
compliance instruments from the linked program can be used for compliance and
allowing for the joint auctioning of emission allowances.” 259 The Linkage
Readiness Report went on to note that “it is anticipated that the jurisdictions will
continue to make adjustments during the implementation of their programs that
will affect program operations. To ensure that the California and Québec programs
remain harmonized, the jurisdictions must work together to identify and address
implementation issues as they arise. Collaboration is also required to ensure that
both programs enforce their respective requirements in a consistent manner.
Harmonized enforcement helps ensure that the same high standards of compliance
are maintained throughout the two programs.” 260
The Linkage Readiness Report’s observations on this point are important
given that they envisage adaptive behavior as part of harmonization. Jurisdictions
do not harmonize at one point in time, but across time. Hence the need for a
common approach to enforcement and system integrity. For this reason, Art. 4 of
the CA-QC Linking Agreement ultimately provided the following:
To support the objective of harmonization and integration of the
programs, any proposed changes or additions to those programs shall be
discussed between the Parties. The Parties acknowledge that sufficient
time is required to enable effective public review and comment . . . The
Parties shall consult regarding changes that may affect the harmonization
256
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and integration process or have other impacts on either Party. Each Party’s
public process for making program changes must be respected. 261
The Linkage Readiness Report also noted that “Staff-level collaboration is an
important aspect of achieving and maintaining the harmonization and integration
of the programs.” 262 Three working groups – Tracking System, Auction and
Monitoring and the Management Working Group – demonstrate the ability to
maintain the harmonization of their respective programs. Additional working
groups could be formed to address specific needs. The Linkage Readiness Report
noted that “The track record of successful working group collaboration, combined
with the commitments from both California and Québec embodied in the [CA-QC
Linking Agreement], demonstrates the readiness to continue to collaborate
effectively following linkage of the two programs.” 263
A second general area of concern in the California-Québec linkage process
was the exchange of compliance instruments, a key focus of mutual recognition.
In this respect CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report observed that “The primary
operational aspect of linking the California and Québec programs is that
compliance instruments issued by California can be used to comply with the
Québec program, and compliance instruments issued by Québec can be used for
compliance in California.” 264 Here the demand was for complete
interchangeability, or ‘fungibility’. Fungibility was assessed in two respects: 1) the
status of the Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service (CITSS) and 2) the
efficacy of compliance instrument issuance.
The CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report notes that the status of the CITSS was
reviewed to evaluate whether the system was prepared to enable transfers among
participants in the two programs. It was foreseen that CITSS would be used to 1)
register entities participating in the California and Québec programs, 2) track
ownership of compliance instruments, 3) enable and record compliance instrument
transfers, 4) facilitate the submission of compliance instruments as required for
compliance, and 5) support market oversight by providing access to account and
transfer data. 265 The CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report observed that both the
California and Québec programs perform the same steps within the CITSS to:
261
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staff during the process, will also be consulting with Québec staff regarding proposed program
changes.” Id. at 15.
262 Id. at 11.
263 Id. at 13.
264 Id. at 17.
265 Id. at 17-18.
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•

issue and transfer allowances into the jurisdictions’ accounts

•

transfer allowances from jurisdiction accounts to participants’
accounts

•

transfer allowances from jurisdiction accounts to the auction holding
account

•

transfer allowances from the auction holding account to successful
auction bidders’ accounts

•

retire allowances from participants’ compliance accounts.

For each of these functions, the CITSS was designed to require that
individuals authorized to initiate these functions (i.e. transfers) were separate from
the individuals authorized to approve the completion of the functions.
Consequently, no single individual would be capable of performing all of these
functions. In this respect the CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report found that, “In all
cases, the California and Québec procedures [for CITSS functions] were found to
be equivalent. For example, in addition to the CITSS audit trail of activities, both
programs include paper-based checklists and workflow forms for these CITSS
actions, each of which must be signed by senior managers before action is taken.
These forms are retained in a secure location for each program, providing an
independent audit trail of the work that underlies the action and the management
approval that was provided.” 266
On the issue of ensuring equivalent efficacy of compliance instrument
issuance, the CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report observed that “the stringency of
the two programs was evaluated and found to be consistent. This finding means
that the number of emission allowances being issued by each program, and the
number and type of offset credits that can be used in each program, result in similar
program stringency.” 267 At the same time, in the CA-QC Linkage Readiness
Report, CARB staff recommended the introduction of transfer summaries – that
is, the obligation to provide a summary report to the other jurisdiction that shows
the purpose of the transfer, the total number of allowances that will be transferred,
and the sources of the allowances. Such a summary report would enable each
jurisdiction to provide an added check on the other’s proposed transfer. In addition,
a CITSS monthly balance would be reconciled to ensure that the total of
allowances traded matched records of what had been issued and what had been put
into circulation. 268
The CA-QC Linkage Agreement concluded in 2013 embodies many of the
points covered in the CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report, confirming that the
arrangement between them was to be purely intergovernmental rather than
supranational. For instance, it notes the following:

266
267
268

Id. at19.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 20.
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the Parties further recognize that the present Agreement does not, will not
and cannot be interpreted to restrict, limit or otherwise prevail over each
Party’s sovereign right and authority to adopt, maintain, modify or repeal
any of their respective program regulations. 269
In specific textual terms the CA-QC Linkage Agreement mandated that the
parties “shall consult each other regularly and constructively” and that “the
procedural requirements of each Party shall be respected” (Art. 3). It also provided
for ongoing regulatory harmonization with respect to their respective GHG
emission reduction programs and that “[i]n the case where a difference between
certain elements of the Parties’ programs is identified, the Parties shall determine
if such elements need to be harmonized for the proper functioning and integration
of the programs.” (Art. 4). Offsets should have the “essential qualities of being
real, additional, quantifiable, permanent, verifiable, and enforceable”. At the same
time, parties “may consider making changes to their respective offset protocols,
adding additional offset protocols, or changing procedures for issuing offset
credits.” However, to support harmonization and integration “proposed changes or
additions [to offsets] shall be discussed between the Parties.” (Art. 5). The CA-QC
Linkage Agreement also expressly provided for mutual recognition of compliance
instruments. However, it noted obligations of notification and respect for voiding
actions undertaken by each jurisdiction where it was determined “that a
compliance instrument that it has issued should not have been issued or must be
voided”. (Art. 6). In addition, the CA-QC Linkage Agreement identified the
trading of compliance instruments (Art. 7), joint auctions (Art. 8), a common
program registry and auction platforms (Art. 9) and the need for the two
jurisdictions to work cooperatively to supervise and enforce their respective
programs (Art. 10).
The CA-QC Linkage Agreement also provided for the creation of a
Consultation Committee composed of one representative from each jurisdiction
(Art. 12). The Committee was described as “monitor[ing] the implementation of
all measures that are required for the effective harmonization and integration of
the Parties’ [programs]”, reporting the results of the CA-QC Linkage Agreement
annually and “address[ing] any other issues at the request of the Parties.” Among
these is serving as the ultimate stage for the resolution of any differences among
the parties. 270

269

Id. at 1. Article 13 of the Agreement also noted that “This Agreement does not modify
any existing laws and regulations, nor may any of its provisions be interpreted as amending any
agreement or provision of an agreement entered into or to be entered into by either Party.”
270 CA-QC Linkage Agreement Article 18 entitled “Resolution of Differences” noted that
the parties “shall resolve differences by using and building on established working relationships,
including enabling staff to work jointly through workgroups to develop proposed harmonized
and integrated approaches for consideration by each Party.” If approaches for resolving
differences that are acceptable to the Parties cannot be developed in a timely manner through
staff workgroups, the Parties shall constructively engage through the Consultation Committee,
and if needed with additional officials of the Parties, or their designees. The Parties endeavor to
resolve differences in a timely manner, so that the harmonization and integration of the programs
can be maintained.”
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2.4.2.2 California-Québec-Ontario Linkage (2018)

As the preceding section suggests, the California-Québec-Ontario Linkage of
2018 arose out of a rich background of regulatory harmonization. The Province of
Ontario had a long history of collaborating with California and Québec regarding
their respective cap-and-trade program regulations as well as associated regulatory
changes. California, Québec, and Ontario were among the eleven jurisdictions that
collaborated in the development of the WCI’s 2008 Recommendations and 2010
Design document. All three jurisdictions were well aware of the regulatory actions
that followed in each jurisdiction to give shape and form to these. In addition, the
Ontario cap-and-trade program was designed with advice and support from
California and Québec. Likewise, Ontario, together with Québec, had participated
in regulatory discussions with CARB when California’s cap-and-trade program
was revised in 2016 following the passage of Assembly Bill 398. At that time, it
was noted that “the constructive engagement of the jurisdictions [was]
instrumental for ensuring that key aspects of all three programs will continue to
align.” 271
There were clear benefits projected from Ontario’s inclusion in the link.
Although the three jurisdictions are not “regional”, they constitute the three largest
jurisdictions (by population size) involved in WCI. Ontario’s entry would result in
the extension of coverage to approximately 150 new entities. It could be expected
that, consistent with considerations of economic theory underlying cap-and-trade
design, the inclusion of Ontario would materially expand the market for emission
allowance trading at the same time.
Certain drawbacks could be foreseen as well. The ‘trilateralization’ of the
California-Québec relationship to include Ontario would necessarily render
harmonization more complex. A further partner would have to be consulted.
Another set of program priorities and objectives would have to be accommodated.
The extension of the link to another jurisdiction raised the possibility of a more
complicated relationship among the partner jurisdictions and the need to address
this complexity through a certain ‘genericization’, or ‘objectivization’, of the
overall arrangement. This step would be reflected in the ultimate shape of the CAQC-ON Linkage Agreement.
Once again, requirements of California law triggered the need for a review by
CARB of Ontario’s program prior to certification of linkage readiness, as had
happened in the case of Québec in 2013. The first finding required by California
Government Code section 12894 subd. (f) focused on the strength of the proposed
linking partner’s program. The linked program needed to be “equivalent to or
stricter than” that of California. To determine equivalence, CARB examined the
jurisdiction’s emission reduction goal, the role of cap-and-trade in achieving the
jurisdiction’s reduction goal, and the rules and requirements incorporated in
Ontario’s cap-and-trade program legislation.

271 California Air Resources Board, CA-QC-ON Linkage Readiness Report at 11 (2017),
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/linkage.htm [hereinafter CA-QC-ON Linkage
Readiness Report].
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First, on the subject of Ontario’s reduction goal, CARB staff noted that
Ontario’s 2020 goal was to reduce emissions to 15% below 1990 levels by 2020,
which is more stringent than California’s goal (to reduce emissions to 1990 levels
by 2020). At the same time, staff noted that both California and Ontario’s
reduction goals were codified in legislation. CARB staff also noted that while
Ontario’s per capita emissions (17.65 Mt) were higher than California’s (14.48
Mt) in 1990, Ontario had succeeded in lowering its per capita emissions as of 2014
to 12.43 Mt per capital, mostly through the phase-out of coal generation in
electricity production, mentioned above. Casting a somewhat wider eye at
Ontario’s reduction goals in decades to come, CARB staff noted that Ontario’s
goals were very similar or equivalent to those of California. 272
Second, on the role of the cap-and-trade program in achieving Ontario’s
reduction goal, CARB staff noted that like California, Ontario supported “the
attainment of their emission reduction goals in concert with other programs.” 273 In
addition, the amount of emission allowances in both the California and Ontario
programs in the period 2017-2020 was developed using the same methodology
originally recommended by WCI. For this reason, California and Ontario were
deemed to have “equivalent roles in each jurisdiction’s overall emissions reduction
program.” 274
Third, with respect to the rules and requirements incorporated in Ontario’s
cap-and-trade program legislation, it was noted that “[d]ue to extensive
collaboration as California and Ontario participated in WCI, the two Cap-andTrade Programs share many identical features.” 275 These include identical verified
emission reporting requirements, program coverage of the same GHG,
government control of emission allowances, compliance instrument surrender,
anti-fraud provisions, holding limitations, and limited offsets subject to detailed
protocols. However, some minor differences were noted. For instance, Ontario
(and Québec) covered all seven GHG in their cap-and-trade programs whereas
California had opted to regulate certain high global warming potential (GWP)
gases by direct regulation. 276 Likewise, on the subject of reserve sales, covered
participants in California could have no allowances whereas in Ontario reserve
sales were limited to participants unable to obtain allowances, a requirement
California’s program did not include. 277 Finally, with respect to offset invalidation,
CARB staff noted that Ontario’s legislation provided recourse against the offset
developer. “If the offset developer is unable to replace the invalidated offsets,
Ontario will withdraw replacement offsets from a buffer account” 278 containing
3% of the offset project’s allowances. In California, by contrast, the law employed

272

California Discussion of Findings Required by Government Code section 12894 at 4-5
(2017), www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/linkage.htm.
273 Id. at 5.
274 Id. at 6.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 7.
277 Id. at 8.
278 Id. at 10.

206

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43, 2019]

a different strategy: “If the offset had been used for compliance, the party that
surrendered the offset credits is required to obtain and surrender replacements.” 279
From all of the above, CARB staff was able to conclude that “the
harmonization of the program regulations results in equivalency in the two
programs’ environmental integrity, compliance requirements, and market
rules.” 280
On three other mandated bases, linkage with Ontario was held to meet
California criteria. Thus, it was determined that “[l]inkage with Ontario will not
impede California’s ability to enforce its regulations to the maximum
constitutionally-permissible extent.” 281 It was also determined that Ontario had
equivalent or stricter enforcement tools then California. 282 Finally, linkage with
Ontario did not impose liability on California. Out of this set of determinations,
CARB staff concluded that “[t]he foregoing comparison of California and
Ontario’s emissions trading programs provides support for making the four
findings” required under California Government Code section 12894(f). 283
A close examination of differences in the CA-QC-ON Linkage Readiness
Report versus that of the CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report concluded four years
before also reveals little change. The texts differ only in minor respects. 284 Much
of the template for linkage appears to have been set. The general impression is one
of an extension of mutual recognition of compliance instruments as opposed to
their wholesale modification.
Where differences become more pronounced is in the scheme of the Linkage
Agreement. Under the provisions of the CA-QC-ON Linkage Agreement,
California and Québec agreed to terminate their 2013 Agreement and to substitute
a new one in its place. This change demonstrates an important weakness of the
original CA-QC Linkage Agreement. Although a third-party provision had been
included in that agreement, its ‘contractual’ structure made it highly peculiar to
the parties involved and required amendment each time a third party joined. 285 This
shortcoming made the original cumbersome and unwieldly to modify.
To overcome that difficulty, the CA-QC-ON Linkage Agreement projected a
more permanent arrangement. In essence, third party jurisdictions were invited to
279

Id.
Id.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 11-13.
283 Id.
284 For example, the CA-QC-ON Linkage Agreement appears to be slightly more
sovereignty-conscious in the sense that its recitals note that “the present Agreement does not,
will not and cannot be interpreted to restrict, limit or otherwise prevail over relevant national
obligations of each Party”. In addition, it mentions the aim of “develop[ing] and implement[ing]
an accounting mechanism that provides for a transparent and data-driven calculation that
attributes to each Party its portion of the total greenhouse gas emission reduction achieved
jointly by the Parties’ linked cap-and-trade programs”: CA-QC-ON Linkage Readiness Report,
supra note 271, at art. 1(c)).
285 “Recognizing that the Parties welcome effective, timely, and meaningful action to reduce
GHG emissions by states, provinces and territories, this Agreement may be amended to include
additional parties that have adopted programs that are harmonized with each of the Parties’
programs”: Id. at art. 17.
280
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join a concrete agreement rather than fundamentally renegotiate its terms. Article
20 of the new agreement contains an accession clause in the following terms:
Recognizing that the Parties welcome effective, timely, and meaningful
action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by other jurisdictions, a
candidate Party may be added as a Party to the Agreement if the candidate
Party has adopted a program that is harmonized and can be integrated with
each of the Parties’ programs, if all of the Parties to the Agreement agree
to add the candidate Party by signing an Accession Amending Agreement
and then the candidate Party agrees to become a party to the Agreement
by signing an Instrument of Accession.
To do so, the legal procedures required by each Party must be respected.
The CA-QC-ON Linkage Agreement also contains a standard form of an
Accession Amending Agreement and an Instrument of Accession that can be
found in Annex 2 and Annex 3, respectively. The Agreement adds that “Once the
Parties have signed an Accession Amending Agreement, the candidate Party shall
sign an Instrument of Accession.” This standardization is welcome in the sense
that it provides a more regular template for accession in future.

CHAPTER 3: WCI CAP-AND-TRADE: OVERVIEW AND CAP
The preceding chapter examined the legal and policy background to WCI capand-trade. In this chapter, a closer look is taken at specific components of the
system on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. It examines 12 subjects: system
overview, legislation, the cap, compliance periods, emissions attribution,
emissions allocation, flexibility, registration, reporting, verification, monitoring
and enforcement.
3.1 System Overview

The Western Climate Initiative cap-and-trade functions as a “system”, that is,
an assembly of elements operating together to achieve a common purpose. 286 In
the case of WCI cap-and-trade, the purpose is to reduce GHG emissions while
providing a mix of incentives to foster technologic innovation. The exact
requirements to implement the system differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Consequently, before examining specific components of the system, it is useful to
gain some idea of how the system works overall.
Perhaps the most innovative and salient aspect of a cap-and-trade system is
harnessing the power of markets for environmental protection. Markets are
traditionally thought about in economic terms. They appear to have little in
common with the integrity and sustainability that are characteristic of
contemporary understandings of the environment.
286 Donella Meadows defined systems as consisting of elements, interconnections, and a
function or purpose. She gave as an example a football team which “is a system with elements
such as players, coach, field, and ball. Its interconnections are the rules of the game . . . The
purpose of the team is to win games”: Donella Meadows, THINKING IN SYSTEMS: A PRIMER 11
(Earthscan 2008).
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As mentioned, a cap-and-trade system operates by capping the GHG
emissions of certain emitters and then permitting the trading of allowances that
these emitters require to satisfy the cap as calculated at the end of a defined
compliance period. The cap is gradually lowered over time; therefore, emitters
have the option of either lowering their own emissions at a certain cost, engaging
in offset activities to generate allowances, or purchasing allowances from other
emitters who have surplus allowances on hand. The possibility of purchasing
allowances in order to meet individual emitter ceilings gives rise to the idea of a
‘market’.
A ‘market’ for carbon emissions under the WCI requires an appreciation of
markets themselves. Markets are a response to a very common dilemma. When
too many actors share a single resource, the resource tends to be overused.
Consider overfishing in the oceans or air pollution. This wasteful overuse is
occasionally termed the “tragedy of the commons.” 287 Such failures are often
addressed by creating private property out of a common resource. Property
“owners tend to avoid overuse because they benefit directly from conserving
resources they control.” 288 Markets are places where these private rights can be
exchanged. Markets are usually considered to be efficient in the sense that
transactions within them take place at a certain price, which signals the latest value
assigned by actors to the resources involved. Markets also serve a valuable
communication function by indicating the relative value of those rights in
transactions and by socializing behavior so as to allow for participation in the
market.
The trading of emissions allowances under the WCI cap-and-trade takes place
in a ‘market.’ However, like many markets, the market created by WCI cap-andtrade is not unconstrained or completely free. A judicious mix of public and private
incentives is introduced to achieve the goals of the market. First, as we will see,
WCI partner governments introduce caps on GHG emissions which meet (or
exceed) national commitments; they are the key to establishing what baselines
individual emitters in a jurisdiction must meet in order to satisfy their own entityspecific emissions requirements and broader climate goals. Second, the setting of
caps presupposes an extensive administrative framework of governments,
regulators and other actors (such as verification agents) that can determine
emissions attributions and allocations as well as allowances, offsets and participant
registration, and ensure market integrity. Third, once each WCI partner’s cap is
established, emissions allocations have been made, and allowances, credits and
offsets distributed or determined, trading must be facilitated. Here, governments
play a role in helping to establish and maintain active markets for trading
allocations among registered participants. Regulation includes the conduct of
auctions, pricing, sales, transfer of allowances, taxation and other issues. Fourth,
there is the issue of ‘linkage’, or the harmonization and interconnection of
emissions trading systems among partner jurisdictions to create a consolidated
287

A term originally coined by the ecologist Garrett Hardin in 1968. See Michael Heller,
THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION,
AND COSTS LIVES 17 (Basic Books 2008).
288 Id.
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market for allowances, thereby promoting goals of transferability and efficiency.
A substantial degree of uniformity is required in order to promote systemic
integrity and minimize the phenomenon of ‘carbon leakage’, that is, the decision
of emitters to conduct operations in non-WCI jurisdictions in order to circumvent
cap-and-trade disciplines and costs in a jurisdiction covered by WCI.
All of these incentives rely on pre-existing administrative structures that
regulate and facilitate coordination among government and non-governmental
actors. Hence, there is a need to explain as well as analyze the WCI and its
components before examining the operation of the emissions trading market in
detail.
3.2 Legislation

The legislative basis for cap-and-trade in each WCI jurisdiction has already
been previewed in previous chapters. That legislative basis is essential since it
provides the foundation upon which each cap-and-trade program is founded. It is
doubly important in a scheme like WCI cap-and-trade since beyond certain
technical requirements and common features, there are few higher-level norms.
Jurisdictions commit to participating in WCI on a “best efforts” basis, but always
maintain their own laws. There is no external set of disciplines that can be used to
enforce, apart perhaps from the implicit threat of delinking.
The lack of a formal framework means that from a structural point of view,
the feature of WCI must be understood through the law of the separate jurisdictions
in which they operate.
California

The legislative basis for cap-and-trade in California originates in the Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (also known as “Assembly Bill 32”). Assembly
Bill 32 established the goal of decreasing GHG emissions in-state to 1990 levels
by 2020, a reduction of 15%. Pursuant to Assembly Bill 32, CARB was required
to adopt regulations to achieve maximum technologically feasible and costeffective GHG emission reductions. Assembly Bill 32 also required CARB to
develop ‘Scoping Plans’ which lay out California’s strategy for meeting its climate
related goals. The Scoping Plan was required to be updated every five years. In
December 2008, CARB approved the initial Scoping Plan, which included a suite
of measures to cut GHG emissions substantially. One of these measures was capand-trade.
Initially, CARB was not given the authority to implement cap-and-trade
beyond 2020. In 2016 the California Legislature enacted State Bill 32, which
established an additional target of reducing GHG emissions by at least 40% by
2030. Under State Bill 32, CARB was given wide discretion over how to design
the cap-and-trade program. Subsequently, Assembly Bill 398 extended CARB’s
authority to operate cap-and-trade from 2020 to 2030 and provided additional
legislative direction regarding certain design features of the post-2020 program.
Assembly Bill 398 also included new reporting and oversight requirements.
The existing CARB Cap-and-Trade program was modified by Assembly Bill
398 in at least six important ways. First, whereas the current regulations
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established the number of allowances issued each year through 2030, Assembly
Bill 398 indicated that when setting post-2020 caps, CARB was to evaluate and
address concerns relating to a large number of pre-existing banked allowances.
Second, the current regulations set no expiration date for allowances, whereas
Assembly Bill 398 directs CARB to adopt banking rules that “discourage
speculation, avoid financial windfalls, and consider impact on complying entities
and market volatility.” Third, the current regulations set a “soft” price ceiling of
about USD $60 per allowance in 2017 and increasing gradually in future years,
whereas Assembly Bill 398 directs CARB to establish a “hard” price ceiling and
consider various factors when setting that ceiling. Fourth, the current regulations
feature no price containment points, whereas Assembly Bill 398 directs CARB to
establish two price containment points (known as “speed bumps”) between the
price floor and the price ceiling of emission allowances to moderate price
increases. Fifth, current regulations establish an offset limit maximum of 8% of a
covered entity’s emissions, whereas Assembly Bill 398 sets this maximum at 4%
in the period 2021-2025 and 6% in the period 2026-2030, with no more than half
coming from projects that do not provide direct environmental benefits in
California. Sixth, current regulations set three different industry assistance factors
(IAFs) for high-, medium-, and low-risk industries to receive free allowances in
the period 2018-2020. Assembly Bill 398 mandates 100% IAFs from 2021-2025.
In addition to the above amendments, California’s regulatory framework for
GHG emissions is buttressed by the following regulations:
•

Regulation for the California Cap on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Market-Based Compliance Mechanisms, Code of California
Regulations, Title 17, ss. 95800-96023.

•

CARB’s Regulation for the Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions (MMR) appearing at sections 95100-95163 of Title 17,
California Code of Regulations. The regulation was originally
approved in 2007 and revised in 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2014. The
most recent amendments to MRR were approved and became
effective on January 1, 2018.

California’s emissions trading system covers approximately 85% of GHG in
its GHG emissions inventory. The system covers carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), nitrogen trifluoride (NF3) and other fluorinated GHGs.
The number of liable entities in the state was estimated at 700 in 2013. 289 Sectors

289 The CA-QC Linkage Readiness Report indicates that California had approximately 700
facilities in November of 2013. A “covered entity” under the California legislation means an
entity within California that: has one or more of the processes or operations described above;
has a compliance obligation, as specified in subarticle 7 of the Cap-and-Trade Regulation; and
has emitted, produced, imported, manufactured, or delivered in 2008 or any subsequent year
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covered in the First Compliance Period (2013-2014) include those which have one
or more of the following processes or operations: large industrial facilities
(including cement production, glass production, hydrogen production, iron and
steel production, lead production, lime manufacturing, nitric acid production,
petroleum and natural gas systems, petroleum refining, pulp and paper
manufacturing, and cogeneration facilities co-owned/operated at any of these
facilities), electricity generation, electricity imports, other stationary combustion
and CO2 suppliers. Sector coverage in the Second Compliance Period (2015-2017)
and beyond was extended to suppliers of natural gas, suppliers of reformulated
blendstock for oxygenate blending and distillation fuel oil, suppliers of liquid
petroleum gas in California and suppliers of liquefied natural gas. The inclusion
threshold was for facilities in the above sectors emitting 25,000t CO2 per year.
Québec

In June 2009, the Québec National Assembly unanimously adopted the Act to
amend the Environment Quality Act and other legislative provisions in relation to
climate change. This grants the Government the enabling powers to implement, by
regulation, a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission allowances. 290 In
November 2009, after a National Assembly committee hearing, the Government
of Québec adopted a new greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction target of 20%
below 1990 levels by 2020, which was essential for the establishment of annual
GHG emission caps under the cap-and-trade system. This target, adopted by
Order-in-Council, has force of law. 291 In December 2011 the Government of
Québec adopted the Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for GHG
emission allowances. This Regulation describes the operating rules of Québec’s
cap-and-trade system. 292 In December 2012 the Government of Québec adopted
the Regulation to amend the Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for
greenhouse gas emission allowances. 293 This new regulation aimed at harmonizing
Québec and California’s cap-and-trade systems, enabling them to be linked. It also
introduced the operating rules of Québec’s offset credit system. Moreover in
December 2012, the Government of Québec adopted Order-in-Council 1185-2012
regarding the determination of the annual cap on GHG emission allowances under
the cap-and-trade system for 2013-2020. 294 The caps were set based on the most
more than the applicable threshold level specified in s. 95812(a) of the Regulation: CA-QC
Linkage Readiness Report, supra note 258, at 22.
290 Draft Bill 42-2009, An Act to amend the Environment Quality Act and other legislative
provisions in relation to climate change (August 26, 2009) in 2 Québec Official Gazette 34 at
4387.
291 Order in Council 1187-2009 (December 9, 2009) in 2 Québec Official Gazette 49 at 5871
(French only).
292 Order in Council 1297-2011, The Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system of
greenhouse gas emission allowances (December 16, 2011) in 2 Québec Official Gazette 50B at
5519B,
online:
http://www2.publicationsduQuébec.gouv.qc.ca/
dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=3&file=/Q_2/Q2R46_1_A.HTM.
293 Order in Council No 1184- 2012 (December 19, 2012) in 2 Québec Official Gazette 51
at 5480.
294 Order in Council No 1185-2012 (December 19, 2012) in 2 Québec Official Gazette 51at
5613.

212

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43, 2019]

recent known GHG emission data in order to enable Québec’s GHG emissions to
be reduced to 20% below 1990 levels by 2020.
Québec’s emissions trading system covers approximately 85% of GHG in its
GHG emissions inventory. The system covers CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, HFCs, PFCs,
NO3 and other fluorinated GHGs. The number of liable entities in the province
was estimated at 132 in 2017. Sectors covered in the First Compliance Period
(2013-2014) were electrical generation and industry emitting 25,000t CO2 per year
or more. Sector coverage in the Second Compliance Period (2015-2017) and Third
Compliance Period (2018-2020) included those in the First Compliance Period
alongside the distribution and importation of fuels used for consumption in the
transport and building sectors, as well as certain small and medium-size
businesses. The general inclusion threshold was 25,000t CO2 per year or more. As
of 2016, fuel distributors that had distributed 200L or more of fuel (in 2015 and
onwards) were also subject to inclusion even if combustion of the fuel they sold
had resulted in emissions of less than 25,000t CO2 per year. Starting in 2019,
emitters from capped sectors that reported emissions between 10,000-25,000t CO2
per year will be able to voluntarily register as covered entities in the system.
Ontario

The Ontario Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016,
S.O. 2016, c. 7, provided the legal foundation for the cap-and-trade program in the
province. The Act was supplemented by the following four Regulations:
Ontario’s Cap-and-trade Program Regulation (O. Reg. 144/17) took
effect July 1, 2016. It defined the key elements (e.g., caps, allocations)
and program rules (i.e., auctions, market requirements).*
Ontario’s Quantification, Reporting and Verification of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Regulation (O. Reg. 143/17) took effect January 1, 2017 and
provided for opting in, lowered the reporting threshold, and aligned with
cap-and-trade regulation.*
Ontario’s Offset Regulation (O. Reg. 539/17) took effect Jan. 1, 2018
and provided for the registration of offset initiatives, Ontario offset
credits, offset reversals, and offset reporting and verification in the
province.*
Ontario’s Administrative Penalties Regulation (O. Reg. 540/17) took
effect Jan. 1, 2018 and provided for a series of administrative penalties
to ensure compliance with the Act or its regulations. It also prevents
individuals or entities from deriving economic benefits as a result of a
contravention thereof.
Starred instruments (*) were revoked July 3, 2018 due to the provincial
government’s cancellation of cap-and-trade effective that date. 295
295 Prohibition against the purchase, sale and other dealings with emission allowances and
credits, O. Reg. 386/18 (Can.), made under the Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon
Economy Act, 2016, S.O. 2016, c 17, s 2 (Can.).
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Ontario’s emissions trading system covered approximately 82% of GHG in its
GHG emissions inventory. 296 The system covered CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, HFCs,
PFCs, NF3. The number of liable entities in the province was estimated at 148 in
2016. 297 Sectors covered in the First Compliance Period (2017-2020) were
industrial and large commercial operations (such as manufacturing, base metal
processing, steel, pulp and paper, and food processing), institutions (e.g.,
universities), transportation fuel processors and distributors(including propane and
fuel oil), businesses that generate, import (for consumption in Ontario), or
distribute electricity, as well as natural gas generators and distributors. 298 The
inclusion threshold was 25,000t CO2 or above for mandatory participants, 200L of
petroleum product supply for fuel distributors, and reported emissions between
10,000-25,000t CO2 per year for voluntary participants.
3.3 The Cap

As mentioned, the three WCI cap-and-trade jurisdictions (California, Québec,
Ontario) exist within national jurisdictions that have set Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs) for emission reductions under the Paris Agreement. These
NDC targets might be regarded as serving as a baseline for WCI-led reductions,
except that WCI-led GHG reduction efforts have been in place somewhat longer
and are, in most instances, more ambitious. Moreover, as pointed out above, a key
factor in the decision to link WCI jurisdictions was the degree of ambition
demonstrated by each jurisdiction’s cap.
The following are the caps indicated for each WCI partner jurisdiction.
California

In California the overall GHG emissions were 440.4Mt Co2 in 2015. The
overall California reduction target by 2020 is a return to 1990 levels, by 2030 a
40% reduction from 1990 levels and by 2050 an 80% reduction from 1990 levels.
Beyond 2020, compliance periods will be between two and three years long
(2021–2022, 2023–2024, 2025–2027, 2028–2029, and 2030–31) if the EPA
approves California’s plan for compliance with the federal Clean Power Plan by 1
January 2019. Otherwise, the fourth compliance period will start on 1 January
2021 and end on 31 December 2023, and each subsequent compliance period will
be three years long. 299
Year
First Compliance Period
2013
296

Cap (in million allowances of
CO2)
162.8

Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Ontario’s Climate Act From Plan to Progress:
Annual Greenhouse Gas Progress Report, 2017 at 106 (2017), [hereinafter Annual Greenhouse
Gas Progress Report, 2017].
297 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Introduction to Cap-and-trade in Ontario:
Appendix A to the ECO’s Greenhouse Gas Progress Report, 2016 at 10 (2016).
298 Id. at 12.
299 International Carbon Action Partnership, USA-California Cap-and-Trade Program
(2018), icapcarbonaction.com.
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2014
159.7
Second Compliance Period
2015
394.5
2016
382.4
2017
370.4
Third Compliance Period
2018
358.3
2019
346.3
2020
334.2
After Third Compliance Period: 2021 to 2031
2021
320.8
2022
307.5
2023
294.1
2024
280.7
2025
267.4
2026
254.0
2027
240.6
2028
227.3
2029
213.9
2030
200.5
2031
193.8
Québec

In Québec the overall GHG emissions were 82.1Mt Co2 in 2014. In Québec
the overall GHG reduction target by 2020 is a 20% reduction from 1990 levels, by
2030 a 37.5% reduction from 1990 levels, and by 2050 an 80-95% reduction from
1990 levels. The cap projected is absolute and aims to proceed along the trajectory
as found in the below table. After a slight increase in the cap in 2021 (due to an
adjustment of the global warming potential of different GHGs), the cap will
decrease by about 1.24 million allowances per year. This will result in a cap of
44.14 million allowances in 2030. 300
Year
First Compliance Period
2013
2014
Second Compliance Period
2015
2016
2017
300

Cap (in million allowances of
CO2)
23.20
23.20
65.30
63.19
61.08

International Carbon Action Partnership, Canada-Québec Cap-and-Trade Program
(2018), icapcarbonaction.com.
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Third Compliance Period
2018
2019
2020
Fourth Compliance Period
2021
2022
2023
Fifth Compliance Period
2024
2025
2026
Sixth Compliance Period
2027
2028
2029
2030
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58.96
56.85
54.74
55.26
54.02
52.79
51.55
50.31
49.08
47.84
46.61
45.37
44.14

Ontario

In Ontario the overall GHG emissions were 170Mt Co2 in 2014. 301 In Ontario
the overall GHG reduction target by 2020 was a 15% reduction from 1990 levels,
by 2030 a 37% reduction from 1990 levels, and by 2050 an 80% reduction from
1990 levels, as provided in the Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon
Economy Act, 2016 (suspended July 3, 2018). The cap projected was absolute and
aimed to proceed along the trajectory as outlined in the table below. 302
Year
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030

Cap (allowances of CO2)
124,668,000
121,058,000
117,438,000
113,818,000
110,198,000
106,578,000
102,958,000
99,339,000
95,719,000
92,099,000
88,479,000

301 Environment and Climate Change Canada, National Inventory Report 1990-2014:
Greenhouse Gas Sources and Sinks in Canada, Part 3 at 55 (2016).
302 Climate Change Mitigation and Low-Carbon Economy Act, S.O. 2016, c 7 (Can.).
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3.4 Compliance Periods

In all three WCI jurisdictions a trading period is referred to as a “compliance
period”. At the end of this period, covered participants must have allowances on
hand adequate to cover their individual emission limits. Allowances are allocated
and auctioned within calendar year vintages. Some allowances from future
vintages are offered for sale at each auction and may be traded but not used for
compliance until the compliance date for the vintage year. 303
California

In California the compliance period is three years (after the initial compliance
period in 2013-2014 of two years). Allowances for emissions of the whole
compliance period must be surrendered by November 1st (or the first business day
thereafter) of the year following the last year of a compliance period. 304 It is
important to note that California’s trading period is referred to as “compliance
period”, though a portion (30%) of allowances must be submitted for each year’s
emissions depending on the year of the trading/compliance period.
First Compliance Period: 2013-2014
Second Compliance Period: 2015-2017
Third Compliance Period: 2018-2020
Fourth Compliance Period and following: usually two-year periods, with one
three-year period (either 2021-2023 or 2025-2027 depending on the EPA’s
decision under the Clean Power Plan. 305 If the EPA has not approved
California’s plan for compliance with the Clean Power Plan by January 1,
2019, then California’s Fourth Compliance Period will start on 1 January 2021
and ends on 31 Dec. 2023 and each subsequent compliance period will be
three years long). 306
Québec

Similar to California, in Québec the compliance period is three years, and
allowances must be surrendered by November 1st (or the first business day
thereafter) of the year following the last year of a compliance period. 307
First compliance period: 2013-2014
Second compliance period: 2015-2017
Third compliance period: 2018-2020
Fourth compliance period: 2021–2023
Fifth compliance period: 2024–2026
Sixth compliance period: 2027–2029
303 One quarter of California future vintage allowances will be auctioned three years prior to
the vintage date: 17 C.C.R.§ 95910(c)(2)(B)
304 International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), Emissions Trading Worldwide: Status
Report, 2018 at 46-47 (2018) [hereinafter ICAP Status Report 2018].
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 49.
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Ontario

Following the same format as the other WCI jurisdictions, Ontario’s
compliance periods were three years, and allowances had to be surrendered by
November 1st (or the first business day thereafter) of the year following the last
year of a compliance period. 308 However, the first Ontario compliance period was
in fact four years, allowing one year for the province to hold their own auctions
prior to linking with the other WCI jurisdictions.
First compliance period: 2017-2020
Second compliance period: 2021-2023
3.5 Coverage

An emission allowance is a generic term that can represent 1) an emission
unit, 2) an offset credit or 3) an Early Reduction Credit (ERC). An emission unit
is an authorization to emit one tonne of GHG. The number of available GHG
emission units is limited and the total for all emitters covered by the cap-and-trade
system is equivalent to the annual published cap of GHG emission units set by the
government.
There are many different sources of GHG emissions. Under WCI cap-andtrade as currently constituted, emissions are attributed only to certain categories of
emitter and vary by jurisdiction. In California for example, agricultural emissions,
high global warming potential gases and select fugitive emissions are not captured
under current regulations. Québec has been developing offsets for methane
produced through agricultural use.
California

In California, the Regulation for the Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions requires annual reporting of GHGs from sources that emit greater than
10,000t CO2, transportation and natural gas fuel suppliers, and imported
electricity. 309 In 2016 this was estimated to capture approximately 80% of GHG
emissions included in California’s GHG inventory. If reported emissions by an
emitter are less than 10,000t CO2 per year for three consecutive years, the covered
operator or supplier may cease reporting after submitting an emissions data report
for the third consecutive year of <10,000t CO2 emissions. 310
Québec

In Québec, participants are considered emitters and therefore required to
participate if they are a person or municipality, operate in a sector of activity
covered by the relevant regulation, and met or exceeded certain emission
thresholds. In practical terms this included persons and/or municipalities that
operate any facility whose annual GHG emissions (excluding CO2 emissions
308

Id. at 51.
17 C.C.R § 95100-95157
310 California Environmental Protection Agency, Cessation of Reporting for California’s
2012
Mandatory
Greenhouse
Gas
Reporting
Regulation
(2013),
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/ghg-rep/guidance/ghg-cessation.pdf.
309
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related to the combustion of biomass) are greater than or equal to 25,000t. In
addition, any person or municipality that distributes in Québec electricity produced
outside Québec, and whose associated GHG emissions equal or exceed the annual
threshold of 25 kt CO2eq., is also subject to the system. During the first compliance
period these limits covered approximately 80 facilities from the industrial and
power generation sectors. As of January 1, 2015 (i.e. the beginning of Québec’s
second compliance period), any person or municipality that distributed in Québec
fossil fuels whose combustion meets or exceeds the annual GHG emission
threshold of 25,000t was also covered by the cap-and-trade system. This
encompassed almost 85% of GHG emissions in Québec’s GHG inventory. With
respect to initiation and cessation obligations, emitters regulated by the cap-andtrade program are required to cover their GHG emissions until at least 2020 or
until December 31st following their third consecutive GHG emission report when
they fall below the 25,000t CO2 threshold. Conversely, an unregulated emitter
becomes subject to the system on January 1st following its first annual report
showing GHG emissions that are equal to or exceed the threshold of 25 kt CO2eq.
Ontario

In Ontario participants were required to participate if they were 1) an
electricity importer, 2) a facility or natural gas distributor that emits 25,000t or
more of GHG annually, 3) a fuel supplier that sold more than 200L of fuel
annually. In addition, participation in the Ontario scheme was voluntary for
facilities that generate between 10,000-25,000t of GHG emissions per year and for
those participants which opted into the program on a voluntary basis.
3.5.1 Determining Emissions Attribution

Emissions allowances are allocated to participating entities based on the GHG
emissions attributed to each participating entity.
California

California’s cap-and-trade program covers 85% of California’s total GHG
emissions and is estimated to apply to approximately 700 entities. 311 Under
subsection 7430 of the US Code Title 42, California’s GHG emissions are
recorded annually by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 312 The
EPA Administrator is responsible for evaluating and improving the emissions
estimating techniques used to record GHG emissions in the state. 313 The EPA
currently monitors the GHG emissions in six sectors: electricity, transportation,
industry, commercial, residential, agriculture. 314 Emissions in the electricity sector
are determined by examining the fuel source used to create electricity as well as
311

ICAP Status Report 2018, supra note 304 at 45-46.
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions
[hereinafter EPA Sources of GHG Emissions].
313 42 U.S.C. § 7430 (2012).
314 EPA Sources of GHG Emissions, supra note 312.
312
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the amount of electricity consumed by end-use sectors. 315 Transportation sector
GHG emissions are monitored by assessing the emissions from each mode of
transportation including cars, trucks, trains, ships, airplanes, pipelines, and
lubricants. 316 Industry sector GHG emissions are assessed by examining the
emissions produced through industry activities such as burning fossil fuels, and
the emissions associated with the energy used in the operation of the industrial
buildings and equipment. 317 Similarly, emissions in the commercial and residential
sectors are assessed by determining the emissions directly produced through
activities occurring within the commercial or residential property as well as the
emissions attributed to the use of electricity to operate these properties. 318 The
EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) requires all facilities and
suppliers to install and operate continuous emissions monitoring system
(CEMS). 319 A CEMS is considered the most accurate method of determining GHG
emissions. The CEMS continuously gathers information about the quantity of
gases being emitted. 320 Emissions from fuel combustion are calculated with a
combination of the CEMS, fuel composition data, and default emission factors 321
while process emissions are calculated with a combination of the CEMS, mass
balance approach, site-specific or default emission factors. 322 A mass balance
approach is the difference between the carbon entering and exiting the process. 323
In the mass balance approach any unaccounted-for carbon is assumed to have been
released as GHG emissions. 324 Site-specific emission factors consists of
performing periodic measurements of carbon emissions in feedstocks or stacks. 325
Default emission factors are based on average GHG emissions and these values
are provided by the GHGRP. 326
Québec

Québec’s cap-and-trade program covers 85% of Québec’s total GHG
emissions and is estimated to apply to 132 entities. 327 Québec attributes GHG
emissions to participant entities through a self-report system. Under section 4 and
5 of the regulation respecting mandatory reporting of certain emissions of
315

Id.
Id.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program:
Best
Available
Monitoring
Methods
(BAMM),
(Oct.
2018),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-12/documents/ghgrp_bamm_factsheet.pdf.
320 Unites States Environmental Protection Agency, Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program:
Emission
Calculation
Methodologies,
(Oct.
2018),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-12/documents/
ghgrp_methodology_factsheet.pdf [hereinafter EPA GHG Emission Calculation Methods].
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 ICAP Status Report 2018, supra note 304, at 48-49.
316
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contaminants into the atmosphere, all entities subject to the Environment Quality
Act are required to report their annual GHG emissions using an online form that
is submitted to the Minister of Sustainable Development, Environment and
Parks. 328 The mandatory reporting requirements found in this regulation were
amended in December 2011 and December 2012 in order to integrate Québec’s
reporting system with the California reporting system to allow for linkage. 329
Ontario

Ontario’s cap-and-trade program covered 80-85% of Ontario’s total GHG
emissions and covered about 148 entities. 330 Under section 72 of the Climate
Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, the Minister of the
Environment and Climate Change appointed a public servant as Director under the
Act. The Director was responsible for the attribution of emissions to participating
entities. Under section 6 of Ontario Regulation 144/16 the Director was to
determine the attribution of GHG emissions based on four considerations
including verification statements or reports made available to the Ministry,
information obtained by the Director, and information obtained about similar GHG
emitting activities. 331 Upon determination of the amount of GHG emissions
attributed to a participant entity, the Director was obligated to provide each
participant entity with written notice.332 This written notice had to include the
proposed amount of GHG emissions attributed to the participant along with an
explanation detailing how the proposed amount was determined. 333
3.6 Emissions Allocation

Under cap-and-trade schemes emission allowances are distributed either
freely by government, are attributed through offset activities, or can be purchased
privately on the market.
California

In California allowances are distributed either via auction held four times
annually or by free allocation. Allocations differ according to sector.
In California electrical distribution utilities and natural gas suppliers are
utilities that receive allowances on behalf of their ratepayers (these are known as
“consigning entities” and “consignment allowances”). 334 Consigning entities are
required to place all consignment allowances received for sale at the allowance
328 Regulation respecting mandatory reporting of certain emissions of contaminants into the
atmosphere, Q-2 r 15, Division II at 4-5 (Que.).
329 Québec, Québec’s Cap-and-Trade System for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowances:
Technical Overview at 12, (2018) http://www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/
documents-spede/technical-overview.pdf.
330 ICAP Status Report 2018, supra note 304, at 50-51.
331 The Cap and Trade Program (Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act),
R.S.C., 2016 c. 7 § 6(1) (Can.) [hereinafter Reg 144/16].
332 Id at § 6(2).
333 Id.
334 California Air Resources Board, California Cap-and-Trade Program Guidance for
Allowance Consignment to Auction (Sept. 2017), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/
auction/consignment_guidance.pdf .
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auctions. 335 All natural gas and electric utilities must use the allowance value for
ratepayer benefit and for emissions reductions.
Industrial facilities receive allowances for transition assistance and to prevent
carbon leakage. The amount of free allocation is determined by carbon leakage
risk (which is measured through emissions intensity and trade exposure and is used
to define assistance factors), sector-specific benchmarks and production volumes
as well as a general cap-adjustment factor. In the Third Compliance Period (20182020) the assistance factor is differentiated across sectors based on leakage risk.
For the post-2020 compliance periods, assistance factors for allocation will be part
of new rulemaking to reflect the direction provided in California Law AB 398 that
specifies an assistance factor of 100%.
The majority of industrial allocation is based on production benchmarks and
is updated annually based on verified production data. There is no cap on the
amount of industrial allocation.
Other categories of transition assistance are provided for public wholesale
water entities, legacy contract generators, universities, and public-service
facilities. Remaining allowances are auctioned. In 2017 almost 70% of allowances
were available through auction, including allowances from CARB as well as
consignment allowances to utilities.
Québec

In Québec electricity and fuel distributors have to buy 100% of their
allowances at auction (or on the market). Auctions are held quarterly. As of
January 2018, Québec had held a total of 17 auctions, 13 jointly held with
California. All auction revenues go to the Québec Green Fund. Unsold allowances
in past auctions are removed and gradually released for sale at auction after two
consecutive auctions are held in which the sale price is higher than the minimum
price. In Québec, as of 2019, the allocation of free allowances will be made
available to voluntary emitters in alignment with what is been established for
regulated entities.
In Québec a percentage of free allocation is accorded to emission intensive
sectors subject to international competition. These include aluminum, lime,
cement, chemical and petrochemicals, metallurgy, mining and pelletizing, pulp
and paper, petroleum refinement and certain other sectors (manufacturing of
glassware, electrodes, gypsum products and certain agro-foods). During Québec’s
first compliance period (2013-2014) the historical emission intensity was adjusted
for production level and by type of emission (100% for process emissions, 80%
for combustion emissions and 100% for emissions from other sources). In the
second compliance period (2015-2017) and subsequent periods allocation of free
allowances is based on increasingly strict intensity targets (i.e. declining emissions
intensity productivity) and on production levels. Since production volumes can
vary, increasing intensity targets do not guarantee an absolute reduction in free
allocation.

335

Id.
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Ontario

In Ontario fuel suppliers/distributors, electricity importers and most electricity
generators needed to purchase allowances at auction or in the secondary market.
Under the Ontario cap-and-trade legislation, participants were required to
participate if they were 1) an electricity importer, 2) a facility or natural gas
distributor that emitted 25,000t or more of CO2 annually, or 3) a fuel supplier that
sold more than 200 L of fuel annually. In addition, participation in the Ontario
scheme was voluntary for facilities that generate between 10,000-25,000t GHG
emissions per year and for those participants who opted into the program on a
voluntary basis.
In Ontario’s First Compliance Period (2017-2020) eligible capped emitters
were to receive emission allowances free of charge, but the rate of free allowances
was expected to decrease over time. The rate of allowances being distributed free
of charge to eligible capped emitters for the First Compliance Period was projected
to decline over time at a rate of 4.57% per year for combustion emissions starting
in 2018.
3.6.1 Initiation of Activity

An emissions allowance is an instrument created by a government and used to
represent one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e). 336 An allowance
is distributed either by 1) initial allocation by the government, 2) through auctions
or 3) sales.
The government of each WCI jurisdiction has provided certain participants
with free emission allowances. These allowances are given to large industry
participants in an attempt to ease these participants into a market where GHG
emissions are capped and priced. Specifically, larger participants are afforded the
opportunity to slowly adjust to the new system by using free allowances to cover
their GHG emissions. Participants are then able to focus on reducing their GHG
emissions and begin transitioning to more environmentally clean technologies.
Each WCI jurisdiction has created a set of mathematical formulas to calculate the
initial emission allowances due to each industry participant. This reliance on
mathematical formulas is an attempt to provide a data-driven, transparent view of
how GHG reductions are counted towards each participant’s individual emission
reduction target.
California

In California, initial emissions allocation is determined for each participant
entity using one of the following calculation methods: (1) product-based
allocation 337, or (2) energy-based allocation. 338 The government allocates a predetermined number of emissions allowances to participating entities free of
charge. Entities are provided these free allowances based on the industry they are
336 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Introduction to Cap-and-trade in Ontario, at 4
(2016),
https://media.assets.eco.on.ca/web/2016/11/Appendix-A-Introduction-to-Cap-andTrade-in-Ontario.pdf.
337 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95891 (b) at 111 (2012).
338 Id. § 95891(c) .
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part of and how efficient their facility is in comparison to the efficiency standards
found in the rest of the industry. 339 Subsection 95870 of Title 17 California Code
of Regulations outlines the distribution of allowances under the cap-and-trade
program. 340 Entities involved in electric utilities, natural gas utilities, or industrial
facilities are provided free allowances to meet their compliance obligations. 341
These compliance obligations are calculated using a complex formula found in
Title 17 subsection 95852 of the California Code of Regulations. 342 Based on these
compliance obligations, emissions are allocated to electricity participant entities
based on their long-term procurement plans 343 while allowances are distributed to
industry participants based on their GHG output in comparison to the industry
benchmark standards for GHG emissions. 344 Participant entities in the natural gas
sector are given allowances based on their 2011 sales. 345 To be eligible for direct
allowances, industrial facilities and electrical utility participants are required to
comply with Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Regulation
(MRR) and must have received a positive verification statement under MRR the
previous year. 346
Québec

In Québec, participant entities required to participate in cap-and-trade may be
eligible for free allowances. Entities identified in Table A of Part I of Appendix C
of the Regulation Respecting a Cap-and-Trade System for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowances are provided with free allowances annually to meet their
GHG reduction obligations based on their sector of work. 347 These sectors include:
aluminum, lime, cement, chemical and petrochemical industry, metallurgy, mining
and pelletizing, pulp and paper, petroleum refining, glass containers, electrodes,
gypsum products, and some agri-food establishments. 348 Appendix C Part II of the
same regulation dictates the calculations to be used in determining the amount of
free allowances each participant entity shall be provided. 349 On the 14th of January
of each year the Minister will allocate 75% of the free allowances calculated to be
provided to each entity. 350 Once the annual emissions report is filed by the
participant entity the remaining 25% of free allowances is adjusted and the
Minister provides the participant entity with any remaining free allowances on
September 14th of that year. 351
339 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, California Cap-and-trade (2017),
https://www.c2es.org/content/california-cap-and-trade.
340 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95870 (2012).
341 California Cap-and-trade, supra note 339.
342 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95852 (2012).
343 California Cap-and-trade, supra note 339.
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95890 at 136 (2012).
347 Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission allowances,
Q-2 r 46.1 at 39 (Que.).
348 Ib. at Part II, Appendix C.
349 Id. at 40 and Part II, Appendix C.
350 Id. at 40.
351 Id. at 41.
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Ontario

Similarly, in Ontario participant entities were eligible for free allowances to
meet their GHG emission reduction obligations. The amount of allowances to be
distributed by the Minister each year was outlined in section 54 of Ontario
Regulation 144/16. 352 The Minister was permitted to distribute a certain
undetermined number of these allowances to participant entities free of charge. 353
Any participant entities that were not involved in the following sectors could apply
to receive free allowances: electricity (generation, transportation, importation),
petroleum (production, supply), or natural gas distribution. 354 The amount of free
allowances distributed was projected to decrease each year by 4.57%, thereby
requiring participant entities to implement new technologies to reduce their GHG
emissions. 355
3.6.2 Permanent Cessation of Activity

In California, when a participant entity ceases its activities permanently the
participant must comply with subsection 95835 of the California Code of
Regulations. 356 This section describes the sequence of steps that must be followed
in the event of a cessation of activities. First, the participant must return the total
amount of distributed allowances to the Executive Officer of CARB by November
1st of the year following the year in which the participant ceased activities. 357
Allowances are considered to have been returned the day after the allowances were
removed from the compliance accounts. 358 Second, the participant must ensure all
compliance instruments have been transferred from its accounts prior to
submitting a request that CARB close its CITSS accounts. 359 After the completion
of the previous two steps the participant’s accounts will be permanently closed. 360
In Québec, if a participant entity ceases its activities the participant must
surrender to the Minister all free allowances received within 45 days of the last
filed emissions report. 361
Similarly, in Ontario participants who permanently ceased activities had to
return all allowances and credits to the Director by 8:00 p.m. November 1st of the
year in which the last GHG report was filed. 362

352

The Cap and Trade Program, supra note 331, at 54.
Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, R.S.C., 2016 c. 7 § 31(2)
(Can.).
354 Ontario, Cap-and-Trade: Program Overview (Jul. 25 2018), https://www.ontario.ca/
page/cap-and-trade-program-overview#section-0.
355 Id.
356 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95835 (2012).
357 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95890(k) (2012).
358 Id.
359 Id. at 95835.
360 Id.
361 Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission allowances,
supra note 347, at 18.
362 The Cap and Trade Program, supra note 331, at 12.
353
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3.7 Flexibility
3.7.1 Banking and Borrowing of Allowances

Banking allowances entails retaining unused emission allowances for a future
year, while borrowing allowances consists of using allowances from a future year
in the current year. 363 The banking of allowances provides participating entities
with greater flexibility in managing future business needs or investments by
retaining extra unused allowances for use in future years when additional
allowances may be required. 364 While banking is common in cap-and-trade,
borrowing is not common because it involves a deferral of emissions reductions
which is contrary to the purpose of cap-and-trade. 365
All three WCI jurisdictions (California, Québec, Ontario) follow the same
rules for banking and borrowing of allowances. All three jurisdictions permit the
banking of emission allowances but restrict the emitter to a general holding limit,
and all WCI jurisdictions do not allow borrowing. 366 The holding limit for banking
means that only a certain percentage of the total allowances can be banked. 367 The
holding limit for entities in all three WCI jurisdictions is calculated using the
following formula 368:
Holding Limit = 0.1*Base + 0.025* (Annual Allowances Budget – Base)
Where “base” is 25 MT of CO2e.
Where “annual allowance budget” equals the total sum of all allowances
issued by all WCI jurisdictions for the current year.
It is important to note that since reserve allowances do not have a vintage year
they cannot be banked or borrowed. 369
3.7.2 Offsets and Credits

A carbon offset is a reduction in emissions of GHG made in order to
compensate for or to offset an emission made elsewhere. A common project type
generating offsets is renewable energy such as wind farms, biomass energy, or
363

International Carbon Action Partnership, Flexibility Provisions (Sept. 21, 2019),
https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/flexibility-provisions.
364 Hewitt Roberts, Cap-and-Trade: The Basics, at 3-4 (2009) The Delphi Group,
http://www.canadiancleanpowercoalition.com/files/2312/8087/6250/TR5%20-%20Cap-andTrade_--_the_basics.pdf .
365 Id.
366 Canada – Québec Cap-and-Trade System, supra note 300.; Environmental
Commissioner of Ontario, Introduction to Cap-and-Trade in Ontario: Appendix A to the ECO’s
Greenhouse Gas Progress Report, 2016, at 14 (2016), media.assets.eco.on.ca [hereinafter ECO
Intro to Cap-and-Trade Ontario Appendix A].
367 Id.
368 California Air Resources Board, California Cap-and-Trade Program: Facts About
Holding Limit for Linked Cap-and-Trade Programs, at 1 (Dec. 1, 2017),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/holding_limit.pdf.
369 California Air Resources Board, Chapter 5: How do I Buy, Sell, and Trade Compliance
Instruments?, at 21 (2012) https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/chapter5.pdf.
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hydroelectric dams. Other offset projects include energy efficiency projects, the
destruction of industrial pollutants or agricultural byproducts, destruction of
landfill methane, and forestry projects.
California

In California a quantitative limit of up to 8% of each entity’s compliance
obligation may be made up of offsets. 370 In addition, a qualitative limit is observed
on the types of offsets that may be claimed. Currently, six offset types from the
following offset protocols are accepted as compliance units: 371
1) U.S. forest projects
2) urban forest projects
3) livestock projects (i.e. methane management)
4) ozone-depleting substances projects
5) mine methane capture (MMC) projects
6) rice cultivation projects.
According to AB 398, between 2021 and 2025 only 4% of an entity’s
compliance obligations can be met with offsets, and the maximum portion of a
compliance obligation that can be met using offsets will increase to no higher than
6% thereafter. In addition, in those two intervals 50% of the offsets used to meet
compliance obligations must be offsets that create a direct environmental benefit
to the state of California. 372
Québec

In Québec, a quantitative limit of up to 8% of each entity’s compliance
obligation may be made up of offsets. 373 In addition, a qualitative limit is observed
on the types of offsets that may be claimed. Currently, the following five of types
of offsets are accepted as compliance units originating from projects carried out
according to five protocols adopted by the province: 374
1) CH4 destruction as part of products to cover manure storage facilities
2) capture of gas from specified landfill sites

370 International Carbon Action Partnership, USA – California Cap-and-Trade Program, at
3
(Mar.
9,
2018),
https://icapcarbonaction.com/en
/?option=com_etsmap&task=export&format=pdf&layout=list&systems[]=45.
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 Id.
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3) destruction of certain ozone-depleting substances contained in
insulating foam and of certain refrigerant gases recovered from domestic
appliances in Canada
4) capture and destruction of CH4 from a CH4 drainage system at an active
underground or surface coal mine, except a mountaintop removal mine
5) capture and destruction of CH4 from the ventilation system of an active
underground coal mine.
Québec is in the process of developing several new offset protocols. In
addition to offsets developed by the province, offset protocols developed in
jurisdictions linked with Québec will also be accepted to fulfill compliance
obligations in Québec. 375 When issuing offset credits the Minister will take 3% of
the issued offset credits as a contingency which is then used as a reserve to keep
the Minister’s Environmental Integrity Account filled. 376 There are two situations
in which the Minister may require a replacement of previously issued offset
credits: (1) in the event that the documents completed for the receipt of offsets
contain false, inaccurate, or missing information making the GHG emissions
ineligible for the offset, or (2) the GHG emission reductions for which the offset
application was approved are found to have been used to apply for offsets under
another program. 377 In these two situations if the offset credits cannot be recovered
the equivalent of the unrecovered offset credits will be retired from the Minister’s
Environmental Integrity Account.
Ontario

Similar to the other WCI jurisdictions, in Ontario there was a quantitative limit
of up to 8% of each participant’s compliance obligation that could be made up of
offsets. 378 In addition, a qualitative limit was observed on the types of offsets that
could be claimed. Three offset types were created in Ontario via the following
offset protocols 379:
1) GHG reductions at eligible landfills
2) GHG reductions at coal mines
3) the collection and destruction of ozone-depleting substances (ODS).

375

Id.
Id.
377 Id.
378 Ontario offset credits (Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act),
R.S.C., 2016 c. 7 § 539/17 (Can.).
379 Ontario, Ontario’s carbon offsets programs (July 25, 2018), https://www.ontario.ca
/page/ontarios-carbon-offsets-programs.
376
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At the time of the cancellation of Ontario’s cap-and-trade program in July
2018 the province was working on 10 additional protocols with the goal of
November 1, 2021 for completing these offset protocols. 380
3.7.3 Price Management

A carbon price is a monetary cost put on the emission of carbon dioxide into
the atmosphere. Because of that price, regulators need to take care in ensuring that
the market price is not unduly high or low. Too high a price may retard growth
and innovation whereas too low a price may discourage the attainment of climate
change goals.
3.7.3.1 Price Containment Reserves

Price containment reserves act as a soft ceiling for allowance prices and are
used to prevent spikes in allowance prices. 381 Allowance price containment
reserves refer to the setting aside of a certain percentage of allowances per year
for use in the event that the price of allowances reaches a set price ceiling. 382 Once
set aside, these allowances are sorted into three tiers and assigned a selling price
based on the tier. These assigned prices increase annually by five percent plus
inflation. 383 In 2018 the tiers in California were priced at USD $54.26, $61.06, and
$67.83. 384 However, as of 2021 California will no longer use price containment
reserves as a soft ceiling but instead will implement a hard ceiling where these
reserve allowances will be available at a maximum price. 385
3.7.3.2 Price Floors and Price Ceilings

Price ceilings and price floors are containment mechanisms intended to limit
prices within an emissions trading system, thereby stabilizing the market. 386 A
price ceiling “[limits] the risk that carbon prices exceed acceptable levels if
constraining emission turns out to be more expensive than expected.” 387 Price
ceilings also provide greater cost certainty to emitters. 388 A price floor sets a price
below which carbon permits cannot be sold and therefore functions as a minimum
380

The province’s website pertaining to the canceled program noted that “Ontario is working
with the Climate Action Reserve (CAR) to develop protocols for use in creating offset credits
for Ontario’s carbon market. As part of that work, CAR is coordinating significant stakeholder
consultations.” Ontario, “Ontario’s carbon offsets programs” (Jul. 25, 2018),
www.ontario.ca/page/ontarios-carbon-offsets-programs.
381 Environmental Defense Fund & IETA Climate Challenges Market Solutions, California:
An Emissions Trading Case Study, at 2-6 (Jan. 2018), https://www.ieta.org/resources/
Resources/Case_Studies_Worlds_Carbon_Markets/2018/California-Case-Study-Jan2018.pdf.
382 Id. at 3.
383 Id.
384 Id.
385 Id.
386 ICF Consulting Canada, Long-term Carbon Price Forecast Report, EB-2016-0359, at 10
(July
19,
2017),
https://www.oeb.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/OEB-LTCPF-Report20170531.pdf [hereinafter ICF Consulting Canada 2017].
387 Peter John Wood & Frank Jotzo, Price Floors for Emissions Trading, 39 Energy Pol’y
1746, 1746-1747 (2011) [hereinafter Wood and Jotzo 2011].
388 Id.
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selling price. 389 A price floor also provides greater certainty and ensures that prices
will not collapse to near zero. 390 This price floor should also reflect the full costs
imposed on society by carbon pollution. 391 Overall, a combined system of price
ceilings and price floors can reduce the risk and price volatility in carbon markets,
which has been a point of concern in other cap-and-trade markets, specifically the
EU ETS. 392
The WCI has implemented both a price ceiling and price floor. The price
ceiling is created in the form of a Reserve Account. A percentage of allowances
within each jurisdiction’s cap is placed in the Reserve Account annually where
these allowances are given a substantially higher sale price and not available at
auction. 393 Allowances in the Reserve Account are organized into tiers with
increasing prices. 394 When the price of allowances at auction approaches that of
the reserve price the government can decide to auction the reserve allowances at
the stated tier reserve price, thereby flooding the market and dampening price
increases. 395
The three WCI partner jurisdictions agreed to a soft price floor in the sale of
allowances at auction. The agreed upon price floor started at $10 per tonne (CAD
and USD) in 2012 and the price floor increased annually by five percent plus an
adjustment for inflation until 2020. 396 Each WCI jurisdiction was to implement
their own hard price floors and ceilings.
California

In California, recent amendments to section 38562 of the California Health
and Safety Code require the state to have a price ceiling from January 1, 2021 to
December 31, 2030. 397 The price ceiling will be the equivalent of the selling price
for allowances in the Allowance Price Containment Reserve (APCR) and any
additional allowances that are sold by CARB when the APCR is exhausted. 398
California’s 2018 current auction reserve floor price was USD $14.53. 399
Québec

In Québec, the ceiling price is created by the Minister of Sustainable
Development who is permitted to hold a reserve sale in the event that the demand
389

ICF Consulting Canada 2017, supra note 386.
Wood & Jotzo 2011, supra note 387.
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 ICF Consulting Canada 2017, supra note 386, at 10-11.
394 Id. at 11.
395 Id.
396 Id.; Quebec, The Québec cap-and-trade system: Strengths and Advantages, at 6 (Jan. 21,
2016),
http://www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/documents-spede/strengthsadvantages.pdf.
397 HEALTH & SAFETY, supra note 140, § 38562.
398 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, From Plan to Progress, Appendix A: Changes
to California’s Cap-and-trade System under AB 398, at 2 (2018), http://www.eco.on.ca.
399 Ontario,
2018 annual auction reserve price notice (1 Dec. 2017),
https://www.ontario.ca/page/2018-annual-auction-reserve-price-notice [hereinafter Ontario
2018 reserve auction notice].
390
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for allowances far exceeds supply. 400 Only four reserve sales may be held each
year. 401 These reserve sales are restricted to covered participants by virtue of the
Regulation Respecting a Cap-and-Trade system for Greenhouse Gas Emission
Allowances under the Environment Quality Act. 402 In order to hold a reserve sale,
a percentage of the distributed allowances is placed in the reserve each year and is
broken down into different tiers. 403 The allowances are assigned a selling price
based on the tier in which they are held. In 2013 the tier prices were CAD $30,
$45, and $50. 404 Since then these prices have increased annually by five percent
plus inflation. 405 In joint auctions between Québec and California, the price floor
is to be the higher of the Québec and California price floors taking into account
exchange rate and comparing the prices in USD. 406 Québec’s 2018 current auction
reserve floor price was CAD $14.35. 407
Ontario

Ontario’s price floor and ceiling were consistent with the WCI approach.
Ontario placed five percent of its total annual allowances in a Cost Containment
Reserve where reserve prices were assigned to three tiers with prices consistent
with the California and Québec reserve prices. 408 Ontario’s reserve prices were
significantly higher than auction prices, aligned with WCI reserve prices, and
increased by five percent plus inflation annually. 409 Similar to the other WCI
jurisdictions, if the auction price for allowances approached the reserve price the
Ontario government could choose to hold a reserve sale, selling allowances at the
reserve price. 410 Ontario’s 2018 current auction reserve floor price was CAD
$14.68. 411 Taking into account the exchange rate between USD and CAD, in 2018
Ontario had the highest floor price of all three WCI jurisdictions. 412
3.8 Registration

Registration is a key feature of emissions trading under WCI linked emission
trading schemes. Registration helps to verify the identity of participants and instill
security and discipline in trading arrangements.

400 Quebec, The Québec cap-and-trade system: Strengths and Advantages, at 7 (Jan. 21,
2016)
http://www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/documents-spede/strengthsadvantages.pdf.
401 Id.
402 Id.
403 Id.
404 Id.
405 Id.
406 Id at 6.
407 Ontario 2018 reserve auction notice, supra note 399.
408 ICF Consulting Canada 2017, supra note 386, at 13.
409 Id.
410 Id.
411 Ontario 2018 reserve auction notice, supra note 399.
412 ICF Consulting Canada 2017, supra note 386, at 13.
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California

All entities participating in the WCI cap-and-trade program are required to
have a CITSS account in order to participate in auctions, hold or transfer
compliance instruments. There are two steps to registration under CITSS: (1) user
registration and (2) opening an account. To register for an account both a primary
account representative (PAR) and an alternate account representative (AAR) must
be registered with CITSS for an entity. 413 Both of these individuals must first
complete the user registration for CITSS by submitting an online form and
providing hard copies of supporting documents to CITSS. The online application
form requires the submission of general personal information such as the
individual’s name, address, and employer. The supporting documents include the
completion of the User Registration Checklist, User Registration Form, and Proof
of Identity Form. 414 The Proof of Identity Form must be accompanied by a
notarized copy of a government issued identity document, proof of employment,
and proof of having an open bank account. 415
Once both of these representatives are approved by CARB they will receive
their User ID which allows them to complete the application for the creation of
accounts for an entity. This application process also requires the submission of an
electronic application form in addition to providing hard copies mailed to the
California Registrar. The structure of the corporation will need to be disclosed
through the completion of the Corporate Associations and Structure Form. 416
Forms must be signed by the PAR, the AAR and an officer or director of the entity
for which the accounts are being created. 417 Each person being registered for the
CITSS program cannot have more than one role. For instance, the PAR cannot
also be the AAR. 418
Québec

All covered GHG emitters are required to register in CITSS as an emitter. In
addition, any person who is domiciled or owns an establishment in Canada may
voluntarily register as a participant in the cap-and-trade system in order to
purchase, hold, sell or voluntarily withdraw emission allowances.
Any emitter that owns an establishment covered by regulations in both
jurisdictions will have to open a CITSS account in each one. It should be noted,
however, that already-registered emitters may not also register as simple
participants. Non-emitting participants may elect to register either in Québec or
California in order to participate in the linked carbon market.
413 California Environmental Protection Agency, User Guide – Volume I User Registration
and Profile Management: Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service (CITSS), at 4 (Dec.
2012),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/markettrackingsystem/vol1citssguide-7-2116.pdf [hereinafter CEPA User Guide CITSS].
414 Id at 7-8.
415 Id.
416 California Air Resources Board, Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service (Apr.
27,
2018),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/markettrackingsystem/
markettrackingsystem.htm.
417 CEPA User Guide CITSS, supra note 413, at 4.
418 Id at 7-8.
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Québec follows a registration process similar to that used in California. There
are two steps to registration: (1) user registration, and (2) opening an account. 419
Each account must have both a primary account representative (PAR) and an
additional account representative (AAR). 420 These individuals must both be
registered as users in CITSS. User registration requires the completion of an online
application form on the CITSS website in addition to the completion of the
following documents to be mailed to the Carbon Market Division of the Québec
Ministry of the Environment in Québec City: user registration checklist, user
registration form including user ID, attestation of verification of identity and
designation. 421 The attestation of verification of identity form must be notarized
and submitted along with proof of identity and proof of a deposit bank account. 422
Once the users are registered with CITSS, one of the users may submit a
completed account application form on behalf of the entity they are
representing. 423 This involves completing an online application form found on the
CITSS website in addition to completing the account application checklist, and
account application with attestations form that are both generated on CITSS. These
forms must be signed by both the PAR, the AAR and an officer or director of the
entity being represented. 424 The structure and business relationship disclosure form
must also be completed, signed and submitted. All documents must be mailed to
Carbon Market Division of Québec Ministry of the Environment in Québec
City. 425
Ontario

In Ontario, all covered emitters had to be registered in CITSS and any entity
with at least one facility producing 10,000 to 25,000 tonnes of GHG emissions
annually could register as a voluntary participant. 426
The deadline for mandatory participants to register in the program in 2017 and
onwards was set-out in the Ontario Cap-and-trade Regulation 144/16, s. 24(1). 427
Generally speaking, a person required to have a GHG report verified was required
to register as a mandatory participant by September 1st of the year following
specified GHG activities at a facility. 428 Certain categories of mandatory
participants, electricity importers, natural gas distributors, or petroleum product
supply, were also subject to more detailed reporting requirements. Specifically,
they were required to report activity prior to September 1st of the same year or
prior to March 31st if the activity occurred after September 1st of that year. 429
419 Québec, The Carbon Market: Cap-and-Trade System (C&T) Registration (2018),
http://www.environnement.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/inscription-spede-en.html.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 Id.
423 Id.
424 Id.
425 Id.
426 Ontario, Cap-and-Trade: Register as a voluntary participant (Jul. 25, 2018)
https://www.ontario.ca/page/cap-and-trade-register-voluntary-participant.
427 Reg. 144/16, supra note 331, at 21-27.
428 Id.
429 Id at 24.
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All mandatory participants were required to have begun the registration
process and submitted the completed hard copy of their registration for Ministry
review prior to November 30, 2016 in order to comply with requirements for
registration in the cap-and-trade program. 430
Voluntary participants in the Ontario cap-and-trade program had to register in
CITSS no later than September 1st in order to become a voluntary participant for
the following year. 431 Market participants could apply any time after 2017 for
CITSS registration. 432
All mandatory participants, voluntary participant and market participants in
Ontario were required to register for a CITSS account in order to participate in
auctions and the transfer of compliance instruments. 433 The CITSS registration
process in Ontario was very similar to the California and Québec CITSS
registration processes. Ontario used the same two-step process: (1) recognition as
an account agent (user registration) and (2) participant registration (the account
application). Entities had to have both a primary account representative (PAR) and
at least one alternate account representative (AAR) registered as users in CITSS
prior to applying for participant registration. 434 Recognition as an account agent
required the completion of an online application form and the completion of the
following forms in hard copy: recognition as an account agent registration
checklist, recognition as an account agent registration form, proof of identity form,
identity verification and attestation form (including two copies of government
identification documents and a letter of attestation), a letter of attestation of
identity from a bank. 435 Once the users were approved, one user could complete
the application for participant registration which included the completion of an
online form as well as the completion of the following documents in hard copy:
participant registration checklist, participant registration form, voluntary
participant registration form, business relationship disclosure form, and a letter of
authorization (if not submitted during user registration). 436 Once the users and
participants had their registration approved they were able to participate in WCI
auctions and the transfer of compliance instruments.
3.9 Reporting

Reporting in an accurate and timely manner is required to maintain an
effective cap-and-trade program. Reporting requirements were an important part
of the discussions surrounding the creation of the WCI. Therefore, the reporting
mechanisms used in all three WCI jurisdictions are very similar.
California

In California, participants use a web-based reporting tool known as California
Electronic Greenhouse Gas Reporting Tool (Cal e-GGRT). This tool manages the
430
431
432
433
434
435
436

Id at 22.
Register as a voluntary participant, supra note 426.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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reporting, certification, submission and verification of GHG emissions data. All
emitters must register as users in this tool and create an electronic signature that
permits them to certify and submit their emissions data without a written signature.
The submitted emissions report is then automatically sent to the regulatory agency.
This tool is completely secure with many firewall security systems as protection
as well as the inability to access the information on this account without a
registered user account. To ensure security the third-party verifier must also be
registered in the reporting system for read-only access to the emissions data
reports.
California’s reporting requirements are set out in Assembly Bill 32. The
Regulation for the mandatory reporting of GHG was updated on September 1,
2017 and was effective beginning January 1, 2018. 437 This amended regulation
requires that all participants submit their GHG emissions reports annually no later
than April 10th. 438 However, electric supply entities have until June 1st to submit
their GHG emission reports. 439 For entities that emit less than 25,000 metric tonnes
of CO2 emissions there is the option of completing an abbreviated GHG emission
reporting form if they do not have a compliance obligation for the current year, are
not subject to the reporting provisions, and they are an electric power entity. 440
Québec

In Québec, participants use a web-based tool similar to that used in California,
known as the Québec Air Emissions Inventory (Inventaire québécois des
émissions atmosphériques, or IQEA). This reporting system serves the same
function as the California system in that it manages the reporting, certification,
submission and verification of GHG emissions data. The Québec system also
requires participants to register as users and create their own electronic signature
to certify and submit their emissions data. The data is then automatically sent to
the regulatory agency. Similar to the California system, Québec has strong firewall
features to protect the security of the reporting system as well as a requirement for
the third-party verifier to register in the reporting system in order to have readonly access to emissions data reports.
Québec’s reporting requirements are set out in the Environmental Quality Act
and specifically the Regulation respecting mandatory reporting of certain
emissions of contaminants into the atmosphere. Reports must be completed
annually on June 1st. 441 This report must include the use of any offset protocols
and the emitter’s total GHG emissions in metric tonnes of CO2 in accordance with
the calculation identified in section 6.2 of the Regulation. Québec and California
compared their regulations surrounding reporting several times to ensure

437 California Air Resources Board, Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Regulation
(2018), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/mrr-regulation.
438 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95103(e) (2012).
439 Id.
440 Id. at reg 95103(a).
441 Quebec, Mandatory reporting of certain emissions of contaminants into the atmosphere
(2018), http://www.environnement.gouv.qc.ca/air/declar_contaminants/index-en.htm.
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harmonization of the reporting requirements, with the final amended Québec
regulations being enacted in December 2016. 442
Ontario

Ontario’s GHG emissions reporting requirements were set out in Ontario
Regulation 143/16; however, specific rules for reporting were identified in the
following legislation and associated regulations: Environmental Protection Act,
Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, Ontario Regulation
143/16, Ontario Regulation 452/09, and the Guideline for Quantification,
Reporting and Verification of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2017. Table 1 below
should be used to determine which documents were to be consulted for quantifying
the entity’s annual GHG emissions.
A GHG report had to be submitted every year by June 1st, for the previous
year’s reporting period. Example: June 1, 2018, for the reporting year 2017. A
GHG emissions report had to be submitted using the Environment and Climate
Change Canada’s Single Window System. This system allowed a user to submit,
view and update their information using Environment and Climate Change Canada
applications.
In Ontario, the following entities were required to report their GHG emissions
annually: fuel suppliers placing more than 200 L on the Ontario market, electricity
importers, natural gas distributors emitting more than 25,000t of GHG emissions
annually, and facilities generating 25,000t or more of GHG emissions annually. 443

442

Id.
Quantification, reporting, and verification of greenhouse gas emissions (Climate Change
Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act) at Table 2, R.S.O., 2016 c. 7 § 143/16 (Ont.).
443
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Table 1: Determining which documents to consult for quantifying annual
GHG emissions.

Ontario, Report greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: The rules for reporting greenhouse
gas emissions (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.ontario.ca/page/report-greenhouse-gasghg-emissions.

A Guide to Emissions Trading under the WCI

Table 2: Which entities are required to report annual GHG emissions.
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Ontario, “Report greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: The rules for reporting greenhouse
gas emissions” (20 March 2014), online: <https://www.ontario.ca/page/reportgreenhouse-gas-ghg-emissions>.
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Ontario, “Report greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: The rules for reporting greenhouse
gas emissions” (20 March 2014), online: <https://www.ontario.ca/page/reportgreenhouse-gas-ghg-emissions>.
3.10 Verification

Third party verifiers are used by California and Québec to ensure consistent
quality of GHG emissions reports. Operators must implement internal audit,
quality assurance and control systems for the reporting program and the data
reported.
The ISO (International Organization for Standardization) provides standards
accepted worldwide for a variety of industries. All three WCI jurisdictions require
that the verification of GHG emission reports meet the ISO 14064 standards. ISO
14064 is the standard for programs aimed at reducing GHG emissions and
emissions trading. This 14064 standard consists of three verification and validation
standards, as follows:
•
•
•

ISO 14064-1 are standards set for the organizational level of GHG
emissions reporting.
ISO 14064-2 are standards set for the project level of GHG emissions
reporting.
ISO 14064-3 are standards set for the validation and verification of
GHG assertions.

In addition, ISO 14065 compliments ISO 14064 by setting standards for the
accreditation of recognized GHG validation and verification bodies. These ISO
14064 standards are used by California and Québec in their verification of GHG
reports, and these standards were intended to be used by Ontario as well until the
cancellation of Ontario’s cap-and-trade program.
California

In California, the following entities are required to have their GHG emissions
reports verified: entities emitting over 25,000 CO2e annually, electricity importers
or exporters, entities with a compliance obligation in the current compliance
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period, and entities that do not meet the requirements for cessation of
verification. 444 These entities are required to obtain annual verification from a
recognized verification body and must submit this verification information to
CARB’s Executive Officer annually prior to August 10th. 445 Entities must ensure
that they do not use the same verification body for more than six consecutive years
beginning on the date in which the verification body was contacted for the use of
their services. 446
Québec

In Québec, all mandatory and voluntary emitters must obtain verification from
an ISO 14065 accredited body and file a verification report prior to June 1st. 447
The verification process requires that the verifier or a representative for the verifier
must visit each of the emitter’s facility at least once. 448 However, for emitters that
transport or distribute electricity or natural gas the verifier is only required to visit
a representative sampling of their facilities. 449
Ontario

In Ontario, GHG emission reports were required to be verified for all entities
that emitted 25,000t or more of GHG emissions annually. Verification reports had
to comply with ISO 14064 and 14065 and had to be submitted prior to September
1st. 450 Lists of eligible organizations that could verify emissions reports were
available from the Standards Council of Canada (SCC) and the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI). A GHG report had to be reviewed impartially. If a
conflict of interest existed related to the GHG report being verified a mitigation
plan had to be submitted to the Ministry of the Environment and Climate
Change. 451
A verification statement confirms that there is no material discrepancy in the
completed GHG emission reports. 452 The third-party verifier would evaluate
reports to determine that any errors in emissions due to measurements or
calculations are fewer than 5%, any errors in production data are fewer than 0.1%
(starting in 2017), and that the report was prepared according to the rules and
guidelines under the law. 453
An accredited verification body (“AVB”) had to provide their clients with a
verification statement and verification report to confirm the review of the client’s

444

CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95103(f), 95130 (2012).
Id.
446 Id. at 95130(a)(2).
447 International Carbon Action Partnership, Canada- Québec Cap-and-Trade System, at 4
(Mar.
9,
2018),
https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/
?option=com_etsmap&task=export&format=pdf&layout=list&systems%5B%5D=73.
448 Mandatory reporting of certain emissions of contaminants into the atmosphere, supra note
441, at 6.8.
449 Id.
450 O. Reg. 143/16, supra note 443, at 27.
451 Id. at 31.
452 Id. at 32.
453 Id.
445
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GHG report. 454 To properly complete a verification statement, the applicable
verification statement template had to be used. For the 2017 reporting year and
onward, there were two different templates based on activity type. However, there
was no template for the verification report.
3.11 Monitoring

Well-functioning markets for allowances and offset credits are fundamental to
the implementation of a cap-and-trade program. To ensure that these markets are
free of abuse and disruptive activity and that they appropriately reflect the supply
and demand for compliance instruments, all three programs conduct regular
market surveillance and analysis. In the creation of WCI, Inc., the WCI
jurisdictions created a shared market monitoring system to be implemented by
WCI, Inc. 455 To ensure compliance with the WCI market practices and to avoid
abuse or unlawful activities within the WCI system, Monitoring Analytics, a
private company in Eagleville, Pennsylvania, has been retained by WCI, Inc. as
the WCI market monitor. 456 In addition, the two continuing WCI jurisdictions
work with Monitoring Analytics to track and analyze the operation and
transactions within the WCI allowance auctions. 457 Monitoring Analytics is an
independent third party which is responsible for reviewing auction procedures for
fairness, auditing and monitoring auctions to ensure compliance with procedures
and auction protocols, detecting flaws in the auction process, preparing reports on
market trends, and advising on ways to improve the market and auctions. 458 If
manipulative or anti-competitive behavior is detected in the bidding process,
Monitoring Analytics will communicate this concern to the relevant WCI
jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction will be responsible for conducting a further
investigation, as well as prosecuting the offence when required. 459 The offence will
be prosecuted in accordance with the laws of the relevant jurisdiction.
3.12 Enforcement

Each WCI jurisdiction has the authority to enforce compliance for any
violations that arise within that jurisdiction. However, similar enforcement
strategies and penalties are shared among all WCI jurisdictions.
California

When a participating entity does not provide sufficient compliance
instruments to meet their compliance obligations, California imposes a three-for454

Id. at 32-33.
Québec: A Historical Overview, supra note 13, at 5.
456 California Air Resources Board, Market Program Monitoring (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/marketmonitoring/marketmonitoring.htm.
457 Id.
458 Air Resources Board, Cap-and-Trade: Market Oversight and Enforcement (Oct. 20,
2011),, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/market_oversight.pdf.
459 “California-Québec-Ontario Joint Auction Participant Training Presentation (Ontario
Version)”, California Air Resources Board, Minister of Sustainable Development, Environment
and the Fight Against Climate Change, Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Climate
Change (January 2018) at 91, wci-auction.org.
455
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one penalty. Specifically, the participating entity must surrender four compliance
instruments for each compliance instrument the entity failed to present at the
required time: one of which is permanently retired, and three are made available
at the next auction. 460 There is a requirement that no more than twenty-five percent
of the four compliance instruments surrendered can be offsets. 461
If the participating entity refuses to comply with the above three-for-one
penalty, the next penalties imposed are set out in section 38580 of the California
Health and Safety Code. Penalties for violation of the Health and Safety Code can
include convictions of a misdemeanor, fines, and imprisonment. The penalties
associated with submitting incorrect information or omitting information under the
Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Regulation are a finding of guilt of a
misdemeanor and a fine of no more than $75,000. 462 In determining the fine to
impose for a violation of the Health and Safety Code, CARB will consider the
following: extent of harm, nature and continuation of the violation, duration of
time of the violation, frequency of violations, record of maintenance, the nature of
the equipment, actions taken to mitigate the violation, financial burden, and other
circumstances. 463 Each metric ton of carbon dioxide emitted but not reported is a
separate violation, as is each day that a reporting violation continues. 464
CARB can impose civil or criminal penalties for manipulating the market,
cornering the market, fraud, attempted fraud, and for false or inaccurate reports. 465
The maximum administrative civil penalties CARB can impose is up to $500 per
violation. 466 The penalty scheme for civil penalties, shown below, has an
escalating set of steps based on intent, or lack thereof, from strict liability with the
lowest maximum fines, to willful and intentional actions carrying the highest
maximum fines: 467
Type of Violation/Level of
Intent
Knowing violation of rule, law,
permit, etc. 468
Knowing false statement or
document 469

Maximum Civil Penalty
$40,000
$35,000

460 International Carbon Action Partnership, Emissions Trading in Practice: A Handbook on
Design and Implementation 132 (2016) [hereinafter ICAP Handbook on Design].
461 Id.
462 HEALTH & SAFETY, supra note 140, § 42400.3.
463 Id., §42400.8.
464 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95107(a)-(c).
465 California Environmental Protection Agency, Facts About Cap-and-Trade: Market
Oversight and Enforcement (Oct. 20 2011), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/
market_oversight.pdf.
466 HEALTH & SAFETY, supra note 140, § 42402.5.
467 Id. § 42402.
468 Id. § 42402.2(a).
469 Id. § 42402.4.
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and
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Failure to take corrective action
after known emission 471
Negligent violation 472
Strict liability violation 473
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$75,000
$40,000
$25,000
$1,000 or $10,000

Québec

In Québec, when a participating entity fails to remit the adequate number of
compliance instruments for their compliance obligation they will be notified of the
infraction and may be subject to the three-for-one penalty. 474 Similar to
California’s three-for-one penalty, the entity will be required to surrender each
missing compliance instrument, as well as three compliance instruments per
missing compliance instrument. 475 For example, if one compliance instrument is
not appropriately submitted prior to the November 1st deadline, the entity will then
be required to submit four compliance instruments according to the three-for-one
penalty.
In addition to the above penalty, a participant entity can be subject to a fine
between $3,000 and $50,000 for a natural person, or $10,000 and $3,000,000 for
corporations. 476 A natural person may also be subject to a maximum of eighteen
months in jail. 477 In the event that the entity has committed a previous offence, the
fine may be doubled, and the Minister may restrict distribution of allowances to
that entity. 478 It is important to note that the offence if committed for more than
one day is considered a new offence each day the offence continues. 479 A
participant entity may also be suspended from participating in auctions, or have
emission allowances distributed by the Minister either suspended, withdrawn, or
cancelled. 480
In determining whether to impose an administrative or penal sanction, the
Minister shall take into consideration that the intentions behind imposing such
sanctions are to remedy the current infraction and deter future infractions. 481 In
addition, the determination of whether to impose such a sanction shall consider:
the positions held by individuals who impose sanctions, the requirements for
appointing such individuals, the guidance used in making the decision to impose
470

Id. § 42402.3(a).
Id. § 42402.2(a).
472 Id. § 42402.1(a).
473 Id. § 42402(a)-(b); Alison B. Torbitt, Jessica E. Intrator & Elaine Enfonde, “Now + Next:
Nixon Peabody Environmental Law Alert” (April 15, 2014).
474 Environmental Quality Act, Q-2 at 115.15 [hereinafter, EQA].
475 ICAP Handbook on Design, supra note 460, at 132; and ICAP Status Report 2018, supra
note 298, at 49.
476 ICAP Handbook on Design, supra note 460, at 132.
477 Id.
478 ICAP Status Report 2018, supra note 304, at 49.
479 EQA, supra note 474, §115.22.
480 Id. § 46.12.
481 Id. § 115.13.
471
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sanctions, priority of the circumstances, and procedures involved in imposing
sanctions. 482 When imposing a monetary sanction, the Minister shall consider the
following criteria: consequences (real or possible), vulnerability of the location
affected, nature of the infraction, frequency of the infraction, mitigation of
damages, consequences to the Ministry or Government, and unacceptable conduct
by the offender. 483
In the event that a monetary administrative penalty is imposed on a participant
entity, the penalty may be sent for review within thirty days after the participant
entity receives the notice of claim. 484 The participant entity then has the
opportunity to present their reasoning for appeal, and the person reviewing has the
authority to confirm, quash, or vary the original decision. 485 If the decision is
confirmed, the participant has the right to appeal the decision to the Administrative
Tribunal of Québec. 486
Ontario

In Ontario, when a participant entity fails to surrender sufficient compliance
instruments to satisfy their compliance obligation, the participant is subject to a
three-for-one penalty. 487 Similar to California and Québec, the three-for-one
penalty in Ontario requires the participant to submit three compliance instruments
for each compliance instrument that was not surrendered, in addition to the
quantity of compliance instruments that were required to be surrendered.
In addition to the three-for-one penalty, an entity that was a corporation could
be subject to a fine between $25,000 and $6,000,000, where $25,000 would be
fined each day the compliance instruments were missing until they were
surrendered or the fine reached $6,000,000. 488 An entity that was a natural person
could be subject to a fine of between $5,000 and $4,000,000, as well as a maximum
of five years imprisonment. 489 When the violating entity committed previous
offences the value of the imposed fine could be increased. 490
The gravity of the penalty in Ontario reflects the existence of aggravating
factors and the severity of those factors. Specifically, the court was to consider the
following: intention, recklessness, purpose of increasing revenue or decreasing
costs, previous warnings, endeavor to hide the offence, failure to co-operate with
the Ministry, failure to mitigate consequences or damages, action to limit the risk
of future offences, and any other circumstances. 491 Restitution orders could also
be imposed in circumstances where harm was caused to another person. 492
482

Id.
Id. § 115.
484 Id. § 115.17.
485 Id. § 115.19.
486 Id. § 115.20.
487 ICAP Status Report 2018, supra note 304, at 51.
488 Id.; Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act, 2016, SO 2016, c7, s
51(4) (2016) [hereinafter, Climate Change Act].
489 Climate Change Act, supra note 488, s 51(5).
490 ICAP Status Report 2018, supra note 304, at 51.
491 Climate Change Act, supra note 488, § 53(1).
492 Id. § 54(1).
483
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Administrative penalties of less than one million dollars could be imposed to
motivate continued compliance with Ontario acts and regulations, as well as
ensuring the individual or entity that committed the offence did not receive any
benefit from the offence. 493 If an imposed fine was not paid, the Director had the
authority to suspend the entity’s auction account or impose other penalties. 494
Cap-and-Trade Litigation

Since its inception, the WCI cap-and-trade program has been the subject of
only limited litigation in WCI jurisdictions. So far, all of this litigation has arisen
in California. The first action brought against CARB with respect to cap-and-trade
was the matter of Association of Irritated Residents v. CARB in June 2009. 495 In
that case the Association of Irritated Residents argued that the Scoping Plan,
outlined by CARB to reduce carbon emissions, was not strict enough and should
be viewed merely as a minimum standard and not as a final goal. The argument
was also made that CARB failed to consider alternatives to the cap-and-trade
program prior to the program’s initiation. On December 6, 2011, the California
Superior Court “approved an expanded environmental analysis of alternatives to a
cap-and-trade program for implementing AB 32.” 496
In 2012, the matter of Coalition for a Safe Environment v. CARB was brought
before the EPA. The dispute involved a complaint that federal civil rights
regulations were being violated by the cap-and-trade program. 497 Specifically, the
Coalition for a Safe Environment argued that “a cap-and-trade program’s potential
adverse co-pollutant impacts on communities constitute discrimination in
violation of Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act.” 498 On July 12, 2012 the
complaint was rejected by the EPA “as not ripe for review.” 499
In March 2012, the matter of Citizens Climate Lobby v. CARB was brought
before the California Superior Court by two environmental groups. 500 The Citizens
Climate Lobby opposed the use of offsets in the cap-and-trade program, stating
that offsets would not result in additional reductions of GHG emissions. 501 The
California Superior Court denied the petition, stating that “the Global Warming
Solutions Act gave the California Air Resources Board vast discretion to develop
493

Id. §§ 57(1) and 57(8).
Id. § 57(16).
495 Alice Kaswan, Climate Change and Environmental Justice: Lessons from the California
Lawsuits, 10 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1 (2014) at 10 [hereinafter, Kaswan
2014].
496 Association of Irritated Residents v California Air Resources Board, Sabin Center for
Climate Change Law (2018), http://climatecasechart.com/case/assoc-of-irritated-residents-vcal-air-resources-board/.
497 Kaswan 2014, supra note 495, at 14.
498 Ibid.
499 Coalition for a Safe Environment v California Air Resources Board, Sabin Center for
Climate Change Law (2018), http://climatecasechart.com/case/coalition-for-a-safeenvironment-v-california-air-resources-board/.
500 Kaswan 2014, supra note 495, at 15.
501 Citizens Climate Lobby v California Air Resources Board, Sabin Center for Climate
Change Law (2018), http://climatecasechart.com/case/citizens-climate-lobby-v-california-airresources-board/.
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regulations to curb greenhouse gas emissions and that the evidence demonstrated
that the agency’s use of the standards-based approach in developing the carbon
offset protocol was consistent with the law.” 502
In June 2017 in Morning Star Packing Company v. California Air Resources
Board (decided jointly with California Chamber of Commerce v. California Air
Resources Board) the California Supreme Court upheld the cap-and-trade system
by refusing to hear an appeal by business groups who argued the system was an
unconstitutional tax. 503 There were essentially two possible outcomes in the
dispute: (1) “If judges view the auction revenue as a fee, the Air Resources Board
should only be able to raise enough revenue to cover the costs of managing the
program,” 504 and (2) “If it’s a tax, Proposition 13 requires that the auctions win the
blessing of two-thirds of the Legislature.” In response, California’s Deputy
Attorney General argued that the cap-and-trade revenue was distinct from both a
fee and a tax. 505 These legal challenges created uncertainty in the future of the capand-trade program which may have contributed to hesitation among participants
purchasing allowances. 506 However, with this legal matter now resolved in favor
of the cap-and-trade program and the program having been extended to 2030, the
cap-and-trade program has proven its strength and permanence in California. 507
To date, there has not been any litigation pertaining to cap-and-trade programs
in Québec or Ontario.

CHAPTER 4: WCI CAP-AND-TRADE: TRADING
The preceding chapter examined the specific components of the cap-and-trade
system. This chapter examines the trading aspect of cap-and-trade. It examines
seven subjects: the nature of the WCI market: account types, the transfer process,
auctions, reserve sales, secondary markets, and taxation.
4.1 Nature of the WCI Markets

Once participants obtain allowances through distribution, auction or sale, they
are able to trade allowances with other participants in WCI-linked jurisdictions.
502

Id.
Dan Whitcomb, California Supreme Court upholds cap-and-trade law (Jun. 28, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-capandtrade-idUSKBN19K05D; Chris Megerian,
California Supreme Court leaves in place decision upholding cap-and-trade system (Jun. 28,
2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-cap-andtrade-supreme-1498684764-htmlstory.html; Theodore McDowell, The Case for Cap-andTrade:
California’s
Battle
for
Market
Based
Environmentalism,
http://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/case-cap-trade-californias-battle-market-based-environmentalism/.
504 Adam Ashton, Is it a fee or a tax? California’s cap-and-trade faces tough questions (Jan.
24,
2017),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/
article128494604.html.
505 Id.
506 Mikayla Wujec, California Cap-and-Trade: Waiting for Clarity (Mar. 3, 2017),
https://environmentaldefence.ca/2017/03/03/california-cap-trade-waiting-clarity/.
507 Katy Steinmetz, California Challenges President Trump With Cap-and-Trade Law: ‘We
do not have to Wait for Washington’ (Jul. 25, 2017), http://time.com/4871996/california-captrade-bill-signing-brown-schwarzenegger/.
503

A Guide to Emissions Trading under the WCI

247

Allowances can be traded through auctions or sale. The WCI uses the term
“transfer” to refer to the movement or trading of emissions allowances. Transfers
of emissions allowances between participant entities in any participant jurisdiction
occur through the Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service (“CITSS”).
CITSS is an online, web-based program, used to register participating entities and
track the holding, transfer, and retirement of emissions allowances and credits. 508
All participants who want to engage in the auction or trading markets must register
for a CITSS account. This engagement involves two steps: (1) an individual must
submit an application to receive a CITSS user ID and Recognition as an Account
Agent (“RAA”), and (2) the RAA must submit an application for Participant
Registration which will allow the RAA to open an account for the entity that wants
to participate. 509 The application process includes completing an online or hard
copy of the CITSS participant registration form, CITSS participant registration
checklist form, and Business Relationship Disclosure Form. 510
4.2 Account Types

There are several different types of accounts involved in the WCI cap-andtrade program. Each account is used to facilitate the movement of allowances
through auction, trade, and sales. California has a multitude of accounts, while
Québec provides for only two accounts. Accounts are managed in each jurisdiction
by a primary account representative, an alternative account representative, and
account viewing agents. Each of these positions have similar roles and privileges
within each jurisdiction. Further, when opening accounts, participants are
obligated to disclose their corporate and business relationships with entities
participating in other WCI jurisdictions.
California

In California there are five accounts that can be created for a registered entity.
The CARB Executive Officer will create one of each of the following types of
account for each entity:
•

holding account

•

limited use holding account

•

compliance account

•

annual allocation holding account

508 Ontario Climate Change Action Plan, “Ontario’s Cap-and-Trade Program How to
Participate: Frequently Asked Questions – Recognition as an Account Agent and Participant
Registration Process” at 3, ontario.ca/capandtrade [hereinafter Ontario Cap-and-Trade FAQ] ;
and California Environmental Protection Agency – Air Resources Board, “Compliance
Instrument Tracking System Service: User Reference CITSS Version 5.0” (January 2015) at 1,
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/markettrackingsystem/vers5_reference.pdf [hereinafter
CEPA-ARB Version 5.0]. (not sure how to cite this)
509 Ontario Cap-and-Trade FAQ, supra note 508, at 3.
510 Id. at 12.
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exchange clearing holding account. 511

A holding account can be used to transfer emission allowances and credits.
Within this category of account, there are also “limited use Holding Accounts”
which can be used when an entity qualifies for a direct allocation. 512 However,
entities cannot transfer compliance instruments into the limited use holding
account and can only transfer compliance instruments out of the limited use
holding account and into an auction holding account. 513
Compliance accounts can have compliance instruments transferred into them
by the entity for which the account was made. However, the entity cannot remove
compliance instruments from this account. Only the CARB Executive Officer has
the authority to transfer compliance instruments into or out of a compliance
account for the purposes of satisfying compliance obligations or closing the
account. 514
Exchange clearing holding accounts are used only for the purpose of
transferring control of compliance instruments to the clearing entity. Such
compliance instruments can only be transferred out of the exchange clearing
holding account by the clearing entity to the specific account identified by the
entity receiving the compliance instruments from the transaction being cleared. 515
Annual allocation holding accounts are used when an entity qualifies for direct
allocation under sub article 9 of the California Code of Regulations section
95831. 516 Any allowances for a future vintage that are received by an entity will
be placed by the CARB Executive Officer into the annual allocation holding
account. Allowances in the annual allocation holding account can only be
transferred into the entity’s compliance account, and these allowances must not
exceed the holding limit as determined in section 95920(c) of the California Code
of Regulations.
In addition to the above accounts, there are seven accounts that can be created
but remain under the control of the CARB Executive Officer. These accounts are
described below.
The allocation holding account is used to register the serial numbers of
compliance instruments upon their creation. 517
Allowances are transferred into an auction holding account prior to the auction
at which the allowances will be sold. 518 These allowances for sale may be
transferred into the auction holding account from an allocation holding account,
holding account, limited use holding account, or compliance accounts.
Allowances will be transferred into the retirement account for the purpose of
retiring those allowances permanently. 519 Allowances that are retired cannot be
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519

CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95831(a) (2012).
Id. § 95831(a)(2).
Id. § 95831(a)(3).
Id. § 95831(a)(4).
Id. § 95831(a)(5).
Id. § 95831(a)(6).
Id. § 95831(b)(1).
Id. § 95831(b)(2).
Id. § 95831(b)(3).
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returned after retirement. All linked WCI jurisdictions are notified of all
retirements, and all retirements will be recorded by the Executive Officer on the
public Permanent Retirement Registry.
An allowance price containment reserve account contains the serial numbers
of all allowances directly placed in the allowance price containment reserve. 520
The forest buffer account contains the offset credits associated with the
California forest buffer offset protocol, and is the account from which these offset
credits may be retired. 521
The voluntary renewable electricity reserve account is a type of holding
account that contains originally allocated allowances and once these allowances
are all transferred or retired this account will be closed. 522
The external GHG program holding account processes voluntary retirements
under the Retirement-Only Agreements in section 95943(d) of the California Code
of Regulations. Compliance instruments are transferred into this account for
retirement by entities that are involved in external GHG programs. CARB reviews
transfers to this account and if the transfers are approved, the allowances will be
transferred to the retirement account for permanent retirement. 523
Québec

In Québec, when registration requirements are met and an entity is approved
as an emitter, the Minister creates a general account and a compliance account for
the emitter. The general account is used to record the transfer and trading of
allowances, while the compliance account is use for recording emissions
allowances. 524 Upon the creation of these accounts, emitters are permitted to
participate in WCI auctions and participate in allowances transfers between
emitters. 525
Ontario

Similar to Québec, in Ontario once the registration requirements were met and
registration was approved, the Director would create a holding account and a
compliance account for the emitter. 526 The holding account was used to transfer
compliance instruments, while the compliance account was used to record trades
of emission allowances between jurisdictions.
4.3 The Transfer Process

Participants with a CITSS account can use their account to transfer emissions
allowances in four ways:

520

Id. § 95831(b)(4).
Id. § 95831(b)(5).
522 Id. § 95831(b)(6).
523 Id. § 95831.
524 OC 1184-2012 (12 December 2012) GOQ II, 3485, §§ 10-14 [OC 1184-2012].
525 California Environmental Protection Agency, 3.3 General Market Participant –
Individual
Account
Application,
Air
Resources
Board
(December
2012),,
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/markettrackingsystem/vol2citssguide-12-20.pdf at 1.
526 O. Reg. 144/16, supra note 331, at 39.
521
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(1) transfer to another registered participant’s General Holding Account;
(2) transfer to the registered participant’s own Compliance Account;
(3) an Exchange Agreement to an Exchange Clearing Service Provider’s
Exchange Clearing Holding Account;
(4) Voluntary Retirement.
There is a three-step process when transferring to another participant entity’s
General Holding Account: (1) propose, (2) approve, and (3) accept. 527 First, the
Primary Account Representative (“PAR”) or Alternate Account Representative
(AAR) of the entity making the transfer must propose the transfer in CITSS by
submitting a transfer request. 528 Once submitted, all representatives for that
transferring account will receive an email notifying them of the proposed
transfer. 529 Second, a different PAR or AAR from the transferring entity must
approve the proposed transfer by selecting the “process transfer” option in CITSS
prior to midnight two days after the transfer is proposed. 530 Once again all
representatives of this transferring account will receive a notification email
detailing this action. 531 Third, the receiving entity’s PAR or AAR must accept the
transfer in CITSS by selecting “process transfer” prior to midnight of the third day
after the transfer was proposed. 532 Once complete, all representatives for both the
transferring and receiving accounts will receive an email notification that the
transfer is complete. 533
While the process described immediately above is the standard transfer
process, transfers to a Compliance Account or an Exchange Agreement to an
Exchange Clearing Service Provider’s (“ECSP”) Exchange Clearing Holding
Account only require the completion of the first two-steps, as detailed above. 534
Transfers to a Compliance Account can only be completed by participants who
have compliance obligations under the cap-and-trade program or a linked
program. 535 The transfer is made from a participant’s General Holding Account to
their Compliance Account and the transfer is irreversible. 536 On the other hand, an
Exchange Agreement to an ECSP’s Exchange Clearing Holding Account is a
transfer from a participant’s General Account to an entity registered in CITSS as
providing clearing exchange services. 537 An ECSP temporarily takes possession of
compliance instruments that are in the process of being transferred between two
CITSS participants. 538
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538

CEPA-ARB Version 5.0, supra note 508, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CEPA-ARB Version 5.0, supra note 508, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.

A Guide to Emissions Trading under the WCI

251

Compliance instruments can also be retired. To retire a compliance
instrument, a participant registered in CITSS can voluntarily transfer the
compliance instrument for retirement from their participant account to the
jurisdiction’s Retirement Account. 539 This process is irrevocable and requires the
same three-step process used for transfers to another entity’s General Holding
Account. 540 However, retiring compliance instruments will not fulfill any
compliance obligations. 541
4.4 Auctions
4.4.1 Format

Joint auctions are held for California and Québec, and are conducted on the
Markit Auction and Reserve Sale Platform (“Auction Platform”). 542 Auctions are
completed with sealed bids, and only one round of bidding for participants occurs,
where the lowest bid wins the auction. Any bid lower than the auction reserve price
will not be considered. 543 The auction reserve price will be the highest reserve
price of the WCI jurisdictions after taking into account exchange rates. 544 The
exchange rate for CAD to USD will be as specified by the Bank of Canada and set
at that rate the day before the auction. 545 Québec participating entities have the
option of participating in auctions using either CAD or US. However, once the
currency is chosen, the entire auction process must be completed in the same
currency. 546 Each participant bid must include the bid price, the number of lots
being bid on (each lot equals 1000 emission allowances), the vintage of the
allowances being bid on, and the currency to be used for payment. 547
4.4.2 Administration and Participant Application

Participants are required to have a CITSS account to participate in the
auction. 548 In addition to an auction application form, a bid guarantee must be
submitted by the PAR or AAR for each participating entity, and Notice of
Approval to Participate in the Auction must be received. 549 As part of this
application form, the entity permits the release of their contact information, their
representative’s contact information, and their account number to the Auction

539

Id. at 26.
Id.
541 Id.
542 “Auction and Reserve Sale Platform User Guide” (August 2017) at 4, wci-auction.org
[hereinafter Auction and Reserve User Guide].
543 “California-Québec-Ontario Joint Auction Participant Training Presentation”, California
Air Resources Board, Minister of Sustainable Development, Environment and the Fight Against
Climate Change, & Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (January 2018)
at 12, wci-auction.org [hereinafter California-Québec-Ontario Presentation].(not sure how to
cite this as there is no link)
544 Id.
545 Id.
546 Id. at 14.
547 Id. at 66.
548 Auction and Reserve User Guide, supra note 542.
549 Id.; California-Québec-Ontario Presentation, supra note 543, at 12.
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Administrator for the purposes of participating in the auction. 550 The Auction
Administrator will then send an account activation email to the PAR or AAR who
must activate the Auction Platform Account, creating a username and password as
well as creating three security questions. 551 A participant entity who has previously
participated in auctions can simply login to their Auction Platform Account and
update their password, if required. 552
In order to participate in auctions, participants must keep all their bidding
information, including intent to bid, bidding strategy, and bidding price,
completely confidential. 553 In addition, all participants are required to employ a
consultant or advisor for the bidding process. 554 The participating entity must
inform their jurisdiction and complete the appropriate forms to notify their
jurisdiction of the appointment of a consultant or advisor. 555 Further, the
participant must inform their consultant or advisor of the confidentiality
requirement observed in the bidding process. 556
There are three main limitations to auction bidding. First, a bid is rejected if
the bid is greater than the bidder’s purchase limit. 557 A purchase limit is the
maximum amount of allowances the participant is permitted to purchase. 558
Second, a bid is rejected if it is greater than the purchaser’s holding limit. 559 A
holding limit is the maximum number of allowances the participant is permitted to
hold. 560 Third, a bid is rejected if the value of the bid is valued at a greater amount
than the value of the bid guarantee made prior to the auction. 561 A bid guarantee is
an amount of money paid in advance of the auction that must cover the cost of all
bids made during the auction. 562 The bid guarantee must cover all bids made for
both current and advance auctions. 563
It is possible that a tie arises in the auction process. A tie occurs where the
quantity of allowances bid on exceeds the quantity of allowances available. 564
Each tied bidder receives a share of the remaining allowances based on the
quantity of allowances that can be granted at the settlement price. 565 This share is
then multiplied by the quantity of allowances that have not yet been sold. 566 The
result is the quantity of allowances the participant receives due to the tie.567 Any
550

Auction and Reserve User Guide, supra note 542.
Id. at 4-9.
552 Id. at 15.
553 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95914(c); Ontario Climate Change and Low-Carbon
Economy Act, SO 2016, c7, § 32.
554 California-Québec-Ontario Presentation, supra note 543, at 89-90.
555 Id.
556 Id.
557 Id. at 76.
558 Id. at 79.
559 Id. at 76.
560 Id. at 89.
561 Id. at 76.
562 Id. at 77.
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allowances that remain after this tie-breaking process are randomly assigned to
participants in the tie by randomly allocating numbers to the participants and
distributing the remaining allowances from lowest to highest number. 568
Upon completion of the auction, a Joint Auction Summary Results Report will
be accessible on the websites of all three jurisdiction within five business days
after the auction. 569 The report will be published in both English and French, and
consist of the auction results and statistics. 570
4.4.3 Auction Results

The WCI auctions have been successful thus far. One hundred and twenty
qualified bidders submitted auction applications and bid guarantees and were
approved by CARB, MOECC, or NDDELCC to participate in the February 21,
2018 auction, the first auction in which all three jurisdictions participated. 571 The
auction, which cleared and complied with the regulations of each such jurisdiction,
provided for the sale of 14,894,520 2016 vintage allowances, 83,321,400 2018
vintage allowances (“Current Allowances”), and an advance auction of 12,427,950
2021 vintage allowances (“Advance Allowances”). 572 With an average of 1.21 bids
per sale, qualified bidders purchased 100% of the 98,215,920 of the Current
Allowances available, 92.1% of which were purchased by compliance entities. 573
With an average of .69 bids per sale, qualified bidders purchased 69% of the
Advance Allowances, with compliance entities purchasing 89% of the
allowances. 574 Bidding prices for both the Current and Advance Allowances began
at USD $14.53 (CAD $18.34). However Current Allowances sold at a mean price
of USD $15.90 (CAD $20.07), and Advance Allowances sold at a mean price of
USD $15.32 (CAD $19.34). 575 The highest price a Current Allowance sold for was
USD $54.27 (CAD $68.50). 576
The most recent auction with all three WCI participant jurisdictions was held
on May 15, 2018. 577 The auction consisted of the sale of 2016 and 2018 current
auction vintage allowances, as well as the sale of 2021 advance auction vintage
allowances. 578 The Market Monitor assessed the auction and recommended the
approval of the May 15, 2018 auction results. 579 During this auction, all available
current auction vintage allowances were sold, totalling 13,368,884 2016 vintage
allowances and 77,218,854 2018 vintage allowances. 580 In addition, 6,057,000
2021 advance auction vintage allowances were sold out of 12,427,950 2021
568

Id.
Id. at 92.
570 Id.
571 Summary Results Report–Joint Auction #14 (February 2018) California Cap-and-Trade
Program, Ontario Cap-and-Trade Program, & Québec Cap-and-Trade System at 1-7.
572 Id. at 1.
573 Id. at 4.
574 Id. at 2.
575 Id. at 3.
576 Id.
577 May 2018 Joint Auction #15 Summary Results Report (May 2018) at 1-2, wci-auction.org.
578 Id.
579 Id.
580 Id.
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advance auction vintage allowances that were available. 581 Compliance entities
purchased the majority of the allowances, specifically 95.6% of the current auction
vintage allowances, and 77.7% of the advance auction vintage allowances. 582
4.5 Reserve Sales

Reserve sales refer to the sale of reserve allowances from the price
containment reserve in order to manage prices. As previously discussed, a
percentage of allowances are placed in the price containment reserve annually and
divided into three tiers with increasingly high sale prices.583 These reserve tiers are
only sold when the auction price nears the reserve price. The purpose of a reserve
sale is to limit allowances prices in both the auction and secondary markets. 584
California

In California, participation in a reserve sale requires the production of all
corporate structuring information of the participating entity, the participant to be
registered with an approved CITSS account, and the participant have a CITSS
representative. 585 All possible dates for reserve sales from 2015 to 2031 have been
identified in Appendix C of the California Code of Regulations. 586 Pursuant to
section 95913 of the California Code of Regulations, a reserve sale will be held
annually in the third quarter of the year prior to November 1st. In addition, reserve
sales will be held up to three additional times per year only when the previous
allowance auction had a settlement price of sixty percent or more of the lowest
reserve tier price. 587
A reserve sale notice will be posted approximately thirty days prior to the sale
date to provide information about eligibility for participation in the sale, the sale
format and what allowances will be for sale. 588 An application for participation
must be completed and submitted on CITSS for each participant entity. 589
Applications will only be accepted starting thirty days prior to the sale and ending
twenty days prior to the sale. 590 Once the application is submitted, the Financial
Services Administrator will either create or verify the existence of the applicant’s
581

Id.
Id.
583 California Air Resources Board, Detailed Reserve Sale Requirements and Instructions:
California Cap-and-Trade Program Sale of Greenhouse Gas Allowances from the Allowance
Price Containment Reserve (16 March 2018) at 1, arb.ca.gov.
584 California Air Resources Board, Chapter 5: How do I buy, sell, and trade compliance
instruments? (Dec. 2012) at 21, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/chapter5.pdf.
585 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § reg 95913(c); Detailed Reserve Sale Requirement and
Instructions Board, “Reserve Sale Application Requirements” (March 2018) at 4,
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/2018_rs_requirements.pdf
[hereinafter
Reserve Sale Application Requirements].
586 California Air Resources Board, Greenhouse Gas Allowance Price Containment Reserve
Sales (2018), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/reservesale.htm [hereinafter
CARB Price Containment].
587 California Air Resources Board, “Detailed Reserve Sale Requirements and Instructions”
(March 2018) at 1, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/reservesale.htm.
588 CARB Price Containment, supra note 586.
589 Reserve Sale Application Requirements, supra note 585, at 4.
590 Id. at 8.
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financial services account. The participant entity must then submit a bid guarantee
that will cover the cost of any bids made by that entity. 591 The Financial Services
Administrator will review the bid guarantee, and once it is approved, the
participant’s status will change from “applicant” to “qualified applicant,” meaning
the participant is prepared for the auction. 592
At the reserve sale, each reserve tier has a different fixed price that is
significantly higher than the allowance auction price. This difference allows the
WCI to determine supply and demand for allowances. 593 For instance, if the first
tier of reserve allowances are purchased quickly and purchases are made for higher
tier allowances, this pattern may indicate an imbalance requiring adjustments to
the cap-and-trade program. 594 The fixed prices are adjusted every year for
inflation. 595 In 2013, the tiers from lowest to highest had fixed prices of forty
dollars, forty-five dollars, and fifty dollars in USD. 596 Sales will begin from the
lowest to the highest priced tier. 597 The account representative or a qualified bidder
can submit as many bids as they wish, and edit or withdraw bids at any time during
the bidding window. 598
Allowances in a reserve tier will be sold to an entity who submits a bid for
those allowances as long as the number of allowance bundles (1,000 allowances
per bundle) that are bid on does not exceed the number of allowances available. 599
If there are allowances remaining in the first or second tier, the reserve sale
administrator will assign random numbers to each bundle of allowances purchased
by participants and the remaining allowances will be distributed to those
participants based on the randomly allocated numbers from lowest to highest. 600 If
the number of allowances bid on exceeds the number of allowances available in a
tier, the reserve sale administrator must comply with the procedure set out in
section 95913(h)(5) of the California Code of Regulations in order to determine
how allowances will be distributed. 601 After confirming that the payment for

591

Detailed Reserve Sale Requirement and Instructions Board, Bid Guarantee Submittal
Process
(2018)
at
12,
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/
2018_rs_requirements.pdf; CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95913(g).
592 Detailed Reserve Sale Requirements and Instructions Board, Receipt of Bid Guarantee
(2018) at 19, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/2018_rs_requirements.pdf.
593 California Air Resources Board, “Reserve Sale Information” (Mar. 2017),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/reservesale.htm.
594 Allowance Price Containment Reserve – the mechanism for managing the risks of the
California carbon market or the risk in itself?, (Mar. 6, 2013), https://www.emissionseuets.com/component/content/article/909-california-cap-and-trade/247-allowance-pricecontainment-reserve-the-mechanism-for-managing-the-risks-of-the-california-carbon-marketor-risk-in-itself.
595 Id.
596 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95913(f)(3).
597 Id. at § 95913(h)(1).
598 Detailed Reserve Sale Requirements and Instructions Board, Bidding in the Reserve Sale
(2018) at 24-25, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/2018_rs_requirements.pdf.
599 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95913(h)(4)(A).
600 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95913(h)(4)(B).
601 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95913(h)(5).
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allowances have been received, the CARB Executive Officer will transfer the
allowances purchased into each winning bidder’s Compliance Account. 602
Québec

In Québec, reserve sales take place at most four times a year. 603 In order to
participate in reserve sales, purchasing entities must be registered in accordance
with the Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for GHG emission
allowances. The purchasing entity must also be an emitter covered by the cap-andtrade program in Québec. Further, the purchasing entity must not have any
allowances in their general account that could cover their GHG emissions for the
current compliance period. 604 Participation in a reserve sale requires that all buyers
are registered with the Minister at least thirty days prior to the reserve sale date. 605
To register, the purchasing entity must provide the Minister with their name,
contact information, compliance account number, information for account
representatives, and a financial guarantee in CAD. 606 In addition, at least forty days
prior to the reserve sale, all purchasing entities must provide the Minister with an
update of the entity’s identity, ownership, corporate structure, any business
relationships, and the entity’s holding limits. 607 A purchasing entity may be
refused participation in the reserve sale if any of the information provided to the
Minister changes with less than thirty days prior to the reserve sale, or if false or
misleading information is provided, information is omitted or the entity fails to
comply with the rules of procedure. 608
At the reserve sale, emission allowances are sold in lots of 1,000
allowances. 609 There are three tiers of emission allowances (A, B, and C) with
fixed sale prices. 610 The fixed prices in 2014 were forty dollars, forty-five dollars,
and fifty dollars CAD respectively and these prices increase by five percent plus
inflation each year. 611 There is only one bidding round and all bids are sealed. 612
Once the reserve sale is complete, the reserve allowances are distributed in the
following order: Tier A, Tier B, Tier C. 613
When the offers made for allowances do not exceed the amount of allowances
available for sale, the allowances will be distributed according to the offers
received. 614 Any allowances that are not sold, are retained for sale at a later date. 615
However, if the offers made exceed the amount of allowances available for sale,
602

CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95913(i)(4).
O.C. 1297-2011, 2011 G.O. 2, 3655B at 57.
604 Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission allowances,
Q-2 r 46.1 at 56.
605 Id. at 59.
606 Id. at 59.
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608 Id. at 59, 60.
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each purchaser’s offer will be divided by the total amount of offers made for the
same allowances. 616 This value is then multiplied by the amount of allowances
available for purchase, rounding the value down to the nearest whole number. 617
This calculation will determine the amount of available allowances each
purchasing entity is owed. In the event that these calculations result in extra
unaccounted-for allowances, a random number will be assigned to each purchasing
entity and distribute one allowance to each purchasing entity in order of lowest to
highest number until all allowances are distributed. 618 In the event that the
purchasing entity submits bids that exceed the amount of allowances available for
sale, exceed the entity’s holding limit, or exceed the financial guarantee submitted
by the entity, excess allowances may be removed from a purchasing entity’s bids,
beginning by removing the lowest bids to the highest bids. 619
Purchasing entities have seven days after the results of the reserve sale are
released to submit full payment for their purchased allowances. 620 If payment is
not received during these seven days, the amount due will be held back by the
Minister from the bid guarantee provided prior to the reserve sale. 621 Once
payment is received the amount of allowances purchased is recorded in the
purchasing entity’s compliance account. All funds raised from the sale of reserve
allowances is placed in Québec’s Green Fund, used to finance climate change
efforts in the province. 622
Ontario

Ontario reserve sales were very similar to Québec’s reserve sale format and
procedure. Participation in an Ontario reserve sale required that the purchasing
entity be a capped participant for at least forty days prior to the reserve sale, that
the participant received permission from the Minister to bid in a sale, that financial
assurance was provided to the Minister at least twelve days prior to the reserve
sale, and on the reserve sale date the purchasing entity could hold any allowances
in their holding account that could be used to meet their then-current compliance
period obligations. 623 Similar to Québec requirements, to receive permission to bid
in a sale, Ontario entities had to update the Minister with information about any
entity changes at least forty days prior to the sale.
Further, at least thirty days prior to the sale, participants had to provide the
Minister with their compliance account number, contact information and holding
account number for the participant entity, identification numbers and names of all
account representatives, name and contact information for any consultants used,
social insurance number if the participant was an individual, and the type of
financial assurance that would be provided during the sale. 624 In addition, financial
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
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assurance had to be provided to the Minister at least twelve days prior to the sale. 625
The Minister would refuse an application to bid in a sale or suspend a participant’s
ability to participate in a sale if false or misleading information was provided by
the participant, the participant refused to disclose required information, or the
participant’s compliance account was prohibited from participating in transfers of
compliance instruments due to the cap-and-trade regulations or an imposition from
the Director. 626
Similar to California and Québec reserve sales, Ontario emission allowances
were sold in lots of 1,000 allowances from the same category. 627 Before accepting
any bids, the Minister would compare the participant’s actual maximum bid value
and the participant’s financial assurance. 628 If the maximum bid value was greater
than the participant’s financial assurance, the excess bids would be removed to
ensure the bid value did not exceed the financial assurance provided. 629 In addition,
bids could be rejected by the Minister in order of lowest to highest bid in the event
that allowing the bid would cause the participant to exceed their holding limit. 630
Accepted bids would be completed beginning with Tier A, followed by Tiers B
and C. 631 If the amount of allowances available was sufficient to fulfill the number
of allowances bid on, then allowances were distributed based on the bids
received. 632 However, if the amount of allowances available was not sufficient to
fulfill the number of allowances bid on, then the allowances were distributed
following the same protocol used in Québec. Specifically, the number of
allowances bid on by each participant was individually divided by the total number
of allowances available for that category. 633 This value represented that
participant’s share of the available allowances, and this value was then multiplied
by the total value of emission allowances available for sale. 634 This value was then
rounded down to the nearest whole number and that was the number of emissions
allowances to be distributed to that participant. 635 In the event that there were
remaining allowances, random numbers would be assigned to each participant and
the remaining allowances would be distributed from lowest to highest assigned
number. 636
4.6 Secondary Markets

In addition to auctions and reserve sales, there is the secondary market in
which participants in California and Québec can buy or sell compliance

625

Id. at §76(1).
Id. at § 76(3).
627 Id. at § 79.
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629 Id. at § 83.
630 Holding limit in Ontario is calculated using the following formula: 𝐿𝐿 = 2,500,000 +
0.025 𝑥𝑥 (𝐶𝐶 − 25,000,000): Id. at §§ 40; 81.
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instruments from each other. 637 The secondary market allows for the sale of
emission allowances previously distributed to a capped emitter, early reduction
and offset credits, and any derivative financial products. 638 These transactions
occur between market participants (non-capped participants) and capped
participants. The revenue generated from secondary market sales stays with the
seller of the compliance instruments and is not given to the government. 639 All
secondary market transactions are registered in the same CITSS system used for
auctions. 640 All prices at the secondary market are left to the discretion of the
parties involved in the sale; therefore, compliance instruments may be sold for
higher or lower prices than they are sold at auction. 641 Compliance instruments
may also be traded or exchanged as agreed upon by the parties. 642
California

In California, secondary market transactions can occur through
Intercontinental Exchange Inc., a trading corporation that lists compliance
instruments available for trade, swap, or exchange. The Intercontinental Exchange
Inc. is a large market that is heavily regulated by global financial standards, local
regulations, and internal market supervision policies. 643 Generally, the secondary
market price for allowances is higher than the auction price. However, beginning
in May 2016, the secondary market price was below the auction price, likely due
to ongoing cap-and-trade litigation in California. 644 Once the litigation was
resolved in favor of cap-and-trade, the secondary market prices once again were
higher than auction prices. 645 The conduct required by parties in conducting any
trade is detailed in section 95921 of the California Code of Regulations. 646 In
California, secondary market transactions only have to be reported when there is
a change in control of the compliance instrument, meaning the compliance
instruments are physically transferred to a new owner. 647 As of August 17, 2018
there were many California allowances and options available for trade on
Intercontinental Exchange Inc.

637 California Air Resources Board, California Cap-and-Trade Program: Facts about the
linked cap-and-trade programs (Dec. 1, 2017), arb.ca.gov.
638 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Introduction to Cap-and-trade in Ontario:
Appendix A to the ECO’s Greenhouse Gas Progress Report, 2016 (2016) at 5,
media.assets.eco.on.ca.
639 Id. at 15.
640 Id. at 14.
641 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Facing Climate Change: Greenhouse Gas
Progress Report, 2016 (2016) at 69, docs.assets.eco.on.ca [hereinafter ECO Facing Climate
Change].
642 California Air Resources Board, “Chapter 5: How Do I Buy, Sell, and Trade Compliance
Instruments?” (December 2012) at 28,, arb.ca.gov [hereinafter CARB Chapter 5].
643 Intercontinental Exchange, ICE, theice.com.
644 ECO Facing Climate Change, supra note 641, at 72.
645 Chris Busch, “Oversupply Grows in the Western Climate Initiative Carbon Market: An
adjustment for current oversupply is needed to ensure the program will achieve its 2030 target”,
Energy Innovation (Dec. 2017) at 18, energyinnovation.org.
646 CAL. CODE REGS. 17 CA ADC § 95921.
647 CARB Chapter 5, supra note 642, at 28.
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Québec

In Québec, all trades involving allowances must be completed following the
procedure set out in section 26 of the Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system
for GHG allowances. 648 This includes the requirement for the seller to submit a
transaction request to the Minister including the buyer and seller’s information,
the type and quantity of the allowances being sold, the settlement price, the date
of agreement, and the date of trading. 649 The transaction request must be approved
by another of the seller’s account representatives within two days after
submission. 650 The request must then be sent to the buyer’s representatives to be
accepted within three days of the request being sent. 651 Upon acceptance by the
buyer, the request will be completed and the transfer will occur, unless the Minister
believes an offence under the Environment Quality Act is being committed. 652 As
of August 17, 2018 there were no Québec compliance instruments available for
trade on Intercontinental Exchange Inc.
Ontario

In January 2017, Intercontinental Exchange Inc. began listing Ontario
compliance instruments as available for trade. 653 During its operation, the Ontario
secondary market was not very active. That was likely due to the novelty of the
Ontario program and the fact that at its inauguration in 2017, linkage with
California and Québec was not yet confirmed. As of August 17, 2018 there were
no Ontario compliance instruments available for trade on Intercontinental
Exchange Inc.
4.7 Taxation

Given the value associated with compliance instruments in the cap-and-trade
program it is important to assess any potential tax consequences arising from the
acquisition of compliance instruments.
4.7.1 United States

In the United States, there is a tax imposed on emission allowances. This tax
is based either on the value of the emission allowances when received through
government allocation or based on the cost paid for the allowances in a market
transaction. 654 However, emissions allowances received free of charge from the
648 Regulation respecting a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission allowances,
Q-2 r 46.1 at 25.
649 Id.
650 Id. at 26.
651 Id.
652 Id.
653 Tyson Dyck & Henry Ren, Canada: Ontario Joins Linked North American Carbon
Market, Torys LLP (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.torys.com/insights/publications/2018/01/
ontario-joins-linked-north-american-carbon-market..
654 Ernest & Young Global Limited, Tax Aspects of Cap-and-Trade System Operation,
(2018),
https://www.ey.com/us/en/industries/oil---gas/carbon-market-readiness---9---taxaspects-of-cap-and-trade-system-operation [hereinafter Ernest & Young]; 26 US Internal
Revenue Code at 1012.
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federal government are not subject to taxation. 655 Emissions allowances may be
characterized as “inventory, materials or supplies, ordinary business expenses,
amortizable intangible property [or] intangible property with an indefinite life.” 656
Depending on the characterization, certain emission allowance taxes may be
recoverable or deductible. 657 An emission allowance becomes taxable in the tax
year, and the emission allowance is used to meet compliance obligations, sold or
exchanged. 658
A participant may purchase emissions allowances to meet compliance
obligations or as an investment. 659 When a participant owns allowances as
commodities for the purpose of selling them, the tax obligations that arise would
be characterized as ordinary gains or losses. 660 However, when allowances are
used in any way other than as a commodity, when sold the participant will have a
capital gain or capital loss since the allowances are not depreciable property
according to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. 661
4.7.2 Canada

The Canadian federal government imposes a five percent value-added goods
and services tax (“GST”). In addition, most provinces have a provincial sales tax.
Four provinces have eliminated the provincial sales tax (“PST”) and harmonized
it with the federal GST. 662 In these provinces, this harmonized GST is known as
the Harmonized Sales Tax (“HST”). Most property and services supplied in
Canada or imported into Canada are subject to GST or HST. 663 Ontario imposes
an HST rate of 13%, while Québec imposes a 5% GST and a 9.975% Québec Sales
Tax (“QST”). 664
Legislative Scheme

Initially, Canada had no taxation scheme specific to cap-and-trade compliance
instruments. 665 The lack of a specific taxation scheme created confusion and
655 Mark Price, Hearing Before US Senate Committee on Finance on Climate Change
Legislation: Tax Considerations, KPMG LLP (Jun. 16, 2009) at 2, finance.senate.gov. (can’t
find link)
656 Ernest & Young Global Limited, supra note 654.
657 Id.
658 Id.
659 Id.
660 Ernest & Young Global Limited, supra note 654.
661 Id.
662 The provinces that impose an HST, or Harmonized Sales Tax, and their corresponding
taxation rates are: New Brunswick (15%), Newfoundland and Labrador (15%), Nova Scotia
(15%) and Ontario (13%).
663 Government
of
Canada,
Charge
the
GST/HST
(Feb.
5,
2018),
https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/businesses/topics/gst-hstbusinesses/charge-gst/charge-gst-hst.html.
664 Revenu
Québec,
Tables
of
GST
and
QST
Rates
(2018),
https://www.revenuQuébec.ca/en/businesses/consumption-taxes/gsthst-and-qst/basic-rules-forapplying-the-gsthst-and-qst/tables-of-gst-and-qst-rates/.
665 House of Commons, Department of Finance Canada, Tax Measures: Supplementary
Information (March 2016) at 24, https://www.budget.gc.ca/2016/docs/downloadtelecharger/index-en.html [hereinafter House of Commons, “Supplementary Information”].
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resulted in issues of double taxation for free allowances. 666 In January 2017,
Canada’s federal Income Tax Act 667 was amended to include a new taxation
scheme governing the use and sale of emissions allowances by regulated emitters
who are Canadian taxpayers. 668 The amendments govern the acquisition of
emissions allowances in taxation years beginning after 2016. A taxpayer can also
elect to have this new set of rules apply to emissions allowances acquired in
taxation years ending after 2012. 669 For the purposes of taxation, Canada’s federal
government has created definitions for emissions allowance and emissions
obligation. An emissions allowance is “an allowance, credit or similar instrument
that represents a unit of emissions that can be used to satisfy a requirement under
the laws of Canada or a province governing emissions of a regulated substance,
such as greenhouse gas emissions” 670 while an emissions obligation is “an
obligation to surrender an emissions allowance, or an obligation that can otherwise
be satisfied through the use of an emissions allowance, under a law of Canada or
a province governing emissions of a regulated substance.” 671
Value of Emissions Allowances

For tax purposes, emissions allowances are treated as inventory. 672 The value
of an emissions allowance is the cost paid by the taxpayer to acquire the
allowance. 673 This cost paid valuation method is used in order to account for the
potential volatility of emission allowance value. 674
If a registered emitter, who already holds one or more emissions allowances,
acquires additional identical emission allowances, then the cost of each identical
allowance is held to be the average cost of all the identical emissions allowances
of the taxpayer. 675 This averaging allows taxpayers to calculate gain on identical
emissions allowances in a simple manner, even if particular emissions allowances
are later disposed of. 676 For tax purposes, emissions allowances are identical when
666

Id.
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) (Can.).
668 Id. § 27.1(1)-(6). See also: House of Commons, Department of Finance Canada,
“Growing
the
Middle
Class”
(March
2016)
at
160,
https://www.budget.gc.ca/2016/docs/plan/toc-tdm-en.html.
669 Bill C-29, A second Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in
Parliament on March 22, 2016 and other measures, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, (2016), SC 2016, c 12.
See also: Budget Implementation Act, 2016, No 2, SC 2016, c 12, s 10 [hereinafter Budget
Implementation Act].
670 Income Tax Act, supra note 667, § 248.
671 Id.
672 Julie D’Avignon, Federal Budget addresses the taxation of Emissions Allowances,
Stikeman Elliott, (March 2016) stikeman.com [hereinafter D’Avignon 2016]; and Income Tax
Act, supra note 662, at 248: “inventory means a description of property the cost or value of
which is relevant in computing a taxpayer’s income from a business for a taxation year or would
have been so relevant if the income from the business had not been computed in accordance
with the cash method and includes . . . an emissions allowance”.
673 Income Tax Act, supra note 667, § 27.1(1).
674 D’Avignon 2016, supra note 672; Income Tax Act, supra note 667, § 27.1(1).
675 Income Tax Act, supra note 667, § 27.1(2).
676 William Francis Morneau, Explanatory Notes Relating to the Income Tax Act, Excise Tax
Act, Excise Act, 2001 and Related Legislation, (2016) Department of Finance Canada at
667
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they can be used to settle the same emissions obligation. 677 For example, if one
emissions allowance can only be used in one province and the other emissions
allowance can only be used in another province, they are not identical. Further, for
two emissions allowances to be considered identical, it must be possible to use
them for the same time periods. If one can be used to settle emissions obligations
for several years, but the other can only be used to settle emissions obligations in
one specific year, then the two are not considered identical. 678
GST/HST Collection

As previously discussed, there are several ways in which an emission
allowance can be allocated. Prior to June 27, 2018, emission allowances provided
directly from the government to participating entities were not taxable but
secondary market acquisitions of allowances were taxable. 679 However, effective
June 27, 2018 new taxation rules were instituted in which a self-assessment of
emission allowances purchases is required by all Canadian residents or GST
registered entities. 680 A new tax credit was also created which allow tax paying
entities to claim back the GST/HST taxes they self-assess. 681 This new taxation
scheme applies retroactively, meaning that if GST/HST taxes have not already
been collected for emissions allowances purchases prior to June 27, 2018 then the
new taxation scheme will apply and the purchaser must complete a GST/HST selfassessment. 682 In the event that GST/HST had been charged but not collected prior
to the new legislation the vendor may issue a credit under s. 232 of the Excise Tax
Act for the tax the GST/HST charged. 683
One identified concern with the new taxation scheme is the lack of selfreporting requirement when the vendor of emission allowances is neither a
Canadian resident nor a GST/HST registered entity and the emissions allowances
are used in commercial activities. 684 Specifically, purchasers who exclusively use
emissions allowances for commercial activities will be required under this new
legislation to determine if the vendor of their purchased emissions allowances is a
GST/HST registered entity. 685 If the vendor is a registered entity a self-assessment
of GST/HST is required by the purchaser. However, when the vendor is not a
registered entity no such self-assessment is required. 686

15,,https://www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/2016/ita-lir-0716-eng.asp
[hereinafter
Morneau
Explanatory Notes 2016].
677 Income Tax Act, supra note 667, § 27.1(2).
678 Morneau Explanatory Notes 2016, supra note 676, at 16.
679 Alan Kenigsberg, New GST/HST rules for carbon emission allowances, Osler Hoskin &
Harcourt LLP (June 2018), : <https://www.osler.com/en/resources/regulations/2018/new-gsthst-rules-for-carbon-emission-allowances>.
680 Id.
681 Id.
682 Id.
683 Id.
684 Id.
685 Id.
686 Id.
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Tax Deductions

In certain circumstances, a registered emitter can deduct the cost of emissions
obligations when calculating their income for a given taxation year. However, the
total amount deductible is limited to the cost of emissions allowances that are, or
could be, used to satisfy the outstanding emissions obligations. 687
A tax deduction is available for emission obligations but must not exceed the
amount calculated with the following formula: A + B X C. 688 In this equation, “A”
represents the total cost of emissions allowances either used by the participant to
fulfill their compliance obligations, or the total cost of emissions allowances held
by the participant at the end of the year that can be used to meet that year’s
compliance obligations. 689 The value for “B” is calculated by the formula D –
(E+F). 690 In this calculation, “D” is the amount of emissions allowances required
to fulfill the current year’s emission allowances, “E” is the amount of emissions
allowances used by the participant to fulfill the current year’s emission allowances,
and “F” is the amount of emissions allowances that could be used to fulfill the
current year’s compliance obligations that are still held by the participant at the
end of the year. 691 The value for “C” is the fair market value of the emissions
allowances that can be used for the current year’s compliance obligations
remaining in the participant’s possession at the end of the taxation year. 692
If the taxpayer deducts an amount from their income based on an emissions
obligation but does not settle the obligation in the taxation year that immediately
follows, then the taxpayer must include the amount deducted in the previous year
as business income for income tax purposes. 693
Disposal of Emissions Allowances

If a taxpayer uses an emissions allowance to settle an emissions obligation,
there is no income to declare for tax purposes. The proceeds of disposing the
emissions allowance is deemed to be equal to the cost of the emissions allowance
used to settle the obligation, so there is no net gain or loss to declare. 694
If a taxpayer sells an emissions allowance outside of an emissions allowance
regime, then the net proceeds must be included as income for tax purposes. 695 An
emissions allowance must be valued at the lower of its cost and its fair market
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value at the end of that year. After that time, that lower amount is deemed to be
the cost at which the property was acquired by the taxpayer.” 696
4.8 Survey

As part of assembling this Guide, a telephone survey was conducted in JuneAugust 2018 with government, regulators, and market participants as well as other
stakeholders (ombuds, NGOs, consumers, academics and researchers) in an effort
to elicit details about how the WCI cap-and-trade scheme actually functions. The
original plan was to interview thirty to sixty such individuals. Initial contact was
made with sixty-one individuals. Ultimately, four persons agreed on an
anonymous basis to provide detailed answers to a list of questions prepared by
researchers and approved by Western University’s Research Ethic Board (see
4.8.1 below). The number of responses may have been low due to uncertainty
about the scheme following the Ontario provincial election in June 2018 and the
province’s decision to withdraw from the WCI’s cap-and-trade scheme effective
July 3, 2018. The responses below are a synopsis of the answers received.
4.8.1 Survey Questions

INTRODUCTORY DESCRIPTION [to be read at the beginning of each interview]:
This interview is being conducted as part of the First Phase (“Phase 1”) of a
mapping of the legal framework of carbon pricing under the Western Climate
Initiative (WCI). Under a cap-and-trade system, a jurisdiction implementing a capand-trade program issues “emission allowances” to meet jurisdiction-specific
emissions goals. The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) is one scheme promoting
a cap-and-trade system.
Phase 1 of this project is being conducted by assembling material concerning
regulatory design as well as arrangements within the three WCI Partner
jurisdictions relevant to creation and administration of their cap-and-trade
programs. The final work product in Phase 1 is a guide to the legal framework for
the cap-and-trade system of emission permits created and adhered to under the
WCI.
Answers to the questions below will be contained in the drafting of a guide,
to be submitted to the sponsor, the Centre for International Governance Innovation
(CIGI), in November 2018. However, details about how the WCI cap-and-trade
scheme actually works in practice will be elicited through telephone/Skype
interviews conducted with government, regulators and market participants, as well
as other stakeholders (such as ombuds, nongovernmental organizations,
consumers, other academics and researchers) in Ontario, Québec and California,
as well as in the northeastern United States and the European Union.
Questions for Cap-and-Trade Market Participants
A. Identification
1. What entity do you work for?
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2. Why is your entity involved with Western Climate Initiative (WCI)? Does
your entity trade in emission permits under the WCI? In which WCI jurisdictions?
3. Please explain why your entity needs emission permits.
4. When did your entity become associated with WCI? Did it formally
register? In your view, was the registration process relatively straightforward? If
your entity is a voluntary participant, what convinced you to join the scheme?
5. Did your entity use any cap-and-trade consultants or advisors at any point?
For what purposes?
6. How many individuals oversee your accounts (i.e. account representatives
and account viewing agents)? How did you find the process for registering agents?
Have you had to switch agents on accounts? Was this process difficult?
B. Allowances
7. How many emission credits does your entity produce or need each year?
Do you foresee those numbers increasing or decreasing in future?
8. How has emission allowance pricing affected your business decisions? Has
your business reduced emissions to avoid purchasing allowances?
9. Has your organization been involved in the secondary market for
allowances (i.e. buying and selling allowances outside of auctions)?
10. Has your entity received free allowances in any WCI jurisdictions? How
did it obtain these allowances?
C. Auctions
11. Has your entity been directly or indirectly involved in cap-and-trade
auctions? Please explain exactly how.
12. How easily has your entity been able to purchase allowances at WCI
auctions?
13. Did your entity encounter any participation restrictions or limitations in
the auction process?
14. [If Ontario participant:] How did linkage of the Ontario market to the
Québec-California market impact how you approached the auctions?
15. Have differences in compliance periods between the jurisdictions created
any difficulties for your entity?
16. Have you had any issues with the compliance obligations under WCI capand-trade of any subsidiary or parent company that you may have? Have the rules
surrounding corporate disclosure under legislation in your jurisdiction been clear?
D. Offsets
17. Have your entity been engaged in any offset programs to meet your
entity’s compliance obligations? If so, please describe.
18. Do you fully understand the offset program and what options may be
available to your entity in this respect?
19. If offsets were cost-comparable to purchasing allowances at auction,
would you feel comfortable pursuing the offset option?
E. Assessment
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20. In your view, is WCI cap-and-trade i) cost-effective and ii) efficient?
21. Does WCI cap-and-trade allow your entity to function more optimally? If
so, how? If not, please specify.
22. In your view, how could WCI cap-and-trade be improved in the future?
What would you like to see?
23. Is price volatility a concern for your entity going forward?
24. Does your entity have a GHG reduction plan in place? If so, when was this
initiated?
25. Is your entity involved with any other emissions trading scheme? If so,
which ones? Is it contemplating any such involvement in future?
26. Is there anything else you would like to comment on about the WCI’s capand-trade scheme at present?
F. Background Questions that may be used to inform the above questions to
market participants:
1. How is the money raised from the cap-and-trade auctions divided between
the jurisdictions and how is it being spent?
2. What are the legal requirements for spending money raised from cap-andtrade? Is cap-and-trade “revenue-neutral” in your jurisdiction?
3. What are WCI jurisdictions in Canada doing to develop offset credit
programs?
4. How can Canadian companies be prevented from purchasing
disproportionately more Californian offsets than vice-versa?
5. Is there potential for a Canada-wide offset program that would counterbalance California’s offset requirement?
6. In your view, how might the current WCI scheme be enhanced?
Questions for Regulators, Administrators and Civil Society
1. What entity do you work for?
2. Why is your entity involved with Western Climate Initiative (WCI)?
3. How is the money raised from the cap-and-trade auctions divided between
the jurisdictions and how is it being spent?
4. What are the legal requirements for spending money raised from cap-andtrade? Is cap-and-trade “revenue-neutral” in your jurisdiction?
5. What are WCI jurisdictions in Canada doing to develop offset credit
programs?
6. How can Canadian companies be prevented from purchasing
disproportionately more Californian offsets than vice-versa?
7. Is there potential for a Canada-wide offset program that would counterbalance California’s offset requirement?
8. In your view, how might the current WCI scheme be enhanced?
Background Questions that may be used to inform the above questions to
Regulators, Administrators and Civil Society:
A. Identification
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1. Please explain why an entity might need emission permits.
2. When did your entity become associated with WCI? Did it formally
register? In your view, was the registration process relatively straightforward?
Why should entities voluntarily participate in WCI cap-and-trade?
3. Did your entity use any cap-and-trade consultants or advisors at any point?
For what purposes?
4. Are you familiar with the process for registering account viewing agents?
In your view, is this process difficult?
B. Allowances
5. How many emission credits does an entity produce or need each year? Do
you foresee those numbers increasing or decreasing in future?
6. How has emission allowance pricing affected business decisions? Has
business reduced emissions to avoid purchasing allowances?
7. Are you aware of any secondary market for allowances (i.e. buying and
selling allowances outside of auctions)?
8. What about the receipt of free allowances in any WCI jurisdictions? In your
view, have these free allowances distorted the market?
C. Auctions
9. Has your entity been directly or indirectly involved in cap-and-trade
auctions? Please explain exactly how.
10. How easily is it to purchase allowances at WCI auctions?
11. [If Ontario regulator or administrator] In your view, how did linkage of
the Ontario market to the Québec-California market impact how you approached
the auctions?
13. Have differences in compliance periods between the jurisdictions created
any difficulties in your view?
14. Have you noted any issues with the compliance obligations under WCI
cap-and-trade of subsidiaries? In your view, have the rules surrounding corporate
disclosure under legislation in your jurisdiction been clear?
D. Offsets
15. Have you been engaged in any offset programs to meet your compliance
obligations? If so, please describe.
16. Do you fully understand the offset program and what options may be
available to entities in this respect?
17. If offsets were cost-comparable to purchasing allowances at auction,
would you feel comfortable pursuing the offset option?
E. Assessment
18. In your view, is WCI cap-and-trade i) cost-effective and ii) efficient? How
would you assess WCI cap-and-trade versus other similar emission trading
schemes elsewhere?
19. Does WCI cap-and-trade allow your entity to function more optimally? If
so, how? If not, please specify.
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20. In your view, how could WCI cap-and-trade be improved in future? What
would you like to see?
21. Is price volatility of emission credits a concern going forward?
22. Is there anything else you would like to comment on about the WCI’s capand-trade scheme at present?
4.8.2 Summary of Survey Responses

Introduction
What entities do you work for?
Survey participants work for a variety of government funding organizations,
cap-and-trade market experts, cap-and-trade participant entities, and cap-and-trade
offset project developers.
Why is your entity involved with the WCI?
Participants include offset project developers working in the various WCI
jurisdictions as well as cap-and-trade jurisdictions outside the WCI, funding
organizations that invest in clean technology projects, and advisors in the cap-andtrade market. One participant was a mandatory participant in the WCI cap-andtrade program. The nature of their work is intimately connected to ETS programs
in North America and elsewhere.
Why do entities need emission permits?
Most survey participants indicated that they did not need emissions permits
since they are not emitters per se. However, their clients are emitters and so require
emission permits to cover GHG emissions. One survey participant required
emission permits to comply with Ontario Regulation 144/16.
Was the registration process for the WCI relatively straightforward?
Most survey participants indicated that they registered as market participants
under the WCI CITSS (Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service). There
was a difference of opinion expressed about whether the CITSS registration
process was straightforward, but all participants agreed that it is burdensome. The
many necessary steps and requirements to register – especially those related to the
registration of complex corporate structures – means that CITSS registration
becomes quite difficult for companies with many subsidiaries. One particular
difficulty some participants have experienced is the requirement to get proof of
identity from a bank or financial institution. The sense expressed by participants
was that a bank is not an appropriate authority from which to get this proof and
many banks did not understand what was required of them.
When are cap-and-trade consultants or advisors used?
Two participants indicated that they are cap-and-trade consultants or advisors
themselves and therefore did not use external consultants or advisors. However,
one participant indicated that they have internal audit requirements to consult with
third parties for verification of their clean technology projects. Verification takes
place to ensure the GHG reductions are related to the project under review.
Further, market consultants are used to engage in discussions to identify changes
in the market and their client needs in order to meet individual corporate
compliance and GHG reduction goals. One participant used advisors to assist in
tracking their risk position, monitoring the market, trading in secondary markets,
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preparing bids, and informing their clients of new developments in the program
and the USD/CAD exchange rate.
Do you use agents to oversee their accounts?
Most WCI cap-and-trade market participants use agents to register and
purchase and sell allowances. While the process to register agents is clear,
participants said they generally found the registration process to be burdensome.
One participant has one primary account representative, and several alternate
account representatives and account viewing agents.
Allowances
Do you anticipate your entity’s needs and/or production of surplus emission
credits will increase or decrease in the future?
Two survey respondents said their largest participants anticipated the volumes
of emission credits they dealt with would increase year-to-year. However, one
participant was less sure. While participants in this category anticipate that
volumes will increase, much would depend on what happens to Ontario’s cap-andtrade program and whether they are able to obtain new clients given the recent
changes in Ontario’s cap-and-trade program.
How has emission allowance pricing affected your business decisions?
While emission allowance pricing does not directly affect our small sample of
survey participants, changes in allowance pricing directly impacts their clients.
Speaking for their clients, market experts and project developers said emission
allowance pricing creates a real and tangible incentive for participants to reduce
their carbon emissions outside the cap-and-trade market. Emission allowance
pricing directly impacts the commercial attractiveness of undertaking emissions
reduction actions. Allowance pricing also reduces the return on investments made
with capital funds. When returns on investments are low, participants may be less
likely to undertake further clean technology investments. Allowance pricing
directly affects auction prices and the amount of funding the government dedicates
to clean technology projects. Industrial emitters have begun to consider emission
allowances as having a direct financial value which has lead companies to include
not only environmental managers but also energy managers and financial
departments in decisions related to emission allowances and their acquisition.
Many larger companies are investing in energy saving projects to compensate for
the price on carbon emissions. In reducing their own carbon emissions, companies
are able to sell surplus allowances, which functions as an additional incentive to
reduce their carbon emissions.
Has your organization been involved in the secondary market for allowances?
One survey participant has been involved in the secondary market for
allowances, while an additional participant has been involved in the secondary
markets for offsets.
Has your entity received free allowances in any WCI jurisdictions?
Three survey participants have not received free allowances since they are not
emitters. Two of those participants support their clients in advocating for free
allowances and in conforming with government guidelines. One participant has
received free allowances.

A Guide to Emissions Trading under the WCI

271

Auctions
Has your entity been directly or indirectly involved in cap-and-trade
auctions?
Two survey participants have been indirectly involved in cap-and-trade
auctions either in a confidential advisory role or in assisting their clients with the
initial set-up to participate in auctions. These survey participants are registered as
participants in cap-and-trade auctions. However, they do not actively participate.
Instead, they closely monitor the auctions and advise their clients on developing
bidding strategies, registering for auctions and participation in auctions.
How easy is it to purchase allowances at WCI auctions?
Two survey participants feel that purchasing allowances at WCI auctions is
generally straightforward. However, there is a learning curve to understanding the
overall auction process and how it works. Becoming a qualified bidder can be a
bureaucratic process but, once registered, it is a clear process. It is important to
note that many participants in Ontario’s trial with WCI cap-and-trade were
provided with free allowances. For this reason, they were not required to purchase
allowances through auctions. These participants generally only participate in
secondary markets and auctions for futures. One of the main criticisms of the WCI
auctions is that too many entities were given EIGE (Emissions Intensive Trade
Exposed Sector) status. These participants did not need to purchase allowances at
auction, meaning that many allowances sold at auction were sold at a profit.
Did your entity encounter any participation restrictions or limitations in the
auction process?
None of the survey participates or their clients experienced restrictions or
limitations in the auction process. The one issue that did arise was the result of
Ontario selling vintage allowances with an incorrect year. Specifically, Ontario
had an initial compliance period of four years while the compliance period in
California and Québec is three years. When Ontario created their auction
documents they accidentally stated that their future vintage would be for 2020,
only a three-year compliance period. Therefore, Ontario future vintages were
incorrectly sold at auction for the year 2020. This mistake skewed the auction
because many participants in the auction did not understand that an error had
occurred.
How did linkage of the Ontario market to the California-Québec market
impact how your entity approached the auctions?
The larger the cap-and-trade market is, the more concentrated the demand is
for allowances. This is an important consideration in developing a bidding strategy
for auctions. The linkage effected between Ontario and California-Québec in
2017, and activated in 2018, increased the volume of allowances in auctions but
also increased the number of sophisticated participants in auctions as well. The
linkage meant that knowledge about cap-and-trade was diffused and there was
greater understanding of the auctions and auction process among participants.
Some survey participants stated that linkage could have had a significant
impact on how entities approached auctions due to the lack of an established offset
protocol system in Ontario. Specifically, this shortcoming left open the possibility
for participants to buy offsets in California and Québec to meet their compliance
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obligations and fulfill their eight percent offset maximum. Since offsets sold for
approximately CAD $2 less per tonne than allowances, a participant’s compliance
obligations could be met with a lower cost to the participant. However, it is
unknown whether any participants actually took advantage of this option.
Have differences in compliance periods between jurisdictions created any
difficulties for your entity?
Survey participants indicated that the only issue that seems to have arisen with
respect to compliance periods was the first Ontario auction where vintage
allowances where incorrectly sold with a three-year compliance period instead of
Ontario’s four-year compliance periods.
Have you had any issues with the compliance obligations under WCI cap-andtrade of any subsidiary or parent company? Have the rules of corporate disclosure
under legislation in your jurisdiction been clear?
None of the survey participants experienced any issues with compliance
obligations of a subsidiary or parent company. Neither did they experience any
issues with the rules of corporate disclosure under the WCI cap-and-trade scheme.
As a result, survey participants were of the opinion that the rules of corporate
disclosure were clear, but at the same time very bureaucratic. For example, there
is already significant paperwork to complete for CITSS registration. However,
when linkage occurred between California, Québec and Ontario, every participant
was required to adjust their CITSS account to reflect the linkage.
Offsets
Has your entity been engaged in any offset programs to meet your entity’s
compliance obligations?
None of the survey participants had compliance obligations requiring the use
of offsets. However, all survey participants are heavily involved in offset programs
through work with project sponsors, offset discussions, or stakeholder
development. This involvement includes assessing client’s potential opportunity
to engage in offset programs, the development of offsets, the approval of offsets,
and the monetization of offsets in the cap-and-trade program.
One issue with offsets that many of survey participants mentioned was the fact
that the Ontario government did not develop its offset protocols in a timely
manner. This delay meant that the only offsets available for purchase were those
from California or Québec. In two years of operation, the government of Ontario
only finalized three offset protocols (landfill gas, mine methane capture (MMC),
and ozone depleting substances (ODS)), and there was a long list of offsets that
had yet to be reviewed. Generally speaking, in the case of Ontario, entities were
not aware that if they kept accurate records of their emissions as the WCI cap-andtrade program evolved, they could have been eligible for offsets in future. This is
because as offset protocols were finalized by the government of Ontario, new
offset protocols could be retroactively applied through careful record keeping.
Some survey participants also indicated that GHG-intensity was not factored
in to the offset review and approval process in Ontario, meaning that the immediate
benefits for climate change were delayed or lost. For example, in Ontario there
was a protocol in review that provided offsets to corporations that capture and
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destroy leaked refrigerant gases. These gases have substantial GHG potential.
However, the offset would not be provided to a corporation that captured and
recycled refrigerant gases. The recycling, as opposed to the destruction, of
refrigerant gases would be significantly better for the environment. However, the
recycling of refrigerant gases was not included in the proposed offset protocol.
Therefore, a new protocol would have to be proposed for the recycling of
refrigerant gases, which would then be placed at the end of the list of offsets to
review.
Do you fully understand the offset program and what options may be available
to your entity in this respect?
All survey participants considered themselves well versed in the offset
program and what options are (or were) available since many are offset experts.
However, one of the survey participants felt that most industrial participants did
not have a good understanding of offsets and identified a misunderstanding among
many participants with respect to the difference between offsets and allowances.
A further common misunderstanding in the view of survey participants was about
who owns and develops offsets.
If offsets were cost-comparable to purchasing allowances at auction, would
you feel comfortable pursuing the offset option?
All survey participants agreed that offsets were only a viable option if they
could be generated at a discount to allowances. Offsets inherently hold more risk
associated with delivery or the lack of delivery of GHG emissions, which is why
offsets are typically sold at a discount. In the view of survey participants, the risk
with offsets is greater in California than in Québec and Ontario and this difference
is due to how offsets are treated in each jurisdiction. In California there is an
invalidation risk, where offsets can be removed from a CITSS account even after
the participant has purchased them. In Québec and Ontario, an insurance account
protects against potential invalidation. Therefore, the difference between
allowances and offsets is not just due to cost but also involves the inherent
associated regulatory risks. One participant stated that “golden offsets” (i.e. offsets
with no invalidation risks) would be a good option regardless of the additional cost
required to purchase them.
Assessment
In your view, is WCI cap-and-trade i) cost-effective and ii) efficient?
All survey participants agreed that the WCI cap-and-trade system is costeffective and efficient. All survey participants expressed the view that a cap-andtrade system is significantly better than a carbon tax because, notwithstanding
popular perceptions to the contrary, there is a certain level of complexity that
would be required in order to ensure a carbon tax is fair and not destructive to
industry sectors. The complexity required by a carbon tax would approach the
complexity of a cap-and-trade system. It is also important to note that cap-andtrade programs were created in the infancy of carbon-pricing. They are by no
means perfect programs. Cap-and-trade programs are being created by
jurisdictions that are leaders in environmental protection and inevitably there is a
learning curve for everyone involved. However, in the long-run, having a cap-and-
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trade program and having worked out all the preliminary issues will serve as a
huge advantage as the world shifts its focus to carbon-pricing in the struggle
against climate change.
Does WCI cap-and-trade allow your entity to function more optimally?
Three survey participants agreed that WCI cap-and-trade allows entities to
function more optimally. Specifically, WCI cap-and-trade acts as a revenue
engine, generating income for clean technology programs. In most instances
private entities only have a finite amount of capital to invest in clean technology
projects to reduce their carbon emissions. Therefore, the funding they receive from
the cap-and-trade program allows them to continue to reinvest in clean technology
when they might not have the capital to do so otherwise. The WCI cap-and-trade
program reduces the cost of compliance and offsets and can create commercial
opportunities for corporations through the revenue it generates. One participant
stated that the cap-and-trade program does not allow their entity to function more
optimally because they are now required to dedicate many additional resources to
the administration of the cap-and-trade program in their entity. However, this same
participant stated that the cap-and-trade program has promoted long-term thinking
and an emphasis on efficiency in their entity.
How could WCI cap-and-trade be improved in the future?
Survey participants identified several changes they would like to see to
improve the WCI cap-and-trade program. First, participants agreed that there
needs to be more membership involved in cap-and-trade programs like the WCI
and for the programs to be less dependent on politics of the partner jurisdictions.
Second, they would like to see sufficient offsets to supply the market. Third,
participants would like to see greater transferability of offsets among the WCI
jurisdictions. Specifically, they would like California to change its invalidation
approach to offsets and adopt an insurance approach similar to that used in Québec
and Ontario. They believe that the risk in offsets should be on the project sponsor,
as in an insurance system, and not on the buyer of the offsets, as in an invalidation
system. Fourth, participants would like the limitations on the percentage of offsets
that can be used to be removed and offset usage to not be arbitrarily restricted.
Fifth, participants would like to see more education about the cap-and-trade
program for organizations, within politics, and in schools. Overall there is the
general consensus that “the longer the system is around, the better it will function”
– A Participant.
Is price volatility a concern for your entity going forward?
Three survey participants indicated that price volatility is always a potential
concern. However, this has generated price stability in the current market. There
has not been much price volatility in the WCI market but there is a concern that
Ontario’s departure from the WCI and the uncertainty with regards to the post2020 WCI may create more price volatility in the future. Survey participants
indicated concern that if prices were to increase significantly over a short period,
there is a chance that some entities might not be able to absorb the carbon price
and the failure to absorb could promote carbon leakage.
Does your entity have a GHG reduction plan in place?
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Three survey participants indicated that they have a GHG reduction plan in
place. Two of these participants, as advisors and funding organizations, have GHG
reduction plans that involve assisting other entities in reducing their GHG
emissions, or meeting certain funding targets in certain markets or for certain
projects. However, the view was expressed that WCI cap-and-trade itself had
motivated corporations to conduct internal reviews of their GHG emissions and to
create internal plans to reduce GHG emissions.
Is your entity involved with any other emissions trading scheme?
Survey participants are involved in, or are working on becoming involved in,
various other emissions trading schemes. This includes provincial and state
schemes across Canada and the U.S., the EU ETS, China’s ETS, and Mexico’s
ETS.
Is there anything else you would like to comment on about the WCI’s cap-andtrade scheme at present?
Participants commented on the uniqueness and importance of linkage between
markets in the WCI and the power of those linkages. These linkages create a liquid
market which allows for a significant reduction in the compliance cost per tonne
of GHG emissions. This is an incentive for more jurisdictions to link to the WCI
scheme, something which would also help in standardizing the WCI scheme and
reduce leakage. One participant mentioned the significant support of industrial
participants for the cap-and-trade program. While large emitters seem to have a
good understanding of the cap-and-trade program, there remains significant
confusion in how a cap-and-trade is different from a carbon tax. One criticism is
that there could have been better education to the participants and the public about
what a cap-and-trade program is and what it consists of.
The WCI cap-and-trade program provides a level of certainty for industry
participants. Through it, participants are able to identify what they are facing in
the world of GHG emissions and carbon pricing, while also creating plans about
how to work with these. Without this certainty, survey participants voiced concern
that new investments will choose other more secure jurisdictions to grow their
business and stop or hinder their investments in jurisdictions of uncertainty.
“The WCI is a model for the rest of the world in terms of how you link systems
and should serve to help other jurisdictions make commitments and create linkages
between cap-and-trade systems.” – A Participant.
Background Questions that may be used to inform the above questions to
market participants:
How can Canadian companies be prevented from purchasing
disproportionately more Californian offsets than vice-versa?
Survey participants agreed that disproportionate purchases of offsets from
outside the jurisdiction was not an issue in Ontario’s cap-and-trade program. In
their view, this abuse was a misconception and a fear among many people that had
so far proven to be false. In Ontario there was a limit of 8% use of offsets to meet
compliance obligations, which raised the question of how much of an impact
would there really be if disproportionately more offsets were bought in one
jurisdiction when compared to another. In addition, the potential flow of money

276

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43, 2019]

from one jurisdiction to another is a risk that must be accepted when deciding to
link with other jurisdictions. Money could flow either way so the real concern
should be ensuring that caps and reduction levels are similar across linked
jurisdictions and are appropriate for the industries in each jurisdiction. Regulatory
parity will ensure additional support for local development and local industries
and result in direct emissions reductions in each jurisdiction. Another way to
prevent money outflows would be to have a very robust market where market
prices closely track the value of allowances and offsets in a market. Such a market
would assist in achieving emissions reductions locally by investing cap-and-trade
revenue in local clean technology projects.
Is there potential for a Canada-wide offset program that would counterbalance California’s offset requirement?
One survey participant asserted that there is a necessity for a federal offset
program in Canada where offsets are approved by the federal government. This
federal offset program would help provinces in developing their own carbon
pricing system and specifically, the offset component of the system. There is a
concern that if a federal offset program is created, a provincial program would be
required in all provinces to protect against double accounting. Other survey
participants asserted that one issue that needs attention is actually ensuring that
Ontario has sufficient offset protocols in place so that if a federal program is
introduced, Ontario’s experience might serve as a ‘toolkit’ or template for
regulatory design.
How might the current WCI scheme be enhanced?
There was a general consensus among survey participants that the WCI capand-trade program is valuable and has built off of the concerns and issues raised
in other countries’ cap-and-trade programs. However, there is always room for
improvement. One area of improvement would be to increase the amount of
linkages with other jurisdictions. This could include cross-border linkages
between Canada and the U.S. but also linkages between Canadian provinces and
between U.S. states. In addition, increasing the membership of the WCI will assist
in achieving the lowest possible market pricing as well as preventing leakage.
Another way to enhance the WCI scheme would be to ensure continuity of the
program and long-term certainty. A ‘2030 framework’, as adopted by California,
provides more certainty than the current 3-year compliance period framework. In
addition, a better understanding of the California offset market and modifying the
California offset market to make it more fungible with the Québec offset market
would assist in creating more certainty in the WCI cap-and-trade scheme.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
The chapters of this Guide reveal divergent motivations and regulatory
environments underlying the introduction of cap-and-trade schemes within
jurisdictions pursuant to WCI. The general experience with it has been mixed,
although a very limited survey of market participants suggests that carbon markets
are working well and that cap-and-trade scheme in California and Québec are
robust and entrenched. Viable emissions trading continues and linkage must be
acknowledged to be a success.
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Nevertheless, recent experience reveals that cap-and-trade raises sensitive
political and legal questions. As Leah Stokes and others have pointed out,
renewable energy policies must remain politically viable over long periods given
the scale of transformation necessary to address climate change. 697 That political
support is not always sustainable or forthcoming.
What are our conclusions? They are different for different actors.
For Federal Governments
For federal governments in North America, the experience of linkage under
WCI emphasizes how, given the constitutional division of powers, subnational
actors will continue to be important agents in policy concerning climate change.
Federal, state, and provincial governments may not necessarily see eye-to-eye on
environmental policy but will have to continue to work at harmonization.
Harmonization may be achieved through alignment of federal and subnational
standards, but it may also be achieved through mechanisms of cooperative
federalism in both the U.S. and Canada. Federal governments also have significant
power to encourage and shape such cooperation.
For States and Provinces
With respect to the subnational role of states and provinces, the two-step
approach to harmonization undertaken pursuant to WCI – of separate program
design and linkage phases – has been useful in allowing jurisdictions to
accommodate certain necessary political realities (competitiveness, attracting
investment, leakage etc.) in the program design phase while moving in the
direction of deeper harmonization and integration in the linkage phase. That one
jurisdiction has decided to withdraw illustrates that withdrawal is still possible but
is ultimately a political question. Partner jurisdictions retain sovereignty under
WCI.
It is also clear to us that the linkage of cap-and-trade programs pursuant to
WCI does not involve “plug-and-play”, that is, a simple transposition of existing
regulation into WCI acceding jurisdictions. The research conducted here reveals
that the initial introduction of cap-and-trade programming in a jurisdiction requires
indigenous commitment and an authentic investment of administrative resources
as well as difficult political choices. This is undertaken in the belief that doing
something about climate change is worthwhile. Linkage is also a demanding
process. It requires a shift in policy thinking and an assurance of ongoing dialogue
with cap-and-trade partners. California, Québec, and Ontario implemented their
programming relatively quickly and seamlessly and were able to link. This is in
part because each worked from a common template provided by the WCI 2008
Recommendations and the 2010 Program Design document. Another factor in
their favor was the high degree of competence and trust among staff in all three
jurisdictions. The same cannot be presumed of all jurisdictions that might be
interested in participating in such a scheme in future.
In connection with the previous observation, we note that the experience of
harmonization and linkage pursuant to WCI is not static but dynamic and adaptive.
697
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In other words, jurisdictions do not link and then simply return to thinking about
regulation of cap-and-trade in the narrow, parochial way they might have done
beforehand. Jurisdictions need to be constantly aware of program requirements in
their own domains and elsewhere. They participate and have input into the design
of their own programming and that of others. Experience with offset design
provides an illustrative example. In other words, linkage requires an expanded
horizon.
Another – and remarkable – observation with respect to the subnational role
of states and provinces is that virtually all of the above developments have taken
place with very little in the way of an overarching supervisory machinery, apart
perhaps from the commitment to meet or communicate regularly and share
information. The motivation for the ‘undertaking’ is, in a broad sense, an abstract
one. There is a degree of idealism about the WCI scheme which sits in tension
with the realism of unfolding events, including varying perceptions of mitigation
and adaptation costs and who will bear them.
For Producers, Regulators, Exchanges and the Public Interest
With respect to producers, regulators, exchanges and the public interest, our
research reveals that a market for emissions trading between subnational
jurisdictions in two separate countries is possible and can work – and according to
the evidence, works very well. Emissions trading pursuant to WCI is successful.
While the presence (or absence) of a jurisdiction is relevant to the market’s
efficiency and liquidity, too much should not be made of a single jurisdiction’s
withdrawal. The market for emission allowances pursuant to WCI continues to
operate successfully, largely, it appears, due to a common design framework,
cooperation, efficient markets and similar legal, administrative and professional
traditions.
At the same time, although large in absolute economic terms, the market
created by linkage pursuant to WCI is relatively small. Our research reveals that
less than 1000 entities across North America are actively involved. The very
limited size of our sample of responses (four individuals) suggests that the market
is dominated by a few key players (usually agents acting for and advising
participants). This result infers that regulators need to exercise high vigilance to
ensure market integrity. Opportunities for market manipulation and conflict of
interest could easily present themselves, a point already made by the California
Legislature in its 2017 directions to CARB on regulatory design. A further
opportunity to confirm – or deny – these preliminary findings by conducting a
wider survey of participants would be useful. We surmise that events during the
course of our study may have depressed sample size.
Emissions trading market participants generally spoke favorably of the trading
system introduced pursuant to WCI and extended through linkage. However,
involvement requires sophistication, something not all participants (or potential
participants) may have. Market sophistication limits participation to those with the
resources to specialize.
The need for market integrity under WCI is obviously linked to cap-andtrade’s political sustainability. To the extent that the market now functions
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effectively, allowing for emissions reductions by the most efficient emitter, then
market behavior is to be encouraged. At the same time, since the emissions cap is
lowered annually, the option of banking allowances gives participants an incentive
to obtain extra allowances in the present for use prospectively because purchases
serve as a hedge against higher prices going forward. A by-product of early
acquisition of allowances is that a jurisdiction may be unable to meet its emissions
targets down the road. In Ontario’s case, for example, participants’ acquisition of
some C$2.8 billion worth of emission credits issued by the province during a time
of free allowance distribution infers that participants were not unaware of this
option.
These developments suggest to us that there is a need for careful surveillance
of emissions markets by regulators, for enforcement action in appropriate
instances, as well as the need for reinforcement through enhanced ethical standards
– such as proposed Code of Conduct for WCI Market Participants. The Code could
set out ethical standards, define prohibited trading practices, required information
disclosure and documentation, training and monitoring and investigation. Similar
standards are already being implemented by some energy traders and suppliers. 698
Final Considerations
The lessons of WCI experience for other jurisdictions are varied. As
mentioned, an international emissions trading scheme at the subnational level can
work well if a common design platform is adopted, if parties are prepared to work
together closely, and if common values help achieve linkage and operational
interchange over time. But neutral standards are also required for the sustainability
necessary to achieve long-term climate goals.
It is also true that WCI cap-and-trade does not regulate or eliminate all GHG
emissions in WCI jurisdictions. Coverage stands at about eighty-five percent in
the two continuing jurisdictions of California and Québec. As has been pointed
out elsewhere, there remain other major sources of carbon emissions (vehicles,
buildings etc.) and these are harder to get at than the 830 or so major emitters
currently covered by WCI (approximately 700 in California, 130 in Québec). For
all of the optimism about ‘decarbonizing’ the North American economy, much
still needs to be done to successfully deal with climate change by addressing GHG
from other sources.
These considerations lead us to conclude that the vital thread running through
carbon markets – and true all of all markets - is trust and fairness. There must be
trust and fairness if carbon markets are to continue to function as intended. That
can only be instilled if ethical standards are adhered to, if greater efforts are made
at transparency, and the public can be made to see tangible evidence of fair and
efficient markets contributing to climate change goals. These concerns are not
new. They simply assume greater prominence at a time when the phenomenon of
functioning carbon markets is a present reality.
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See, for example, Powerex Corp. Trading Code of Conduct (Oct. 31, 2017). Powerex
Corp. is a wholly owned energy marketing subsidiary of BC Hydro. Powerex buys and sells
wholesale electricity, natural gas and environmental energy products and services in Western
North America.

